THE DISSOLUTION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN JEWRY

Before the Second World War, Eastern Europe was the demographic center of World Jewry. After the war, however, only a fraction of it was left behind. What happened? The “Holocaust,” of course, most will say.

The author of this book did not stop there, though, but thoroughly explored European population developments and shifts mainly caused by emigration as well as deportations and evacuations conducted by both Nazis and the Soviets, among other things. The book is based mainly on Jewish, Zionist and mainstream sources. It concludes that a sizeable share of the Jews found missing during local censuses after the Second World War, which have so far been counted as “Holocaust victims,” had either emigrated (mainly to Israel or the U.S.) or had been deported by Stalin to Siberian labor camps.

This is the slightly corrected second edition with an updated foreword by Prof. A.R. Butz and an important epilogue by Germar Rudolf. It compares Sanning’s study with a mainstream investigation into the numerical dimension of the Holocaust which appeared eight years after Sanning’s first edition and was designed to refute it. Both studies come to similar results of Jewish population losses in all European countries once ruled by the Nazis, except for two: Poland and the Soviet Union. These two countries harbored the vast majority of the world’s Jews prior to the war. While Sanning dedicated the majority of his book to a thorough study of both countries’ demographic developments, the mainstream book meant to refute him remains notably silent on those subjects. Also, while Sanning investigates worldwide Jewish migration patterns prior to, during and after the war, his detractors ignore the topic and simply assume that every Jew missing in Europe today was killed by the Nazis – as if there had never been Jewish emigration from Europe during and after the war.
The

Dissolution

of Eastern European Jewry

By Walter N. Sanning
HOLOCAUST HANDBOOKS, vol. 29:
Walter N. Sanning: The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry
2nd, corrected edition
Translation by Thomas Francis
With a foreword by Dr. Arthur R. Butz and an epilogue by Germar Rudolf
Uckfield, East Sussex: CASTLE HILL PUBLISHERS
PO Box 243, Uckfield, TN22 9AW, UK
February 2015

ISSN 1529-7748

Published by CASTLE HILL PUBLISHERS
Manufactured in the United States of America and in the UK

© 2015 by Castle Hill Publishers

Distribution: Castle Hill Publishers
PO Box 243
Uckfield, TN22 9AW, UK

Distribution USA: TBR Books
The Barnes Review
P.O. Box 15877
Washington, D.C. 20003, USA
1-877-773-9077

Set in Times New Roman

Cover Illustration: Eastern European Jewry, symbolized by the Star of David and the Menorah, dissolves between the combined onslaught of National Socialism from the West and Soviet Communism from the East.
Table of Contents

Page

Foreword .................................................................................................. 9
Addendum for the 2015 edition ............................................................... 11
Introduction ............................................................................................ 13

PART I ....................................................................................................... 17

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN JEWS ........................... 17

FIRST CHAPTER: Eastern Jewry ......................................................... 19
  The Demographic Structure of Polish Jews ......................................... 20
  Jews in Other Eastern European Countries ......................................... 32

SECOND CHAPTER: The Growth of Soviet Jewry ............................. 37
  The Division of Polish Jewry ................................................................. 37
  Jewish Newcomers to the Soviet Empire ............................................. 44
  Jewish Population Trends in the Soviet Union .................................... 46

THIRD CHAPTER: Scorched Earth ...................................................... 53
  Soviet Military Build-up .................................................................... 53
  Soviet Policy of Destruction ................................................................. 58
  Soviet Mass Deportations ................................................................... 64
  Vacated Cities ...................................................................................... 74
  Depopulated Ukraine ......................................................................... 83

FOURTH CHAPTER: The Jewish Fate in the Soviet Union: 1941-1945 ......................................................................................... 89
  Soviet Jews in the German Sphere of Influence ................................ 89
  The Evacuation of Wolhynia ................................................................. 93
  Some Remained Behind ..................................................................... 99
  Death in Siberia .................................................................................. 103

FIFTH CHAPTER: The Jews in the Post-War Soviet Union ............... 107
  The Survivors .................................................................................... 107
  Revised Estimates .............................................................................. 113
  The Jewish Cost of Lives and Overall Soviet Losses ........................ 121

PART II.................................................................................................... 125

THE WESTWARD DRIVE .................................................................... 125

SIXTH CHAPTER: The Jewish Fate in German-Occupied Europe .... 127
  France, Benelux Countries, Denmark, Norway and Italy .................... 127
  Greece and Yugoslavia ................................................................. 131
  Germany and Austria ......................................................................... 132
  Hungary ............................................................................................ 135
  Czechoslovakia .................................................................................. 141
  Rumania ........................................................................................... 144
“[…] it is questionable whether one should accept improbable figures supplied by a not overly friendly source.”

— American Jewish Year Book, 1972, Vol. 73, p. 536,
on the Soviet Union being engaged in making Soviet Jews disappear statistically
Foreword

It is an understatement to say that the study of 20th century Jewish population changes presents us with irresolvable problems, but there is much that can be reliably observed. The principal background developments were the rise of Zionism as a significant international political force and the rise of anti-Jewish movements in Europe, notably in Germany. Implicit in both developments were policies, however differently motivated, that would have relocated European Jews in great numbers. Indeed this common objective was the basis for a not negligible amount of cooperation between Zionist and German authorities in the 1933-1939 period.

Other background developments were the adoption of pro-Jewish policies by the USA and the USSR, the latter maintaining those policies through 1948 (the year of Israel’s establishment). These victors in World War II continued, also from various motivations, processes of relocating Jews that had been carried on by Germany, while Germany in turn had not been the first in the field, as large relocations of Jews had been carried out earlier under Zionist and Soviet auspices.

As these massive movements subsided to trickles in the postwar period, the broad outlines of what had happened were clear. Jewish communities had drastically shrunk or even virtually disappeared in much of central and eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Correspondingly, there had been great transfers of Jews to Palestine, the USA and other countries, employing means provided by Jewish organizations or by the U.S.-controlled UNRRA, whose Directors had been New York Zionists Herbert Lehman and Fiorello LaGuardia. There had also been a large dispersion of Jews, especially Polish Jews, into the Soviet Union. Thus the excellent title of this book.

While such broad outlines were clear, many details remain obscure, shrouded or inaccessible. Particularly troublesome are quantitative aspects. We do not know how many were absorbed into the Soviet Union, how many emigrated to the USA or other specific countries, or how many remained or resumed living in central or eastern Europe, and the not insignificant number of those who perished has not been firmly reckoned. On the last matter, only propagandists and uninformed people come forward with a purportedly accurate number.

Reasons for this ignorance are not difficult to give. The movements of Jews through the UNRRA camps were camouflaged as much as was possible under the circumstances, for the excellent reasons, among others, that the
subsequent movements to Palestine were illegal and in any case UNRRA was supposed to be for “United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation” in a war ravaged continent, not for conquest of non-European territory by indigenous European populations.

Useful data on postwar migration and resettlement is difficult to impossible to obtain. Since 1943 the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has made no attempt to count immigrant Jews as such, and Soviet-dominated eastern Europe does not welcome foreign or scholarly curiosity on politically sensitive matters.

Census data is not of much help. In the USA, which is today the leading center of Jewish population, “Jews” are not a category for census purposes, and indeed Jews do not like being counted. The ongoing controversy in Britain on this point is a current illustration of this aversion. The Soviet census attempts to count Jews, but the procedure of the census takers is to accept the word of individuals on this question. When to that observation is added the aforementioned Jewish aversion (operating in a state-encouraged climate of anti-Zionism) and the usual skepticism appropriate to evaluating Soviet claims, the Soviet census figures are seen to be of little value. Jewish spokesmen in the West claim that the Soviet figures are unrealistically low.

To these considerations should be added the difficulty of producing an operationally useful definition of a “Jew.” This is an especially grave problem in western liberal democracies, on account of the large extent of intermarriage and the larger extent of religious apostasy.

This book jumps squarely into the uninviting waters of 20th century Jewish demography and migration and attempts to reconstruct these Jewish population changes, especially in their quantitative aspects. One immediate consequence of this choice of subject is that the person looking for light reading is advised to look elsewhere; this book is difficult to read even for somebody who is accustomed, as I am, to reading texts with high quantitative components. Another consequence is that the reader looking for final and definitive answers to “how many?” type questions, as distinct from at best provisional estimates, will be disappointed. There is scarcely an estimate arrived at in this book that cannot be challenged on some plausible grounds.

Such limitations of this book are not the author’s fault. There is no way his subject can be served adequately with easily readable text, and there is no way to determine the more important numbers involved with the accuracy and reliability of, say, a total population census in a contemporary western country. The author is well aware of such constraints and limitations, and

1 *Jewish Chronicle*, 28 Dec 79, p. 5; 7 Mar 80, p. 9; 11 Feb 83, p. 4; *Patterns of Prejudice*, Jan 80, pp. 24+.
specifically cautions the reader that one vitally important estimate “has no claim on absolute certainty.” If I were to select only one respect in which I wish the author had done something differently, it would be that I wish he had been more emphatic on the rather tentative nature of most of the quantitative conclusions reached here.

Such negative features of this book having been conceded at the outset, what are the positive features that excited my admiration for this work when it was in manuscript, and caused me to strongly urge its publication?

This book is the first full-length serious study of World-War-II-related Jewish population changes. Its esoteric air is perhaps, on the perceptual level, the perfect antidote to the vulgar idiocies that are today monotonously peddled by the media, for whom recent Jewish population changes are also of major interest, although such dry terminology is rarely employed by them.

This book presents the fundamentally correct account of the subject. While the basic structure of that account is not original with this book, the scope and depth of the study are great enough that I daresay that, barring the miraculous release of hitherto confidential data – especially by Zionist and Soviet controlled sources – the treatment has been carried here about as far as it can be.

While the complexity of the subject may disturb some, it is important to learn, as we do from this book better than from any other, why this complexity exists. While many of the numerical estimates are not conclusive, it is important to learn, as we do from this study better than from any other by examining its sources, that such estimates can be made by conscientious deduction from widely accepted, accurately cited and, on very important points, mostly Jewish literature.

The result is that the simplistic legends that have petrified postwar thought on the Jewish aspect of World War II are dealt another of the many blows they have received in recent years.

Arthur R. Butz
Evanston, Illinois
February 1983

Addendum for the 2015 edition

In 1983 I wrote, “these massive movements subsided to trickles in the postwar period,” but now it is 2015, and the trickles have changed many details. Notable was the passage in the U.S. in 1974 of the “Jackson-Vanik Amendment,” dropped in 2012, which successfully encouraged, especially after the mid-1980s, emigration of Jews from the Soviet bloc.
In that period the population of Israel has grown from about 4 million to more than 8 million today, much of the increase consisting of Jews from the former Soviet bloc and elsewhere.

Thus an analysis of Sanning’s subject would produce some different numbers today, but that is inevitable. The subject matter, after all, is “the Wandering Jew,” and it just won’t stand still!

Arthur R. Butz
Evanston, Illinois
February 2015
Introduction

Just one hundred years ago eastern Europe – Galicia, Ukraine, Hungary – was the center of the world’s Jewish population, but today that center has moved overseas to the Western Hemisphere and Israel. Whereas previously there was little doubt as to who was a Jew, today it is much more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition. The increasing secularization of industrial society in the recent past affected the Jewish people in particular. No wonder that today the question of the numerical size of the world Jewish population is one of the most controversial of demographic statistics. Nowhere does one encounter as many contradictions as in the attempt to assess the world’s Jewish population even within the margin of error of a million. The reputable *American Jewish Year Book*, for example, lists the size of the world’s Jewish population in 1979 as 14.5 million; looking a little closer, the surprised layman will find that this number includes several hundreds of thousands of gentiles. Other highly regarded experts such Dr. Nahum Goldmann, for example, believe that Israel’s almost 3.3 million Jews constitute almost one-fifth of World Jewry; in effect, he has put the figure for the world’s Jewish population at 16½ million.

Also, if one learns that only eleven million Jews are supposed to have survived World War Two and that this decimated remnant – with the exception of the Israelis – experienced a very slow natural growth in the post-war period due to over-aging, small families, rising assimilation tendencies and widespread mixed marriages, both of the above figures for the world’s Jewish population become questionable.

Any attempt to trace the flow of migration of the Jewish people during the past fifty years and to narrow down the size of the Jewish population – then and now – can only be successful if the enigmatic demographic characteristics of the Jews in their areas of departure – *i.e.* eastern Europe – become unraveled and, furthermore, if the migration movements are seen in the historical framework.

Unquestionably, the Second World War had by far the largest impact on the numerical development of the Jews in modern times. For this reason, especially the German-Soviet confrontation until 1945 and, thereafter, the determined effort of the Jews to leave the devastated historical countries of origin deserve to be paid the utmost attention.

Primarily in order to meet possible objections, this analysis is based almost entirely on Allied, Zionist and other “sympathetic” sources. The
significance of the statistical accountings in this study is also in the
demonstration that they at least can be made on the basis of allegedly au-
thoritative and largely Jewish sources. The most striking findings of this
study are:
A. The world’s Jewish population faced a serious demographic crisis even
before World War Two. This was also true of the Jews in eastern Europe.
B. During the 1930s roughly one million Jews left the historic places in
central and eastern Europe for North and South America, Palestine, western Europe and several other minor recipient countries.
C. At the beginning of World War Two there were fewer than 16 million
Jews in the world (Zionist data are listed in parentheses):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR (incl. Baltic states)</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>European countries occupied by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany during WWII</td>
<td>2.9 (6.0) million</td>
<td>2.4 (2.2) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>2.4 (2.2) million</td>
<td>2.4 (2.2) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16.0 (16.6) million</td>
<td>16.0 (16.6) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Of the 5½ million Jews in the Soviet Union at the outbreak of WWII, by
far the largest part was evacuated to Siberia; less than 15% fell into
German hands.

E. One million Jews died while fighting in the Red Army or in Siberian
labor camps; this aspect is generally passed over in Zionist accounts.

F. 14¾ million Jews survived the last war (Zionist data in parentheses):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>European countries occupied by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany during WWII</td>
<td>2.4 (1.1) million</td>
<td>2.4 (1.1) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>2.2 (2.3) million</td>
<td>2.2 (2.3) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14.7 (11.0) million</td>
<td>14.7 (11.0) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. Today, the world’s Jewish population numbers 16½ million (American
Jewish Year Book data listed in parentheses):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>European countries occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>by Germany during WWII</td>
<td>1.0 (1.0) million</td>
<td>1.0 (1.0) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>2.0 (1.8) million</td>
<td>2.0 (1.8) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16.3 (14.5) million</td>
<td>16.3 (14.5) million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* including several hundreds of thousands of gentiles in the case of the
5.9 and 14.5 million figures of the American Jewish Year Book.
H. The Jewish world population is likely to decrease at accelerating rates during the coming decades.

This study represents just one step in the attempt to trace the dissolution of Eastern Jewry in the course of the last fifty years. Many of the figures presented will, no doubt, be adjusted as further research discovers new and/or more reliable sources. In particular, it is to be hoped that students of this fascinating subject will follow the main thrust of this analysis which points to three distinct areas where further search should prove rewarding:

1. Soviet deportation of civilians, particularly Jews, before and during the Second World War.
2. The importance of Turkey as a transit country for refugee Jews arriving there by train (Bulgaria) or by ship (Constanza/Rumania); Turkish archives are virgin territory in this respect.
3. Jewish displaced persons camps (UNRRA) from Iran to Morocco.
PART 1

THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE EASTERN JEWS
FIRST CHAPTER:

Eastern Jewry

Myths die slowly, but historical myths sometimes go on to become “facts.” Often it is all but impossible to unmask them for what they are, because myths have that certain ingredient generally lacking in cold facts, namely, that people want to believe them – often for contradictory reasons. One of the myths with a questionable influence on our understanding and analysis of historical developments concerns the fertility of Europe’s Eastern Jewry.

If there is one Eastern Jewish trait which both National Socialists and Zionists agreed upon, then it was undoubtedly that particular eastern European minority’s proclivity to multiply rapidly. What one side considered being a threat, was a well of hope for the other.

Eastern Jewry, while steeped in orthodoxy and tradition, had achieved prolific natural growth rates in the 19th century. The reasons are close at hand: Its higher educational level enabled it to reduce death rates much sooner and faster than the surrounding native host population. At the same time, traditional values, religious beliefs and strong family bonds induced them to go on raising large families.

However, as political self-consciousness rose and industrial society enforced increased secularization, the old social fabric began to crumble – often with lightning speed. – Social characteristics were overturned within a short time span. In addition, the upheavals of World War One left lasting imprints on Eastern Jewish life. The rapidity of this development went almost unnoticed by Zionists and their foes.

In this Chapter we will show that the Eastern Jewry of the 1930s had changed fundamentally since the turn of the 19th to the 20th century and especially since World War One. Outside the Soviet Union, two-thirds of eastern Europe’s Jews lived in Poland at the end of the 1920s and, therefore, we will place our emphasis on the Polish Jews in the attempt to ascertain their demographic characteristics.
The Demographic Structure of Polish Jews

According to the Anglo-American Committee on European Jewry and Palestine (Anglo-American Committee) the Jewish population in Poland numbered 3,351,000 at the beginning of World War Two. The Jewish author Gerald Reitlinger asserted, though, that the Polish census of December 9, 1931, discovered only 2,732,600 “racial” Jews. However, a natural increase by 620,000 during the following eight years is impossible: This would have been equivalent to an annual growth rate of 2.6%, far exceeding the fertility of the native Polish and Ukrainian host population; the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (Universal) denies this possibility outright, and a Jewish immigration into anti-Semitic Poland was non-existent.

The Statesman’s Yearbook 1944 reported that the Polish census contained two different figures for the Jewish population group: One based on “language” and the other on “religion.” The first corresponds exactly with Reitlinger’s figure for the so-called “racial” Jews. As to religious preference the Statesman’s Yearbook mentioned 3,113,900 Polish residents of the Mosaic faith. The resulting difference of 237,000 (3,351,000 less 3,113,900) could well represent the natural growth of a purportedly very fertile Eastern European Jewry during the period from the end of 1931 until the end of 1939.

Also, the Universal reported the average number of births among Polish Jews in the period from 1930 to 1935 to have been 85,000, a figure which would constitute 2.8% of a population of roughly three million. If the mortality figure of about 40,000 annually as provided by the same source is correct, the surplus of births over deaths between 1930 and 1935 would have averaged 45,000 per year. Projected for the time span 1932 to 1939, the Polish-Jewish population might have increased by 360,000 to reach 3.5 million by the start of the war; this latter number is also often being mentioned in post-war literature in connection with Polish Jews.

Still, the above remarks show that the size of Poland’s Jewish population at the outbreak of WWII is by no means certain; Jewish sources differ to a substantial degree from one another and often they even contradict each other. In order to remove or, at least, limit these uncertainties, it is necessary to trace the structure and development of the Jews in Poland by resorting to

---

4 Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, p. 36.
5 Ibid., p. 36. From 1930 to 1937 the mortality in Poland averaged 479,000 (Schlag nach über Polen. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1940 [?], p. 15). The Jewish population accounted for 9.8% of Poland’s population in 1931, but in the age group 50 years and over, where most of the natural deaths occurred, it was 10.9% (for source see Graph 2). Even conceding a smaller age-specific death rate for Jews than for the Polish or Ukrainian population, the average number of Jewish deaths in Poland in the 1930s must have been at least 45,000 per year.
available primary sources; only then will it be possible to shed more light on pre-war Eastern European Jewry.

The Polish census of December 9, 1931 found 3,113,933 of the 31,915,779 inhabitants (excluding armed forces) belonging to the Jewish faith\(^6\) and representing almost 9.8% of the total population. Compared to the non-Jewish population, the Jews exhibited marked differences as to geographic distribution, urban concentration, professions, natural increase and emigration.

15% of the non-Jews, for example, lived in the western provinces (Poznan, Pomerania and Silesia), but in the case of the Jews it was only 1%. The other 85% of the non-Jews divided rather evenly between the eastern and the central provinces. Because of the large Jewish population in Warsaw – every ninth Jew lived in the capital city in 1931 – the central provinces contained far more than half of all Jews, and still the eastern provinces accounted for over forty per cent of the Jewish population (Table 1).

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of the Jewish and the non-Jewish Population in Poland by Provinces as of December 9, 1931\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bialystok</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilna</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowogrodek</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesia</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolhynia</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvo</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanislav</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eastern Poland | 42.68 | 41.92 |
| Warsaw-City    | 11.33 | 2.84  |
| Warsaw-Province| 7.04  | 8.02  |
| Lodz           | 12.16 | 7.82  |
| Kielce         | 10.18 | 9.09  |
| Lublin         | 10.09 | 7.47  |
| Cracow         | 5.58  | 7.38  |
| Central Poland | 56.37 | 42.62 |
| Poznan         | 0.23  | 7.29  |
| Silesia        | 0.61  | 4.43  |
| Pomerania      | 0.11  | 3.74  |
| Western Poland | 0.95  | 15.46 |
| Poland total   | 100.00| 100.00|

Table 2: Jewish Population in Polish Provinces (in per cent) as of December 9, 1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bialystok</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>38.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilna</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowogrodek</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>42.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesia</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>49.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolhynia</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>49.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvov</td>
<td>10.95</td>
<td>33.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanislav</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>34.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>34.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Poland</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>36.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw-City</td>
<td>30.01</td>
<td>30.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw-Province</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>29.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodz</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>31.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kielce</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>30.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lublin</td>
<td>12.75</td>
<td>43.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracow</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>24.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Poland</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>30.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poznan</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silesia</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomerania</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Poland</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland total</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>27.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 1.

In the central and eastern provinces the Jewish element represented “only” every eighth or tenth inhabitant, but in the cities it was an entirely different matter. There, the Jewish share was 31 and 37%, respectively (Table 2). Cities with a Jewish contingent of 50% and more were not at all unusual, especially in the smaller towns of eastern Poland.

Contrary to the huge percentage of Jews in Polish cities and towns, there were relatively few in rural areas: In all of Poland there were about 108 Jews for every 1,000 non-Jews; in the urban areas, however, this number rose to 375 and fell to a mere 33 in the countryside (Table 3).

Only one-quarter of the non-Jewish population was urban, with the Jews it was three-quarters. Also, official statistics tended to overstate the portion of the “rural” Jewish population to a considerable extent. Eastern Jewry still lived in large part in mostly small, yet town-like so-called “shtetls” which constituted some kind of a local trading and manufacturing center for the surrounding peasantry. These “shtetls” were not at all comparable to “villages” (in the European sense), which is indicated by the fact that the vast majority of the Jewish population of those “shtetls” was not engaged in farming.
Table 3: Urbanization in Poland: Jewish and non-Jewish Population as of December 9, 1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>non-Jews</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Jews per thousand non-Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>733,858</td>
<td>(23.6)</td>
<td>22,450,874</td>
<td>(77.9)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>2,380,075</td>
<td>(76.4)</td>
<td>6,350,972</td>
<td>(22.1)</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which: Cities with a pop. of &lt; 20,000</td>
<td>929,852</td>
<td>(29.9)</td>
<td>2,301,566</td>
<td>(8.0)</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,450,223</td>
<td>(46.6)</td>
<td>4,049,406</td>
<td>(14.1)</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,113,933</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>28,801,846</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all of Poland only 125,123 Jews (including family members) out of 3.1 million were classified as peasants. Assuming that two-thirds of them lived in the eastern provinces, only one in five of the 400,000 “rural” Jews of eastern Poland may be counted among the peasants. For these reasons the degree of urbanization of Polish Jews should be seen as nearer 90% in 1931. In the case of non-Jews the opposite was true: Of the 22.5 million rural non-Jewish inhabitants in Poland 19.2 million, or 85%, were engaged in agriculture.

Unfortunately, the Polish census was somewhat deficient in providing data on religious affiliation in individual cities. For the eastern Polish provinces which are of primary interest in this study only 23 towns and cities could be found for which the Jewish population was specified: In two towns the Jewish percentage was 56 and 63%, in eleven towns it ranged from 40 to 49%, in seven towns it was between 31 and 36%, and in three towns 27 and 28%! In other words, not one town contained fewer than 25% Jews (Table 4).

The insignificant representation of Jews in Polish agriculture was mentioned before. It is clear, therefore, that the role Jews played outside Polish agriculture was that much larger in relative and absolute terms. For every single Jew in industry, handicrafts, trade and the other non-agricultural professions there were only a little more than three non-Jews despite the fact that Jews constituted less than one-tenth of the total population.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Jewish Share-%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilna</td>
<td>Wilna</td>
<td>195,071</td>
<td>55,006</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowogrodek</td>
<td>Baranowice</td>
<td>22,818</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Białystok</td>
<td>Białystok</td>
<td>91,101</td>
<td>39,165</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>49,669</td>
<td>21,159</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lomza</td>
<td>25,022</td>
<td>8,912</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suwałki</td>
<td>21,826</td>
<td>5,811</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesia</td>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>48,385</td>
<td>21,440</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pinsk</td>
<td>31,912</td>
<td>20,220</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolhynia</td>
<td>Kovel</td>
<td>27,677</td>
<td>12,842</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rovno</td>
<td>40,612</td>
<td>22,737</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lutsk</td>
<td>35,554</td>
<td>17,366</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Włodzimierz</td>
<td>24,591</td>
<td>10,665</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvov</td>
<td>Lvov</td>
<td>312,231</td>
<td>99,595</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borysław</td>
<td>41,496</td>
<td>12,996</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drohobycz</td>
<td>32,261</td>
<td>12,931</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jarosław</td>
<td>22,195</td>
<td>6,272</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Przemyśl</td>
<td>51,038</td>
<td>17,326</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rzeszów</td>
<td>26,902</td>
<td>11,228</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sambor</td>
<td>21,923</td>
<td>6,274</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanisław</td>
<td>Kolomyja</td>
<td>33,788</td>
<td>14,332</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanisław</td>
<td>59,960</td>
<td>24,823</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stryj</td>
<td>30,491</td>
<td>10,869</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>35,644</td>
<td>13,999</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 Cities</td>
<td>1,282,167</td>
<td>475,648</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Jewish Share-%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63%</td>
<td>2 Cities</td>
<td>72,524</td>
<td>42,957</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49%</td>
<td>11 Cities</td>
<td>452,706</td>
<td>195,631</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39%</td>
<td>7 Cities</td>
<td>517,845</td>
<td>169,971</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-29%</td>
<td>3 Cities</td>
<td>239,092</td>
<td>67,089</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-63%</td>
<td>23 Cities</td>
<td>1,282,167</td>
<td>475,648</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Cities</td>
<td>1,221,809</td>
<td>448,364</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Cities</td>
<td>2,503,976</td>
<td>924,012</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countryside</td>
<td>10,898,567</td>
<td>405,069</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Poland</td>
<td>13,402,543</td>
<td>1,329,081</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 1, but Zeszyt 48 (Miasto Wilno); 58 (M. Lwów); 65 (Województwo Stanisławowskie); 68 (W. Lwowskie); 70 (W. Wołyńskie); 71 (W. Nowogródzkie); 78 (W. Tamopolskie); 83 (W. Białostockie); 87 (W. Poleskie).
In this connection, it is of some interest that in the category “self-employed,” *i.e.* merchants, artisans, doctors, lawyers, etc., the relationship of non-Jew to Jew was about one to one. Considering the small Jewish presence in the western Polish provinces – which because of their more advanced economic structure contained a considerable portion of the non-Jewish “self-employed” – the enormous Jewish influence in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the central and eastern Polish provinces becomes clearer yet. Among the Jews there were seven times as many “self-employed” as among the non-Jews; among salary earners the Jewish proportion was still 50% larger than their number would have warranted, and only among blue-collar workers was there no difference between the two population segments (*Table 5*).

As one would expect, these pronounced socio-economic differences between Jews and non-Jews also affected their respective natural increase. In a population of 3.1 million the portion of the less-than-one-year-old children was only 1.7%, in numbers 52,305, but with the non-Jewish population it was 2.6%. Surprisingly, this enormous gap between Jewish and non-Jewish fertility rates actually developed only since WWI. Until the early 1920s the Jewish population averaged roughly 12% of the non-Jewish – even though a slight recessive trend from 13 to 11% was obviously in progress; after 1924, however, the tendency was steeply downhill (*Graph 1*). Finally, in 1931 there were only seven Jewish births for every 100 non-Jewish births!

*Table 5: Professions in Poland: Jews and non-Jews as of December 9, 1931*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>125,123 (4)</td>
<td>19,221,825 (67)</td>
<td>– 94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural Sectors</td>
<td>2,988,810 (96)</td>
<td>9,580,021 (33)</td>
<td>+189%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which: Self-employed</td>
<td>699,244 (22)</td>
<td>763,617 (3)</td>
<td>+747%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>91,970 (3)</td>
<td>555,274 (2)</td>
<td>+53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar</td>
<td>277,555 (9)</td>
<td>2,473,344 (9)</td>
<td>+ 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>54,256 (17)</td>
<td>420,206 (15)</td>
<td>+ 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not gainfully employed</td>
<td>1,865,785 (60)</td>
<td>5,367,580 (19)</td>
<td>+222%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 3,113,933 (100) | 28,801,846 (100) |

Source: *Drugی Powszechny Spis Ludności Z Dn. 9.XII 1931 R.; Polska: Stosunki Zawodowe – Ludność, Poza Rolnictwem (Cześć II); Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Statystyka Polski, Seria C, Zeszyt 94d (Deuxième Recensement Général de la Population du 9 Décembre 1931; Pologne: Professions - Population hors l’Agriculture – II Partie; Office Central de Statistique de la Republique Polonaise, Statistique de la Pologne), Warsaw, 1939.*
But the non-Jewish population in Poland also showed a clear deceleration in its birth rate. Both the Jewish and non-Jewish population suffered great losses in the number of births during WWI and both registered a steep rise after hostilities ended. To be sure, the non-Jewish population saw no further rise in the number of births since the early 1920s, but they were kept at a relatively high level of 730,000. Not so with the Jews; after reaching a high of 74,875 in 1925, their number of births dropped consistently until it reached 52,305 in 1931 (Graph 2).

Thus, while the 1931 age group of the non-Jewish population was almost twice as large as the age group of the war-year 1917 and of the turn of the 19th to the 20th century – 30 to 35 years earlier – in the case of the Jews it was just barely greater in either instance. The Universal proved quite right when it wrote referring to the Polish Jews: “But even in Eastern Europe the birth rate was falling, and began to approach that of Western Europe”\(^7\) – and that was already negative before WWII.

\(^7\) Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, p. 33.
As far as is known, there are no official statistics on Polish-Jewish mortality rates before the war. If one accepts the mortality figures of the Universal of an average of 40,000 per year for the period 1930 to 1935 – for the Soviet Jews with a numerically similarly large population an average mortality figure of 43,000 was indicated – then the Jews should have enjoyed a surplus of births over deaths of about 12,000 in 1931 (52,305 minus 40,000), or 0.4%!

Obviously, the huge emigration of Polish Jews prior to and following WWI influenced their natural growth rate very negatively because it is generally the younger, fertile age groups who decide to leave; the older people often have too deep roots in the country in which they were born. An excellent example of the strong ties of older people to their country of birth is provided by the very different emigration pattern of younger and older German Jews in the 1930s.

Of the roughly 500,000 Jews living in Germany in 1933 about 160,000 were 50 years or older. By August of 1939, the German-Jewish population had dropped to 272,000; included in this figure were 140,000 people aged 50 years and older. This means that the Jews of 50 years and younger had seen
their numbers reduced by almost two-thirds from about 340,000 to less than 130,000, while the age group “50 years and older” had shrunk only one-eighth from 160,000 to 140,000.8

Now, comparable figures are not available for the Polish-Jewish population of the 1930s, but the Polish census of 1931 nevertheless provides an indication that similar developments were under way among the Jews of Poland. The ratio of the male to female population for the age group born between 1917 and 1931 – children between zero and 14 years – averaged 102.9 to 100 for Jews and 102.5 to 100 for non-Jews. The 15-to-29-year-olds (age group 1902-1916), however, differed markedly with ratios of 85.7/100 and 93/100, respectively.9

It is only natural that the original numerical male predominance should change over time in favor of a slight female majority; but such a drastic reduction of the male side during peacetime must either be due to a comparably much larger emigration of young men or – as the Polish census did not include 191,473 members of the armed forces – to military service or both. If one assumes (data are unavailable) that three-quarters of these military men were less than 30 years old and that Jews constituted about 10% (in keeping with their share of the population), then we obtain additional 14,361 young Jews to be added to the 424,575 aged 15 to 29 years. Compared with the 495,405 Jewesses of that age group, the ratio obtained is 88.6/100; the same non-Jewish age group shows an adjusted ratio of 96/100.

To be sure, the age groups of 1902 and before also show a clear female majority, but this should be expected considering the higher life expectancy of the fair sex and the losses suffered by men in WWI. The male/female ratio in the age groups “1872-1901” who were subject to military service during WWI was the same for Jews and non-Jews, namely, 88/100. It is thus very surprising to see the Jews of the age groups “1902-1916” evidence a male/female ratio of 88.6/100. In other words, there must have been very, very many young Jewish men who left Poland after WWI single without families.10 Their approximate number may be estimated by taking the difference between male and female Jews in that age group: It is about 56,000!

---

10 An indication of the validity of this conclusion can be found in the Statistical Abstract of Israel. According to issue no. 31 (1980), p. 133, 35,183 and 81,613 Jews immigrated in the years 1919/1923 and 1924/1931, respectively. Issue no. 2 (1950/51), p. 26, fixed the male share among the immigrants at 63.2 and 54%, respectively. This translates into an average share of 57% male Jewish immigrants in Palestine between the end of World War One and 1931, i.e. male Jews outnumbered Jewesses by one third. A large, probably the largest part of these immigrants hailed from Poland.
It is a fact that official Polish statistics indicate only a relatively small-size Jewish emigration. But to conclude that only a small number of Jewish emigrants left Poland would be just as mistaken as to infer a small Mexican immigration in the United States after WWII on the basis of Mexican emigration statistics. Illegal border crossings cannot be traced by means of official emigration statistics.

Polish statistics list 294,139 emigrant Jews in the period 1921 to 1931. Deducting the above mentioned 56,000 single young male Jews without families, there remain 238,000 who left in family groups. On the basis of five persons per family one obtains fewer than 48,000 heads of households.

The misery of the Jews in Poland following WWI unfolds in the huge number of these young, often very young men who went abroad in search of a livelihood. In Jewish historical experience this is quite without precedent. In view of the large number of Jewish families who fled the USSR in the course of the Russian Civil War, who lost their homes during WWI and the ensuing Polish-Soviet War and who practically saw no other solution to their desperate situation than to leave troubled, anti-Semitic Poland, it looks rather ridiculous to place the number of emigrant Jewish families below the number of single young Jewish males, particularly as most Eastern Jews had numerous relatives abroad, especially in North America. There is only one conclusion possible: The Polish emigration statistics are worthless.

Official Polish figures mention only 75,527 Jewish emigrants for the years 1934 to 1937. How far removed these figures are from reality may be seen from the enormous Jewish immigration in Western countries and in Palestine prior to WWII, from the fact that the vast majority of extra-Soviet Eastern European Jews lived in Poland (until 1939), and from the naked truth that no country treated the Jews worse than did Poland (at least until 1938). The Poles tried to get rid of their Jews by all means at their disposal; on the other hand, the Western countries refused to accept Jewish immigrants. Therefore, it was in the Polish interest not to draw the world’s attention to the actual extent of Jewish emigration from Poland.

Between 1934 and 1937, for example, 68,000 Jewish immigrants from Poland arrived in Palestine. If Polish emigration statistics were accurate,
90% of the Polish-Jewish emigrants would have left for Palestine, even though Polish Jews enjoyed the closest ties of kinship to hundreds of thousands of Jews in the U.S. We will show in the Seventh Chapter that 400,000 Jews entered the United States between 1933 and 1943. Only a small fraction of them hailed from Germany; Jewish sources maintain anyway that until the end of 1940 just 26% of German-Jewish emigrants went to the United States, i.e. 100,000.14

Of course, other central and eastern European countries, too, recorded a large flow of Jewish emigration, but the largest segment of Jewish immigration into the United States must have originated in Poland. Of the 4.3 million Jews in the geographic area encompassed by Poland, the Baltic countries, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia before the war, approximately two-thirds lived in Poland. Therefore, the largest contingent of Jewish immigrants in North America between 1933 and 1943 simply must have come from that country.

At the same time, western European countries accepted uncounted tens of thousands of Jewish refugees and immigrants from Germany and eastern Europe during the 1930s. At the end of the 1920s a total of 315,000 Jews lived in France and the Benelux countries,15 by the beginning of the war their number was put at 480,000.16 The natural increase of this highly urbanized population with its low fertility was minimal; the growth of 165,000 was almost exclusively the result of net immigration. But since Jewish sources specify that 83% of the Jews leaving Germany were headed for North and South America, Palestine, Shanghai and England,17 by far the largest part of these Jewish immigrants in France and the Benelux countries must have come from countries to the east and southeast of Germany, and again there is only one country in eastern Europe qualifying as the main source of Jewish emigration, namely Poland.

In this respect, even the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) admitted:18

*The wave of emigration of German Jews was only a part – and not even the largest one at that – of a general Jewish emigration from central, eastern and

14 Adlerstein, Fanny R., “Foreign Department,” *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, New York, Vol. XVII, No. 4, June 1941, p. 386. The figure of 100,000 also includes Jewish emigrants from Austria.
16 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 71.
18 *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich, 1958, p. 79 and 80.
southeastern Europe. In the years following 1933 about 100,000 Jews left Poland every year, partly because of the increasingly anti-Semitic policies of the Polish government, but also because of the progressively worsening pauperization of the Polish Jews. Similar tendencies existed in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and, to a lesser degree, in Hungary.

The economic situation of Polish Jews deteriorated drastically during the 1930s. Systematic campaigns were organized to crowd them out of the economy; the boycott of Jewish stores was enforced with brutality, and was found to be within the law by the courts, was blessed by the Catholic Church of Poland, and officially sanctioned by the central government. Anti-Semitic incidents spread throughout Poland and resulted in many victims. Bloody persecutions took place in 1937 in Brest-Litovsk and in Czestochowa.19

The statement by the Institute for Contemporary History, whose Zionist credentials are excellent, that the largest wave of emigration did not originate in Germany is thus quite correct. Just as correct are its findings that 100,000 Jews emigrated from Poland every year after 1933; this may contradict official Polish emigration statistics whose reliability is subject to doubt, but the tremendous Jewish immigration in Palestine, the USA, South America, France, the Benelux countries, England, etc., prior to WWII support the Munich Institute’s testimony.

The persistent emigration, especially of young single Jewish males who would normally have raised families of their own, and the growing economic distress make it rather improbable that the reduction of the birth rate since the mid-1920s could have stopped after 1931. Everything points to an excess of deaths over births for the Jewish population in the latter part of the 1930s. Therefore, even an average growth rate of 0.2% per year between 1932 and 1939 seems somewhat high for the Polish-Jewish population.20

Placing the number of Jewish emigrants from Poland in the seven years and eight months from the beginning of 1932 until September 1939 at 500,000 – the Munich Institute for Contemporary History mentions 100,000 annually after 1933 – the size of the Jewish population in Poland may thus be estimated at 2,664,000 at the beginning of the war. Subtracting the 31,216 Polish-Jewish soldiers reported by the Polish general staff to have been killed in the subsequent German-Polish war,21 the final number of Polish Jews following the cessation of hostilities at the end of September 1939 may be said to have been 2,633,000. The figure of 3,351,000 as reported by the Anglo-American Committee thus is shown to be too large by 700,000!

20 According to official Polish surveys, the birth rate fell in Poland between 1931 and 1937 from 3.02% to 2.49% (*Schlag nach über Polen*, p. 15). The Jewish rate reached 1.7% in 1931 already, and it is not likely that it moved against the weakening Polish trend thereafter. A negative net growth rate is thus quite probable for Poland’s Jewish population at the end of the 1930s.
Jews in Other Eastern European Countries

Much of what was said regarding Polish Jews applies to Jewry of the other countries in eastern Europe as well. With few exceptions its birth rate was low, even negative on a net basis, and its urban concentration was extraordinary. Its average marriage age far exceeded that of the host populations, and emigration, particularly among young males, was widespread. Still, there are some noteworthy differences in degree from the situation found in Poland.

The Czechoslovakian Jews cannot be treated as a single group; too large are the differences between Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian (Carpathian) Jews; they reflect the gap in economic development in this artificial heterogeneous country, as one proceeds from west to east. There, too, young Jewish males left the impoverished eastern areas but instead of going outside the country, they merely migrated to the highly industrialized Bohemian and Moravian areas. Thus, whereas Ruthenian and Slovak Jewish males aged 15-29 years numbered only 81.3% and 95.1%, respectively, of the Jewesses of the same age group, the situation was reversed in the Czech areas of Bohemia and Moravia. There, Jewish males aged 15-29 exceeded the opposite sex by 23.5% as registered by the census taken in 1930.22 This uneven migration affected the fertility of the Jews in Slovakia and Ruthenia rather adversely, yet no positive growth effects could be registered in Bohemia and Moravia.

In the latter two provinces, Jewry was declining since before WWI. In 1930, the largest age group was accounted for by those born between 1906 and 1910; this group represented almost 10% of the total, or 2% for each year. From then on a rapid decline dropped the annual average to 1.35% for the years 1911-1915 and 0.77% for 1916-1920; after WWI, a small baby boom let the group born from 1921-1925 reach 1.1% per year, only to fall again to an annual average of just over 0.8% in 1926-1930. Given the trend of those years, it is fair to state that those less than one year old in 1930 accounted for just 0.6% of the Czech Jews. This low rate would imply an excess of deaths over births somewhere between 0.5% and 1% per year.

In Slovakia, the Jewish demographic crisis was not yet as deep, but the trend was similar. From the 1906/1910 period to 1926/1930 the average annual strength of the mentioned age groups fell from 2% to 1.66%. Those born in 1930 probably constituted only about 1.5% of Slovakias Jews, which was just barely greater than the natural death rate.

---

Only in backward Ruthenia was the traditional Eastern Jewish family still intact, but it seems that there, too, a turning point had been reached. The age group 1926/1930 averaged almost 2.9% per year, compared to 2.8% for 1921/1925. A birth rate of 2.9%, if maintained, would have resulted in a high natural increase during the 1930s of maybe 1.5% p.a. or more. Given the considerable emigration of young males to the Czech areas, the economic crisis of the 1930s and the growing secularization of life in Ruthenia prior to WWII, it is likely that after 1930 there was a drop in the birth rate, even though it probably remained fairly high by general Jewish standards of those years. In any case, when Hungary, which meanwhile had regained Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, conducted a census in 1941, only about 109,000 (see Sixth Chapter) were found there compared to 102,542 as recorded by the Czechoslovak census of 1930; this is equivalent to a natural increase of 0.6% p.a. between 1930 and 1941. This rate would appear somewhat low for that fertile, but tiny segment of Eastern Jewry, and probably reflects a continuing emigration of young males to the industrial Czech areas.

Hungary’s Jews – according to the census of 1930 there were 444,567 – lived overwhelmingly in the larger cities. 204,371, or 46%, were concentrated in the capital city, another 130,207 lived in the Great Plain districts east of the Danube, 49,252 in the north, and just 60,737 west of the Danube. Since 1920, the total Jewish population had decreased by 28,788 from 473,355.24

After 1927 Hungary’s Jews recorded considerable excesses of deaths over births. From 1927 until 1930 the average annual decrease amounted to 467 (0.1% p.a.) and reached 0.5% in 1938.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>In% of the Jewish population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>5,533</td>
<td>5,917</td>
<td>– 384</td>
<td>– 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>5,187</td>
<td>6,244</td>
<td>– 1,057</td>
<td>– 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 1,574</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 1,899</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the Hungarian Jews were in the midst of a serious demographic decline during the 1930s with the number of deaths probably 40% higher than that of births.

23 Annuaire Statistique Hongrois 1931, Nouveau Cours XXXIX, l’Office Central Royal Hongrois de Statistique, Budapest, 1933, Tab. 10, p. 11.
24 Ibid., Tab. 9, p. 10.
25 Ibid., Tab. 21, p. 28.
26 Magyar Statisztikai Övkönyv 1942, Új Folyam L, A Magyar Kir Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1944, Tab. 21, p. 36.
By 1941, after the acquisition of neighboring territories containing maybe 325,000 Jews, i.e. an increase by 73% over 1930, the total number of births (8,380) still was only 50% larger than in 1930, but deaths of 10,074 exceeded their 1930-level also by 73%. In 1942, the roughly 725,000 Greater Hungarian Jews counted only 8,413 births but 10,787 deaths, in relation to their total number, 1.2% and 1.5%, respectively – a natural decrease of 0.3% p.a.\textsuperscript{27}

In other words, the addition of the 325,000 Jews in the acquired territories (see Sixth Chapter) brought no significant improvement to the average rate of natural decrease despite the fact that one-third of those 325,000 “new” Hungarian Jews belonged to the relatively fertile Ruthenian Jewry. Obviously, the Jews living in the newly acquired territories of northern Transylvania, Banat and southern Slovakia had registered birth and death rates quite similar to those of the “old” Trianon-Hungary, Which is to say, their natural demographic development also was gravely negative.

Thus, as a matter of record, the Jewry of the areas covered by Trianon-Hungary, the former Slovak areas, the Banat (Serbia) and northern Transylvania (Rumania) suffered large annual population decreases as a result of very low birth rates. The Ruthenian Jews, whose fertility, no doubt, had lessened as well until WWII, nevertheless registered positive growth rates. But they were the exception to the general Jewish demographic pattern in eastern Europe and the Balkans, and their small total number could not affect the numerical decline of Eastern Jewry before the war.

As to the growth of Rumanian Jewry during the 1930s, the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (Universal) has this to say: \textsuperscript{28}

\[
\ldots\text{in 1932 it [the number of births] was 12,586 for Greater Rumania and 10,039 in 1938, whereas the death rate for the corresponding years was 9,891 and 10,250. Thus from a surplus of 2,695 in 1932 there was a deficit of 213 in 1938. The birth rate steadily declined.}
\]

The surplus of births – in 1932 it averaged just 0.35% – had turned into a deficit by 1938; it seems that allowing for an average growth rate of 0.2% during the 1930s would be ample.

In Latvia, the general population’s fertility rates fell long before WWI. In 1935, the birth rate was down to 1.67%, and the mortality rate of the previous 5-year-period averaged 1.38%. As a result, the net natural population increase was less than half a percent and dropping further. The Jewish

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., Tab. 14, p. 33 and Tab. 16, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{28} Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 9, p. 265.
population – 93,479 according to the 1935 census\(^{29}\) – constituted less than 5% of the total population.

Regionally, about 50% of the Latvian Jews lived in or near Riga, the capital; another 30% populated the easternmost province of Latgale. Urbanization was almost total: Almost 93% of Latvia’s Jewry lived in the cities in contrast to only 34% of the non-Jewish population; but because of their relatively small number, Jews made up a smaller portion of the urban populace than was usual for eastern Europe. Among the larger cities only Daugavpils and Rezekne had a Jewish share of 25%; in all the other urban centers (including Riga) Jews averaged only 11% of the population.\(^{30}\)

As to natural growth, the Latvian Jews showed traits very similar to those in Poland. Until the turn of the century there was a rapid growth, followed by a levelling off until WWI. The war almost halved the number of births, but after the cessation of hostilities the birth rate jumped briefly to a level close to, but still below pre-war years. According to the census, young Jews 11 years of age numbered 1,787, thereafter a rapid decline set in. At the time of the 1935 count, only 1,137 were less than one year old – a decline of at least 36% compared with 1924. Thus, the birth rate was only 1.2%.\(^{31}\) As mentioned before, Latvia’s total mortality rate averaged 1.4% in the early 1930s; while Jewish mortality is not known, it is not likely to have departed much from the national average. This means that already in 1935 and in the years just previous the Jews failed to replace themselves. With economic conditions worsening thereafter, the birth rate probably declined further, producing ever larger rates of natural decrease as the decade wore on.

This brief sketch of the demographic patterns of the various Eastern European Jewish communities outside the Soviet Union allows us to state that, on average, far from general fertility, eastern Europe’s Jews had no natural increase whatsoever during the 1930s. We considered a total population numbering almost 4.8 million in the early 1930s – 93% of Eastern Jewry outside Russia. This population, concentrated in an area reaching from Riga to Budapest and Bucharest, was in the midst of a demographic revolution. Rapid concentration in the larger cities, the decline of Yiddish in favor of the native national languages, large-scale emigration of young single Jewish males, late marriages, the turn to the one- and two-children-family had already destroyed Jewish orthodoxy; only a few tiny remnants remained, for example in Carpathian Ruthenia, too small to offset the losses suffered elsewhere and themselves subject to secularization pressures. By the end of the 1930s, there was no country in eastern Europe where Jews


were able to register natural growth gains. In some, mortality rates for Jews far exceeded birth rates. It is fair to state that – on average – eastern Europe’s Jewry even registered a small natural decline between 1930 and 1939.
SECOND CHAPTER:

The Growth of Soviet Jewry

The Division of Polish Jewry

Still unclear is the distribution of these 2,633,000 Polish Jews over the various areas incorporated into the German Reich, combined in the so-called “Government General of Poland” or occupied by the Soviet Union. According to the *Universal*, a German statistician calculated on the basis of the Polish census of December 9, 1931, the following geographic distribution of Jews among the three specified regions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas incorporated by Germany</th>
<th>632,000 (20.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government General of Poland</td>
<td>1,269,000 (40.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under German administration</td>
<td>1,901,000 (61.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexed by the Soviet Union</td>
<td>1,212,900 (39.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Polish Jews (1931)</td>
<td>3,113,900 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Polish census of 1931 showed that the natural development of eastern Polish Jewry did not differ from the national Jewish average, but it is unknown whether there was any change thereafter – which is improbable – and whether emigration flows during the 1930s were similar in the three areas. Thus, we have to assume that all three areas experienced roughly the same demographic development between 1932 and 1939 as far as the Jewish population is concerned.

As mentioned in the First Chapter, the number of Polish Jews declined from 3,113,900 to 2,633,000, *i.e.* by 15.4%, between the end of 1931 and September 1939. On the basis of this relative reduction we obtain the following Jewish population for the three areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas incorporated by Germany</th>
<th>534,000 (20.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government General of Poland</td>
<td>1,073,000 (40.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under German administration</td>
<td>1,607,000 (61.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexed by the Soviet Union</td>
<td>1,026,000 (39.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Polish Jews (1939)</td>
<td>2,633,000 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Polish defeat began to crystallize shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities, many Polish Jews didn’t bother to await the German occupation; they fled in droves to the eastern Polish cities and towns which later were occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in the second half of September – but smaller numbers also crossed the border into Rumania. Referring to this massive flight, the Latvian Chief Rabbi and leader of the Mizrachi Organization and of the World Jewish Congress, Mordecai Nurok, said on March 28, 1946 at a press conference in New York:²

> It must be emphasized that several hundred thousands of Polish and other Jews found a haven from the Nazis in the U.S.S.R.

This flight away from the sphere of German influence was facilitated by the circumstance that the Soviets originally also occupied the territory between the Vistula and Bug rivers as specified in the German-Soviet agreement on the division of Polish territory; because of this, many Jewish inhabitants of the crumbling Polish state succeeded in escaping from the nearby larger cities – Warsaw, Lodz, etc. – to reach Soviet-occupied areas. One week later the Soviets withdrew from the area west of the Bug, taking the entire livestock with them.³ The Jewish refugees, along with many local Jews, accompanied the Red Army, as it pulled back towards positions east of the Bug. The city of Tomaszow Lubelski may serve as an example of this systematic evasion by the Jews away from German control; according to the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Judaica) 75% of the city’s 6,000 Jews left together with the Red Army, as it withdrew to the newly established line of demarcation further east.⁴

Official German calculations show that the area between the Vistula and the Bug contained a Jewish population of 386,600 at the time of the last Polish census in 1931. If the Jewish population loss of that area in the years before the outbreak of the German-Polish war amounted to the same percentage as for the Polish Jews in general, only 330,000 Jews could have been present at the time of the Soviet occupation (after September 17, 1939). It is not known how many Jews accompanied the Soviet Army when it vacated that region after September 28, 1939, but the massed flight of Polish Jews in an easterly direction – attested to by many witnesses – and the example of Tomaszow Lubelski permit the conclusion that the vast majority of Jews living between the Vistula and the Bug must have left together with the Red Army. It is strange, therefore, that the discussions about the number of Jews who might have succeeded in escaping into Soviet-controlled ter-

---

³ Fischer, Dr. Ludwig and Dr. Friedrich Gollert, *Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft*, Cracow, 1942, p. 186.
ritory pass over this episode almost completely, even though these more than 300,000 Jews had the best chance to evade German control.5

Among the Jewish refugees fleeing eastward was also the 26-year-old Menachem Begin; born in Brest-Litovsk in 1913, the latter-day Israeli Prime Minister studied at the University of Warsaw where he headed the Betar Zionist Youth Movement in Poland until 1939.6

In the Eichmann “Trial” in Jerusalem, the Polish Jews Zwi Patscher and Yakov Goldfine testified that the Germans drove Polish Jews marching four abreast in long columns onto the Soviet portion of occupied Poland.7 The Judaica reported in a similar vein:8

With the outbreak of the war in September, the Poles began to loot stores and attack the Jews. […] the Jews were deported by the Germans [September 1939] to the area under Soviet control on the other side of the San River. […] Those who were deported to the Soviet Zone lived there in very difficult economic conditions. In the summer of 1940 many of them were deported to the Soviet interior.

No one knows for certain how large the number of Jews was who either fled or were driven to the Soviet-occupied former Polish territory and who, within less than a year’s time, found themselves in Siberian labor and concentration camps – if they survived the murderous trip. But we do know that the eastern Polish cities and towns which contained a large Jewish element already, suddenly had to cope with untold masses of displaced Jews: In many towns in eastern Poland the Jewish population doubled overnight: The Judaica refers to this mass flight again and again. Regarding Vladimin-Volynsk it writes:9

[...] thousands of Jews from western Poland sought refuge in the city, bringing the number of Jews in the City to 25,000. [1931: 10,665 or 44% of the population...] In the summer of 1940 many Zionist leaders and refugees were exiled to the Soviet interior.

Lutsk:10

Many refugees who had fled to Lutsk from Nazi-occupied western Poland were deported to the Soviet interior.

9 Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 201.
10 Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 589.
A large number of Jewish refugees from western Poland found shelter in Pinsk, but were deported to the Soviet interior in 1940.

Many Jewish refugees from western Poland found shelter in Rovno [...] Nine years after WWII, on September 22 and 23, 1954, an investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives (Select Committee on Communist Aggression) conducted hearings where representatives of several Jewish organizations testified under oath on the subject of the persecution of Jews by the Soviet. One Herschel Weinrauch, formerly an associate editor of the Soviet newspaper _The Star_, declared that he was an official in the civil administration of Bialystok following the Soviet occupation in 1939. In his testimony he said the Communists made all refugee Jews from German-occupied Poland choose in the spring of 1940 between accepting Soviet citizenship or returning to German control.

Because of the barbarian treatment accorded these Jews from the western portion of divided Poland by the Soviets, most of them opted for a return. Shortly thereafter, though, the Soviet government arrested all those who had decided to return and transported them to Siberia. In Bialystok alone, 50,000 to 60,000 Jewish refugees were arrested. All in all, the Soviets deported roughly 1,000,000 Jewish refugees from western Poland to Siberia.13

Another witness, Bronislaw Teichholz, chairman of the International Committee for Jewish Refugees from Concentration Camps from 1945 to 1952, confirmed Weinrauch’s testimony. At that time he had been working in Lvov, where about 50,000 Jewish refugees had decided to return; all of them were deported by the Soviets, in the process crowding 70 to 80 persons into railroad cars and then moving them eastward.14

A third witness, Adolph Held, chairman of the Jewish Labor Committee, was absent due to an incident of death in his family, but he had his testimony read to the investigating committee by the vice chairman Jacob T. Zukerman. This witness, too, confirmed that up to 1,000,000 Jews escaped to Russia.15 Another witness, Henry Edward Schultz, national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, put the number of Jewish refugees from western Poland deported on Stalin’s orders to Siberian labor camps at

---

11 Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 543.
12 Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 357.
14 Ibid., p. 46 and 47.
15 Ibid., p. 61.
600,000; 450,000 of these unfortunate people have vanished without a trace.\textsuperscript{16}

The Polish Government-in-Exile, too, declared the Soviets deported 600,000 Jewish refugees from western Poland in the spring of 1940. The Jewish statistician, J. Kulischer, asserted that Stalin evacuated 530,000 Jews – 500,000 from eastern Poland and 30,000 from the Baltic countries.\textsuperscript{17} Other Jewish sources arrive at even lower figures.

Rabbi Aaron Pechenick described the Soviet mass deportation in his book \textit{Zionism and Judaism in Soviet Russia} published in New York in 1943 as follows:\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{quote}
\textit{In two days and two nights [end of June 1940] almost one million Jews were loaded into cattle wagons under the most horrible circumstances and deported to Siberia and the Ural. [...] The terrible journey lasted from four to six weeks. Having arrived at their destinations, the Jews obtained only bread and water to sustain their lives after the long working days in the forests.}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Universal} reported that the Joint Distribution Committee – a large international Jewish refugee aid organization – initiated a relief program in early 1942 for 600,000 Polish-Jewish refugees in Asiatic Russia.\textsuperscript{19} However, if there were 600,000 of these Jewish refugees in Soviet Asia in early 1942, many more must have been shipped off to Siberia by the Soviets, because the journey brought death and hardship to many. In connection with the inhuman transport to the east, the Joint Distribution Committee wrote in its Bulletin of June 1943:\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{quote}
\textit{From a fifth to a third of the number of refugees died [...] whoever did not see the thousands of graves, mostly of children, cannot understand.}
\end{quote}

This means that the number of Jewish refugees from western Poland who were arrested by the Soviets and deported to Siberia ranged from 750,000 to 900,000! But only 600,000 survived the incredible journey and arrived at their destination.

Menachem Begin belonged to these deported unfortunates also. The Soviet secret police arrested him a short time after his arrival in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland and put him into a Siberian concentration camp. Following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war (June 22, 1941) he joined the Soviet-sponsored Polish army which left the USSR in 1942 by way of Iran. In the very same year we find the former Soviet concentration camp

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 25.}
\footnote{Pechenick, Rabbi Aaron. \textit{Zionism and Judaism in Soviet-Russia}, New York, p. 60.}
\footnote{Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, p. 176.}
\footnote{Aronson, \textit{Soviet Russia and the Jews}, p. 12.}
\end{footnotes}

The extent of the Jewish flight before the German armies is not at all unusual. As a result of years of continuous Zionist campaigns and Polish inflammatory propaganda, the Jewish fear of the Germans knew no limits; this is probably the most likely explanation for the panic which gripped Polish Jews and non-Jews. Similar events developed in May 1940 when 1½ to 2 million panicky Belgians sought refuge in France, where they suffered severely; in mid-August 1940, there were still 1 million Belgians in France waiting to return home.\footnote{Krakauer Zeitung, Krakau, “Noch 1 Million Belgier in Frankreich,” No. 195, 8/18-19/1940, p. 4.}

Considering that up to one-fourth of this nation of just eight million fled in panic, even though the German Government can hardly be accused of hostility towards the Belgian people (but certainly towards the Jews), the extent of the Polish-Jewish flight is not very surprising. It is worth noting that in terms of time and geography, Polish Jews were much better situated to escape in an easterly direction; after all, during the German Western Campaign, Guderian’s Panzer divisions had cut the escape route from Belgium to France in little more than a week.

For lack of further proof, we will accept the lower figure of 750,000 Jews as having fled from western Poland to the Soviet-occupied former Polish territory. The distribution of the Polish-Jewish population between the German and Soviet occupation zones in Poland therefore changed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas under German control</th>
<th>857,000 (32.5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Areas under Soviet control</td>
<td>1,776,000 (67.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Polish Jews (end of 1939)</td>
<td>2,633,000 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But not only the USSR, Rumania also served as an escape valve for the scared Jewish masses of Poland; this was especially true of the Rumanian provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia. As will be discussed in the Sixth Chapter, this route was used by at least 100,000 Jews. The final distribution of the Jewish population of the former Polish state thus assumes the following shape:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas under German control</th>
<th>757,000 (28.8%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Areas under Soviet control</td>
<td>1,776,000 (67.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees in Rumania</td>
<td>100,000 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Polish Jews (end of 1939)</td>
<td>2,633,000 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these statistics have been gathered from Polish, Zionist, post-war German and American sources, and they show that no more than 757,000
Jews came under German administration, as German and Soviet armies occupied Poland in 1939.

How close to reality these figures are may be seen from a piece of information from the Joint Distribution Committee which stated that it had been active in German-occupied Poland without interruption, in the process reaching 630,000 persons in over 400 localities and providing them with food, medical aid, child care, clothing and other economic help. Many more Jews than that simply did not exist in German-controlled former Polish territory!

But what do German sources say about the number of Polish Jews under German control? Unfortunately, the answer is: Nothing. Of course, the Germans spoke of millions of Jews in the occupied Polish territory, but their figures were not based on a census, not even on estimates. They simply used the figures of the last Polish census of 1931 and added a certain number to allow for a natural population growth. In the ghettos the Jews were accorded some kind of self-administration, and the Germans never bothered to count them.

Thus, the Krakauer Zeitung, for instance, put the number of Jews in the Government General of Poland at 1.4 million as of the middle of 1940. But a closer look shows quickly that this figure matches almost exactly that of the Polish census of 1931, inflated by 10% for the assumed population growth. The huge emigration before the war and the massive Jewish flight to Soviet-occupied territory – a fact which is admitted to by the Zionists themselves – were not taken into account.

After Soviet-occupied, former Polish Galicia was incorporated into the Government General following the outbreak of the Russo-German war, German statements suddenly referred to a Jewish population of 2 million in the enlarged Government General. The difference of 600,000 corresponds precisely to the 545,000 Jews living in the added area according to the census of 1931, augmented by 10%. In this case, too, the massive Soviet evacuation of the urban population – attested to by German and Zionist sources – was not taken into consideration.

These German figures are not very surprising. For propaganda reasons the Germans were interested in magnifying the “Jewish danger” wherever possible. There are plenty of examples. In the case of Rumania, the German
estimate of that country’s Jewish population was 1.5 to 2 million, although the Rumanian census found only three-quarters of a million, and even the largest Zionist estimates never exceeded 900,000. As for France, which according to the largest Zionist estimates contained about 300,000 Jews, the Germans mentioned 1.2 million. All of these German figures on the Jewish population in other European countries – France, Rumania, Government General – are instances of obvious exaggeration; in truth, the Jewish population was far less than half that size.

What happened to these 757,000 Jews in areas under German control? At the end of June of 1946(!), when the option for a return from the Soviet Union expired for the Jewish refugees of 1939, only 240,489 registered Jewish survivors were tabulated in Poland. Of the many hundreds of thousands who had fled to the Soviet Union in 1939, only 157,420 took advantage of this option and returned to Poland. In other words, the primary source which released these figures, the Central Committee for Jews in Poland, a Communist organization, wants to make us believe that only 83,069 Jews of western Poland (240,489 minus 157,420) survived the Second World War under German administration. But even if these figures were correct, they refer only to registered Jews. But how many Jews survived the war as “gentiles” in disguise and/or fled to the West between the end of the war and June 1946, never to register at all?

It is possible that hundreds of thousands of Jews used the fourteen months between the end of the war and the deadline to exercise the option to return from the Soviet Union (June 1946) in order to emigrate, flee or be evacuated from Poland; this aspect will be looked into at a later stage. But assuming that all Polish Jews survived the war under German administration, can one imagine a Communist Polish government admit to this in the face of the Soviet declaration at the so-called war crimes trials in Nuremberg that the Germans had killed just about every Polish Jew?

Still, if 757,000 Polish Jews fell under German control, but only 83,069 of them were found “officially” in June 1946, then this amounts to a difference of 674,000 missing Jews – at least statistically.

Jewish Newcomers to the Soviet Empire

Let us summarize: 1.8 million Jews of the former Polish state found themselves overnight in the Soviet sphere of influence; of this number, one million remained for the time being as Soviet Citizens in former eastern

---

29 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 498.
Poland, and three-quarters of a million Polish-Jewish refugees, who refused to accept Soviet citizenship, were deported to Siberian labor and concentration camps in the most inhuman manner. This action alone cost the Jews up to 300,000, but at least 150,000, dead according to Zionist data!

In 1940, further large Jewish congregations were to disappear in the Soviet empire, as the Baltic states and parts of Rumania were forcibly annexed. The last censuses in the Baltic countries found the following Jewish minorities:\textsuperscript{30}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (1923)</td>
<td>155,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1934)</td>
<td>4,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (1935)</td>
<td>93,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic countries</td>
<td>252,906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned by the Munich Institute for Contemporary History, the Baltic states, too, witnessed a considerable Jewish emigration before the war. In the case of Lithuania, the last census goes back to 1923, which makes it necessary to allow for the emigration in the 1920s as well. Even if one assumes a relatively much smaller flow of emigration from these three countries than was true for Poland, a net reduction of at least 10% is probably a minimum, particularly as a much longer period of time must be accounted for in the case of Lithuania. A considerable emigration and a low fertility before the war probably added up to no more than 225,000 Baltic Jews coming into the Soviet sphere of influence in 1940.

As will be shown in the Sixth Chapter in some detail, Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina contained 225,000 local Jews at the time of the Soviet occupation in 1940. In addition, there were about 100,000 Polish-Jewish refugees in Rumania. These refugees were spread all over northern Rumania: northern Transylvania, Bukovina and northern Bessarabia. It is not certain how many of these refugees who fled before the German armies in September 1939 lived in Bessarabia and in the northern Bukovina at the time of the Soviet annexation. Jewish sources maintain anyway that 65,000 Jews – most of them apparently of Polish origin – crossed over from Rumanian to Soviet-occupied territory at the time of the Soviet occupation of eastern and northern Rumania.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, there is some evidence – see the Sixth Chapter – that 9,000 Polish refugees remained in northern Transylvania when Rumania had to cede that section to Hungary in 1940. Thus, it seems that the Soviet Union obtained not only the 225,000 native Rumanian Jews when it occupied those two Rumanian regions in 1940, but also at least another 91,000 Jewish refugees from Poland.

\textsuperscript{30} AJYB, 1940, Vol. 42, p. 602.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 1941, Vol. 43, p. 330.
The territorial expansion of the Soviet Union until June of 1941 thus put 2,317,000 Jews within Stalin’s empire:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish Jews:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in eastern Poland and Baltic states</td>
<td>1,776,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Rumania</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>1,867,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Jews</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian Jews</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish newcomers to the USSR in 1939/1940</td>
<td>2,317,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the month of September 1939, fewer than 20% (app. 3 million) of the roughly 16 million Jews of the world were subject to Soviet domination. The consequence of the German-Polish war was that by 1940 one-third of world Jewry found itself within the borders of the Soviet Union. For the non-Soviet Eastern European Jewry – which had suffered continuous losses during the 1930s due not only to persistent flows of emigration, but also to an excess of deaths over births and changes in religious preference – the Soviet “confiscation” of 2.3 million people of Jewish origin represented a blow from which it was never to recover.

**Jewish Population Trends in the Soviet Union**

The Soviet census of December 17, 1926, found 2,680,181 Jews.\(^{32}\) Twelve years later the census of January 17, 1939, put the Jewish population figure at 3,020,141 – an apparent increase of 340,000 persons.\(^{33}\) This change would be equivalent to an annual increase of 1%; but this interpretation of the difference between the two censuses fails to consider some important aspects.

In 1946, the American scholar and professor at Princeton University, Dr. Frank Lorimer, published a book, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, under the auspices of the League of Nations. In this book he traced important differences in data collection by the Soviets in the censuses of 1926 and 1939. The census of 1926, for instance, was based on the criterion of “narodnost” (tribe, ethnic group), which corresponds more to an ethnic “tribal” affiliation than the criterion “nationalnost” (nationality) as used in the census of 1939. In any case, the result of these definitional criteria alterations was such that the changes in the numerical size of the

---

various ethnic groups in the USSR from 1926 to 1939 bore little relationship to reality.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Soviet Population Counts}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Nationality & 1926 & 1939 & Changes \\
\hline
Russians & 77,791,124 & 99,019,929 & +21,228,805 (+27.3\%) \\
Ukrainians & 31,194,976 & 28,070,404 & −3,124,572 (−10.0\%) \\
White Russians & 4,738,923 & 5,267,431 & +528,508 (+11.2\%) \\
Jews\textsuperscript{35} & 2,680,181 & 3,020,141 & +339,960 (+12.7\%) \\
Germans & 1,246,540 & 1,423,534 & +176,994 (+14.2\%) \\
Others & 29,376,171 & 33,665,747 & +4,289,576 (+14.6\%) \\
\hline
Total & 147,027,915 & 170,467,186 & +23,439,271 (+15.9\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

This juxtaposition of the two censuses seems to reveal three developments:

a) The Russians, with barely 53\% of the total population in 1926, nevertheless furnished 90\% of the population increase of the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1939!

b) The rural Ukrainians decreased by 10\%!

c) The urban Jews increased at a rate which exceeded that of the children-blessed White Russians, and almost equaled that of the rural German population in the USSR!

A comparison of the Jewish population figures for the USSR in 1926 and 1939 thus is bound to lead to wrong conclusions as to the fertility of this minority. In order to ascertain the natural fertility of each of the ethnic groups, Prof. Lorimer investigated the so-called “Child-Woman Ratios,” \textit{i.e.} the number of children aged 0-4 years per 1,000 women aged 20-44 years. For the year 1926 he found the following ratios:\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
 & 500 \\
Needed for permanent population replacement & 844 \\
European Russia & 832 \\
Russians & 871 \\
Ukrainians & 966 \\
White Russians & 509(!) \\
Jews & 933 \\
Germans & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

These fertility figures contrast sharply with the purported changes of individual ethnic groups.

\textsuperscript{34} Lorimer, Dr. Frank. \textit{The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects}, Geneva (League of Nations), 1946, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{35} Dr. Lorimer mentioned a Jewish population of 2,672,499; this figure is 6,742 smaller than Zionist sources usually mention.

\textsuperscript{36} Lorimer, \textit{Population of the Soviet Union}, p. 95 and 96.
Even supposing the enforced collectivization at the end of the 1920s and beginning 1930s caused much greater losses among the Ukrainians than among the other peoples of the Soviet Union, the result of the census of 1939 can only be explained by the changed definitional criteria. The fertility of the Russians was below the European part of the Soviet Union and – much more important for our analysis – the Soviet Jews had barely enough children to replace themselves. Prof. Lorimer noted:

The lowest fertility is indicated by the Jews, a predominantly urban and highly literate group. [...] It is apparent that the Jewish population was barely replacing itself [...] This was true in 1926 already!

It is impossible that the Jewish fertility improved markedly during the following twelve years, because in those years the Soviets initiated a huge program of forced industrialization with an accompanying scarcity of homes and apartments in the cities. In addition, the Jews continued to migrate northward to Leningrad, Moscow and other Russian cities. The pronounced tendency toward mixed marriages between Jews and the native population of the Russian cities certainly added to a still lower fertility of the Jews until 1939.

This is not to deny that there were 3 million Jews in the Soviet Union in 1939. Considering the aspirations of the Jews to assimilate, it is quite probable that the census of 1939 still left several thousands of them uncounted. However, Prof. Lorimer’s investigations showed that the Jewish population figure for 1926 was understated to the tune of several hundreds of thousands. The conclusion thus must be that the Jewish population of pre-war USSR was already stagnating, and an excess of deaths over births cannot be excluded altogether.

Of the 2.7 million Jews as published by the Soviet census of 1926, 1,981,487 lived in the Ukraine and in White Russia. In 1939 only 1,907,951 Jews were counted in those regions. The foregoing illustrations prove, however, that the Soviet census of 1926 had underestimated the Jewish population by perhaps 300,000, or 11%. If this underestimate was distributed rather evenly throughout the Soviet Union, it is possible that the Ukraine and White Russia really had 2.2 million Jews in 1926 instead of the published 1.98 million. Compared to 1939, this represents a reduction of about 300,000 or 25,000 per year.

The north and the east of the Soviet territory, which up until WWI contained only very few Jews, thus must have been populated by the beginning of 1939 by over 1.1 million Jews, the majority of whom lived in Moscow

---

37 Ibid., p. 94 and 97.
38 AJYB, 1939, Vol. 41, p. 588.
and in Leningrad. The unbelievable migration of Jews from the west and the south is best demonstrated by these two large cities:\textsuperscript{40}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leningrad</th>
<th>Moscow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>25,453</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>52,373</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>84,505</td>
<td>131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>400,000 (450,000)\textsuperscript{41}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, between the two world wars one-third of the Soviet Jews had left the once traditional area of settlement in the west and south of the Soviet Union and moved to the less anti-Semitic north and east.

The \textit{Universal}, too, took account of this enormous migration from the Ukraine and White Russia to the north and east (incl. Siberia) in its calculation of the Jewish population distribution within the Soviet Union. The \textit{Universal} calculated that in 1939 alone the Ukraine and White Russia lost 33,000 (net) of their Jewish population to the east and north.\textsuperscript{42} The basis on which the \textit{Universal} made the estimate is not known – official figures are not available – and, to be conservative, one should not assume that the migration movement accelerated. Therefore, if we limit ourselves to the assumption that the trend existing before 1939 continued until the middle of 1941, this would amount to a net migration loss for both “republics” totaling 63,000 Jews. The Jewish population of those Soviet areas, \textit{i.e.} the north and the east, which were never occupied by German forces, thus could have increased by 63,000 as a result of an internal migration from the south and the west.

According to Zionist sources, on January 17, 1939, 2,092,951 Jews lived in those areas which were later occupied by the Germans during WWII.\textsuperscript{43} These areas included primarily the Ukraine and White Russia.

In the “free” territories, \textit{i.e.} those regions which never saw German occupation during the war, there were 927,190 Jews at the time of the last census. If one adjusts both parts of the USSR, the “free” and the occupied, by the changes incurred until June 1941 – primarily arising from an internal migration of 63,000 from the south to the north, because the excess of births over deaths, if it existed at all, probably was minimal indeed – then the dis-

\textsuperscript{40} Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 11, p. 17 and Vol. 12, p. 365.
\textsuperscript{41} Kauener Zeitung, “Juden-Metropole Moskau,” No. 130, 6/4/1943, p. 2, mentions the same statistics for the years 1920, 1923 and 1926, but none for 1940. On the other hand, this newspaper wrote that the latest published statistical material placed the number of Moscow’s Jewish inhabitants in 1937 already at over 450,000.
\textsuperscript{43} Institute of Jewish Affairs. \textit{Hitler’s Ten-Year War on the Jews}, New York, 1943, p. 184.
tribution of the 3.02 million “old” Soviet Jews must have looked something like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Free” Soviet territory</td>
<td>990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet territory occupied by German forces in the course of the war</td>
<td>2,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Old” Soviet Jews in June 1941</td>
<td>3,020,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adding it all up, there were 5,337,000 Jews in Stalin’s sphere of influence at the beginning of the war:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews “acquired” in 1939/1940</td>
<td>2,317,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Old” Soviet Jews</td>
<td>3,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews in the Soviet Union in 1941</td>
<td>5,337,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures match just about the numbers as provided by the *Universal*, according to which the Soviet Union contained 5.5 million Jews as of June 22, 1941, after having acquired roughly 2.2 million through the annexation of neighboring areas to the west.\(^44\) The *American Jewish Year Book* (Year Book) even believes this figure of 5.5 million may be a “conservative estimate.”\(^45\)

Now, if reputable Zionist sources put the number of Jews living in the Soviet Union at the outbreak of the war at 5.5 million – obviously, this figure includes those who didn’t survive the inhuman deportation of 1940 – then they are in effect providing a rough indication of the number of Polish Jews who fell into German hands. In the course of its territorial expansion, the Soviet Union acquired the Jewish populations of the Baltic states – at most 225,000 – and of eastern Rumania estimated at 225,000. If one adds the “old” Soviet Jews of 3.02 million and subtracts the total from the 5.5 million, the remaining figure should correspond with the number of those Jews whom the USSR acquired from Poland; it is about 2 million. This figure exceeds the one arrived at in this analysis by far more than 100,000 and shows the relative conservatism with which our computations were made.

Since Poland had no more than 2¾ million Jews at the outbreak of WWII, it is impossible that more than three quarters of a million Polish Jews could have fallen under German control.

Summarizing the events until the spring of 1941, one obtains the following table:

---

\(^{44}\) *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. 9, p. 670.

\(^{45}\) *AJYB*, 1941, Vol. 43, p. 319.
Poland (August 1939) 2,664,000
Soviet Union (1939) 3,020,000
Baltic states (1940) 225,000
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (1940) 225,000
Total 6,134,000

deduct:
   Polish-Jewish soldiers killed in action 31,000
   Polish-Jewish refugees in N. Transylvania 9,000
   Polish-Jews under German administration 757,000
Jews under Soviet domination in (1939/1940) 5,337,000

deduct:
   Jewish losses during the deportation to Siberia in the spring of 1940 –150,000
Jews living in the USSR in 1940 max. 5,187,000

deduct:
   Polish-Jewish refugees in Siberia 600,000
   “Old” Soviet Jews in the “free” parts of the Soviet Union 990,000
Jews in the area of the Soviet Union which always remained outside the limits of German military expansion (1940) –1,590,000
Jews living in the subsequently German-occupied parts of the Soviet Union (spring 1941) 3,597,000
THIRD CHAPTER:

Scorched Earth

Soviet Military Build-up

After Hitler’s refusal to accede to further Soviet demands for territorial concessions in Europe, the Soviet Union changed over to a war economy in the summer of 1940; on June 26, 1940, the obligatory eight-hour-workday and the seven-day workweek was decreed in this connection.1 Other decrees made it a criminal offense if workers arrived more than twenty minutes late for work, punishable by up to six months forced labor. No one was allowed to change jobs except with the written permission of the director in charge; in contrast, the commissariats were empowered to send any worker anywhere in the Soviet Union if they so desired. The Soviet press, the radio, the teachers, the travelling public speakers as well as party, union and youth organization functionaries lectured the population in innumerable meetings that a “Capitalist” attack allegedly planned for a long time was liable to be forthcoming at any time.

The American engineer John Scott, who had been working in the USSR until 1942, described the Soviet preparation for war as follows:2

*The Russian defense budget doubled almost every year. Huge reserves of war materials, machines, fuels, food and other supplies were stored. The Red Army grew from about two million in 1938 to 6.5 million men in the spring of 1940.*

Already in early 1940, the USSR had gathered 150 divisions in the western military districts, 100 of which were stationed in the former eastern Polish territories, confronting only 6 (six!) German divisions.3

At the end of March 1941, another 500,000 reservists were called up and placed in the military districts bordering the German frontier; they were followed by a further 300,000 specialists from the reserve units. With these measures the Red Army grew a total of 800,000 men just before the outbreak

---

of the war. Subsequently, General Zhukov confirmed the mobilization of 170 divisions and 2 brigades in the districts close to the border.4

The Swedish air attaché in Moscow estimated that by mid-1941 60% of the Red Army had been positioned in the western Soviet Union, concentrating particularly heavily in areas near the Rumanian border. Obviously, Stalin was aiming at the Rumanian oil fields whose possession would have given him a stranglehold on the German war machine. The Rumanian espionage learned of Stalin’s remarks to the effect that the Soviet Government would still have to make great sacrifices in order to gain time, because the coming war could be postponed but it could not be averted.5 The Yugoslavian ambassador in Moscow warned Stalin early in 1941 of the German “Barbarossa” Plans; in his reply Stalin speculated on the possible date of the German attack and said: “Let them come. We will be ready for them!”6

In April, the Soviet infantry was equipped for military action.7 German intelligence discovered that the Russians had been building airports and ammunition depots in feverish haste throughout the entire spring. Polish agents reported Russian troop movements from the Far East to the western border, and the formation and movement of new armies which could only serve aggressive purposes. The Soviets instructed their commissars that they should prepare for a long and cruel war with Germany.8 Scientists and party functionaries sent to the Baltic countries from Moscow spoke openly of the Soviet Union’s intention to enter the war: The Soviet Union is prepared “to come to the assistance of the European nations suppressed by Capitalism just as it had come to the assistance of the Baltic nations.” The start of the war, they said, depended only on the Soviet Union, but first, all of the preparatory work must be finished.9 Also, the amply staffed and equipped air support organization established near the border in the center of the frontier with Germany was of a clearly offensive character, because for defensive purposes new airports packed with planes make no sense near the border.10

After April 7, even the German embassy in Moscow was able to observe the steady call-up of reservists and raw recruits. On April 8, the Russians started to evacuate the families of the members of their trade delegation in Berlin. In Kiev, trainloads of military hardware could be seen moving toward the former Polish border. On April 9, the German military attaché in Bucharest reported that Marshall Timoshenko, regarded by many as the only

---

6 Ibid., p. 234.
8 Irving, Hitler’s War, p. 236.
10 Helmdach, Überfall?, p. 35.
really capable Soviet general, had called a council of war in Kiev and ordered an alert for all units along the western border.\textsuperscript{11}

The extent of the Soviet military preparations was such that General Halder, the German Chief of the General Staff, feared that – according to his diary entries of April 6 and 7 – the Soviet attack could be expected at any time.\textsuperscript{12} General Halder, a member of the “Resistance,” wrote after the war:\textsuperscript{13}

\[\ldots\text{it was his [Hitler’s] unshakable and not unfounded conviction that Russia was preparing to attack Germany. We know today from excellent sources that he was right.}\]

At the political level, too, Stalin was taking calculated steps to solidify his position vis-à-vis Germany. A high point of Soviet hostility toward Germany was reached on March 27, 1941, when Soviet agents in the Serbian army overthrew the pro-German government in neighboring Yugoslavia just two days after Yugoslavia had joined the Axis.\textsuperscript{14} Already on April 5, 1941, Stalin hastily signed a treaty of friendship with the new anti-German regime; the following day the German air force attacked Belgrade.\textsuperscript{15} Still more ominous from the German point of view was the treaty of neutrality signed by Japan and the Soviet Union on April 13; with this, Moscow was now free to devote all of its attention to the European theater, as the immediately accelerating pace of troop movements from the Far East to the European parts of the country showed.

Hitler and his advisors now had no further doubts about Stalin’s martial plans. Halder was sure that, if one would have shown the Soviet military build-up to a neutral military expert, he would have had to admit that it was of an aggressive design. Throughout the month of March the Soviet troop movements near the border were so intense and the supply transports from Moscow toward Smolensk and Minsk assumed such proportions that Halder feared a Soviet attack on Germany could be imminent. At the time, he said that this danger could last until April 20, 1941, because the Soviets were expected to have far superior forces until then.\textsuperscript{16}

But then, the Soviets knew very well that the Germans had no illusions about the Soviet intentions and were preparing hastily to attain first-strike capability. Already on April 10, high alert was ordered for the entire Red Army.\textsuperscript{17} General Klokov of the Politburo announced on April 16 to a select

---

\textsuperscript{11} Irving, \textit{Hitler’s War}, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{12} Helmdach, \textit{Überfall?}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{14} Hoggan, David. \textit{Der unnötige Krieg}. Tübingen, 1977, p. 438 and 486 f.
\textsuperscript{16} Irving, \textit{Hitler’s War}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{17} Helmdach, \textit{Überfall?}, p. 38.
group of officers that the war could erupt “at any moment” and that the Red Army should not be “caught off guard.”

On April 23, new reports of gigantic Soviet reinforcements in the Bukovina and Bessarabia arrived from Bucharest; the following day the German military attaché in Bucharest reported from Bucharest that ships loaded with Red Army men arrived in Odessa and were being transported from there by train to the Bug and Dniester rivers, and that the Soviets were evacuating the civilian population along their side of the Pruth river. German intelligence had reported since February 1940 already that the Soviets were systematically deporting the Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian population from the western Ukraine. The people to be deported were given only a little time to prepare and were allowed to take just a few bags along. The accuracy of these reports was verified after the recapture of the former Rumanian areas by the combined German and Rumanian armies. The census conducted by Rumania in the regained territories on August 16, 1941, registered a total population loss of about 20%. The urban population in particular had suffered from the Soviet measures; its share of the total population had shrunk to 10% (before the war it was about 20%). Kishinev, for example, lost 62% of its inhabitants, and Chernovitsy approximately 42%.

In May 1941, several armies were moved from the interior to the western USSR:

- The 22. Army from the Ural to the Velikie Luki area north of Vitebsk;
- the 21. Army from the Volga to the Gomel area;
- the 19. Army from northern Caucasus to the Shepetovka area midway between Kiev and the German-Soviet line of demarcation;
- the 16. Army from Transbaikalia (near Manchuria) to the Belaya Tserkov area (southwest of Kiev);
- the 25. Rifle Corps to the western Dvina.

On May 5, Stalin delivered speeches to officers of the Frunse Military Academy. Among the listeners were Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kalinin and Beria; also present were two generals and a major who later happened to fall into German hands and independently reiterated the contents of that speech with a high degree of unanimity. Both Ribbentrop and Göring

\[18\] Ibid., p. 75.
\[21\] Publikationsstelle Wien. *Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941 (Geheim)*, Vienna, 1943: In 1930, Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina had a population of 3.41 million (p. 17); assuming a natural increase of maybe 1.5% p.a., there should have been 4.02 million people in 1941. Deducting the 137,000 resettled ethnic Germans (p. 27), there remain 3.88 million; however, only 3.22 million were found (p. 17) – a decrease by 20%. Kishinev had 140,000 inhabitants before the war (1930: 114,896), but the Rumanians found only 52,962 – a reduction by 62%; Chernovitsy’s population of roughly the same size before WWII (1930: 112,427) was down to 78,825 in August 1941 – a minus of 42% (p. 70-73).

claimed in 1943 and after the war, respectively, that details of this speech had been forwarded to Hitler by agents almost immediately. The gist of Stalin’s speech was:

He referred to the need to prepare for the coming war with Germany and promised that within two months the Soviet Union would possess some of the best and fastest aircraft in the world. The war plan, he said, is completed, the airfields have been built, and the frontline aircraft are there already. Everything has been done to clear out the rear areas; all the foreign elements have been removed. Within the next two months the USSR can begin to battle Germany. The pact with Germany was just a trick. A carefully developed, vast partisan movement built up throughout Europe since the war began in 1939 would paralyze the supplies of the German Army. The era of forcible expansion for the Soviet Union has begun.

On May 10, the German Air Force reported the concentration of 4,000 Soviet aircraft on the airfields near the border and the stationing of another 1,000 in rear areas as detected through radio reconnaissance.

General Vlassov, taken prisoner in 1942, confirmed later that the Soviets intended to attack in late summer of 1941. Jacob Jugashvili, Stalin’s son who fell into German hands in July 1941 as an artillery lieutenant in an armored division, told his German interrogators “that they were preparing to attack when, suddenly, they […] were smashed to pieces.”

No doubt, the German preventive action of June 22, 1941, hit the Soviet military build-up before the Red steamroller started to move. Six weeks earlier, on May 12 and 15, the Soviet spy Sorge had reported the imminent attack by 150 German divisions, disclosing the exact date of June 22, 1941, and the German operative plans to Moscow.

The very first days of the German invasion furnished ample proof that the Soviet Army had indeed been prepared for an attack on central Europe. Even in those frontier pockets extending far to the west around Lvov and Bialystok – which were quite exposed to German encirclement and for this reason were useless for defensive purposes – the German troops encountered massive Soviet assault forces. As a result, the head-on clash with the Soviet army and air force occurred just as soon as the Germans crossed the border.

But since the Soviet high command was limited to just 150-200 air strips adjacent to the German border because of the unfavorable terrain (large parts in the center portion of the German-Soviet border were swampy), the available strips were particularly crowded with planes ready to execute the

---

23 Irving, Hitler’s War, p. 238-240.
24 Ibid., p. 265.
26 Ibid., p. 99.
27 Ibid., p. 42.
planned attacks on German positions. Thus, the very first military operations of the German fighter and reconnaissance squadrons encountered numerous airfields of which several were packed with up to 100 Soviet planes. The German air force cut into this massive concentration of several thousand Soviet planes which were ready for the onslaught on Germany. Just between June 22 and 28, 1941, 4,107 Soviet planes were destroyed, about 3,000 on the ground.28 Similar losses were suffered by the Red Army in the Bialystok area. Between June 22 and July 1, it lost 5,774 tanks, 2,330 artillery pieces and 160,000 prisoners, not counting the fallen Red Army men.29

_Soviet Policy of Destruction_

In his speech of February 25, 1956, at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, N.S. Khrushchev called Stalin’s claim of a German surprise attack a lie and noted that the Soviet leadership knew from many excellent sources (for instance, Churchill; the British ambassador to the USSR, Cripps; the Soviet embassy in London and other Soviet military and diplomatic channels, as well as the Soviet deputy military attaché in Berlin, Chlopov) that the German attack was imminent.30

Also, Stalin’s preparations to wage war against Europe were made from a strategic-economic point of view long before Hitler appeared in the political arena as the leader of a resurrected Germany. In contrast to Stalin, Nikolaj Bukharin, who was liquidated in 1938, and other old Bolsheviks favored the development of light industry; they felt that total industrialization could only be pursued once consumer goods were made available to the population. Stalin won the dispute and silenced the others: The Soviet Union thereupon embarked on the most gigantic industrialization program the world had ever seen.

The foundations for this giant undertaking were laid in the first Five-Year-Plan (1928-1932), which called for the establishment of completely new industrial sectors and bases. The core of the Plan was the development of heavy industry in the Urals and in Siberia.

The German army had penetrated the Ukraine in 1918, and a repetition could not be excluded entirely; therefore, in Stalin’s opinion the Soviet Union needed a heavy industry located out of reach of possible enemies. In February 1931 Stalin said:

---

Russia must overtake the most advanced capitalist countries with respect to industrial and military capacity within ten years [i.e. until 1941], or else those countries are going to destroy us.

He emphasized that these new industries would be located in the Urals and in Siberia thousands of kilometers from the nearest border and outside the reach of enemy planes.

In order to attain this goal, thousands of foreign experts were engaged who, while working for the Soviet Union or foreign companies, had to be paid in gold. The American John Scott wrote that in Magnitogorsk alone there were three to four hundred German and American specialists. Relative to general Soviet living conditions, these foreigners enjoyed almost unbelievable luxuries, while millions of men and women died of hunger, froze to death or succumbed to inhuman work requirements and living conditions.31

Thus, the naiveté of many Western historians is best demonstrated by their stubborn adherence to the thesis that Stalin, who from the very start concentrated the Soviet Union’s forced industrialization in the Urals for strategic reasons only and who was very well informed of German military preventive plans, had been surprised by Germany’s attack. The opposite is true. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviet Union was hurriedly moving people and industrial installations out of the western provinces and districts. John Scott reports that32

before war broke out, important installations for the production of electrical materials had been moved from White Russia and the area around Leningrad to western Siberia. [and] at least one armaments factory, formerly located near Leningrad, was transferred to Magnitogorsk together with the entire machinery and all of the personnel. […] Except for the largest blast furnaces, steel making and chemical installations, everything else was transported by rail rather easily to other regions and without significant damages.

According to Prof. Lorimer, the Soviet plans for transporting people and machines to the interior were immediately put into action at the start of the hostilities.33 Prof. Boris Semjonowitsch Telpuchowski from the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow confirmed that this eventuality had been taken into account in the plans to switch the railroad traffic immediately to serve military needs. In the first few months one million railroad cars loaded with industrial equipment, materials and people left the endangered areas near the frontline.34

The Germans estimated the Soviet stock of passenger and freight cars at the beginning of the war at 36,000 and 850,000, respectively. At the end of

---

31 Scott, Jenseits des Ural, p. 76, 79, 105, 304-305.
32 Ibid., p. 307 and 312.
34 Telpuchowski, Die sowjetische Geschichte, p. 84.
1941, 40% of the Soviet railroad network was in German hands; still the Soviets managed to take the bulk of the rolling stock along with them: At the end of 1941 German troops had captured only 1,100 passenger and 43,300 freight cars—almost half of these during the first four weeks. In other words, the Russians were not at all surprised by the German attack; they seem to have expected it.

Assuming that up to 50%, i.e. more than 400,000 railroad cars, had their home stations in the areas occupied during the war by German forces, the Soviets obviously were able to evacuate about 90% of that rolling stock before the Germans could lay their hands on them. Of course, all these railroad cars were shipped further east fully loaded. If one adds to these the number of cars arriving from the east carrying military personnel and weaponry, ready to transport people, materials and machines on their return trip, then one can understand how the Soviets managed to evacuate huge masses of people in such a short time; the fact that the areas close to the German border were neither very highly industrialized nor greatly urbanized permitted the use of a correspondingly greater number of cars for the removal of the relatively small urban population. John Scott had this to add:

*The Russian railroad tracks running in an east-west direction are crowded with trains bringing supplies and reserves to the front. Going east the freight trains are loaded with machines and workers. Even though I know of no numbers, I am convinced that a large part of the industrial machinery, which was located previously in the areas temporarily occupied by Germany, did not fall into German hands, but is in full operation in Stalin’s Ural fortress fifteen hundred or two thousand kilometers east of the frontline of spring of 1943.*

The Ural area was capable of producing every type of material required for the production of tanks, heavy trucks, artillery and airplanes. Until the outbreak of the war, two things still were in short supply in that region: machines and labor. “Both,” Scott continued, “have been transferred there recently in large numbers.”

Prof. Lorimer confirmed also that the Soviets set out immediately after the German attack to activate their plans for the dismantling of factories and resurrecting them in the interior; in addition, he says, a large part of the agricultural machinery and a lot of livestock was removed. Even Khrushchev admitted that the Soviets succeeded in increasing military production during the war in the eastern sections of the country and to re-install the removed means of production from the western industrial territories.

---

35 Reichswirtschaftsministerium. *Die UdSSR Anfang 1942*, (Date unknown), Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Bestand R 24/817.
37 Telpuchowski, *Die sowjetische Geschichte*, p. 28E.
The re-use of the machines transported from western regions was facilitated by the circumstance that the Soviet leadership had put up factory shells in the Urals and Siberia long before the war started, ensuring that sufficient electric energy was available. John Scott, an eyewitness to these happenings, wrote:

"Railroad and factory construction in the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia was speeded up. [Until the spring of 1941…] Here, new factory buildings rose which were not to be found on any blue-prints. Nobody knew what they were to be used for. At the same time, great efforts were undertaken in order to enlarge the output of power stations even though there was enough power for the local industry, at least in Magnitogorsk."

This, Scott emphasized, occurred only in the Urals region.\(^{38}\)

The Soviets had covered the entire Ural industrial region with a fine railroad system and a far-flung network of power lines together with the appropriate power stations. In 1934, the electric power plants in the Ural area produced 2 billion kWh already; in 1940 it was twice as much.\(^{39}\) Until the outbreak of hostilities and during the war, electric power production was increased further. Possibly, these figures are more meaningful to the reader once he realizes that the entire occupied Soviet territory, administered by the Germans under the name of “occupied eastern territories,” with its huge heavy industry produced no more than 10 billion kWh of electrical power before the war. As I have shown elsewhere, the Germans were able to produce just 1 billion kWh in this wide area in 1943 despite their utilization of large numbers of German personnel and considerable amounts of German equipment.\(^{40}\) Comparisons not only show the extent of the Soviet orgy of destruction, but also the gigantic potential for the production of armaments built up by the Soviets east of the Volga before the war. Telpuchowski describes the Russian measures as follows:\(^{41}\)

\(\text{The evacuation of industrial enterprises proceeded along a uniform economic plan of mobilization. The plan specified the places of destination where the enterprises were to be transported and the successive turns in which the removal was to take place. The interconnections between the individual factories and plants and their dependence on one another was also taken into account. […] Hundreds of industrial enterprises were transplanted to the eastern territories. 455 enterprises were moved to the Urals which served as the arsenal of the Soviet Army. In just three months of the year 1941, more than 1,360 industrial complexes were transplanted. The movable equipment of thousands of collective}\)
and state farms was transported to the interior. Thanks to the heroic work of the blue- and white-collar workers, the evacuated enterprises rose in a very short time at their new locations. It should be noted that, as a result of the evacuation of the enterprises, the enemy did not succeed in using the industrial stock of the occupied regions for his own purposes as he did in western Europe. Because of the successful removal and re-activation of the enterprises, the main stock of industrial equipment was saved. All of this made it possible that the production of tanks, planes, cannons and other arms could even be increased a few months later. [...] The evacuated enterprises rose in an unbelievably short time at their new localities. The workers and cadres [...] worked under the open sky, quite often in rain and snow. [...] Work continued throughout the day. The workday often lasted from 12 to 14 hours and even more. [...] The assembly of the larger plants and factories was finished in three to four weeks and within 3 to 4 months production attained pre-war levels. On average, one-and-one-half to two months were needed to reactivate the evacuated plants. [...] The falling trend of production was stopped already in December of 1941.

The accessible remains of the secret documents of the German Economy Staff East (Wirtschaftsstab Ost) show clearly that the Soviets succeeded indeed in evacuating a large part of their means of production within the framework of a detailed plan of removal, or at least to make them unusable for the Germans. In this connection, the secret No. 3 Fourteen-Day-Report of the German Economy Staff East dated August 30, 1941, has this to say: 43

The Russian and Jewish upper classes withdrew together with the Red Army. The leading Ukrainians have been partially deported and, if they held leading positions in administration and industry, they were also forced to move east of the Dnieper. Numerous tractor drivers and other specialists on the countryside met the same fate. In June, many young men were called up and put in garrisons in the interior of the USSR. [...] Because of this development, there is a tremendous scarcity of people capable of assuming responsible positions in administration, industry and agriculture in the Ukraine. [...] Extensive economic losses have been sustained because of the systematic clearing and destruction operations of the Red Army before withdrawal. These damages have increased progressively from west to east. In the cities, the damage caused in this way affects factories and stores, and in part also the living quarters and their contents; in the countryside, especially the stock of machinery, livestock, grain dumps and the gasoline supplies of the collective and state farms have suffered. The clearing action begins usually about 8-10 days before the withdrawal of the Red Army. The critical machines of the enterprises, especially motors, have been removed, carefully packaged and loaded to be shipped to the east of the USSR.

42 The economic administration of the occupied Soviet areas was in the hands of the so-called Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economy Staff East).
43 Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Vierzehntagesbericht Wi Stab Ost (3.8.-16.8.1941), 8/30/1941, Militärarchiv Freiburg, Bestand RW 31/11.
Destination addresses found in the Ukraine as a rule point to the Ural industrial area, specifically the region encompassed by Sverdlovsk – Molotov (Perm) – Ufa – Chkalov (Orenburg) – Magnitogorsk. It seems that in that area arrangements have already been made for the re-use of the machines removed from the Ukraine. [...] The destruction usually sets in 24 hours before the Soviet troops withdraw. These actions are prepared carefully and include the burning of smaller factories, the blasting of important machine complexes and apparently also the handing over of supplies to the population to loot (contents of the stores in the cities, grain supplies in rural areas). It is quite obvious that the military resistance met in several places (e.g. the giant power station Dnepro-Ges and the aluminum complex in Zaporoshye as well as the iron works in Dnepropetrovsk) had one purpose only, namely to destroy the remaining important industrial works.

Similarly, the Mid-Month-Report dated December 8, 1941, explained that the destruction of the city of Kharkov began on October 21, 1941, according to accounts of the population. The destruction was carried out with extreme brutality. In many cases, the inhabitants had their houses burned to the ground before they could vacate them. Without doubt, only the rapid occupation by German troops prevented them [the Soviets] from carrying out their plans to burn down the entire city. [...] Totally destroyed are especially the water works, a bread factory, a large laundry, and by far the largest portion of factory installations. [...] Local inhabitants reported that the systematic clearing of the most important industrial works started in August already and assumed a vast scale. Specialists and their families were forcibly evacuated. Apparently, Kharkov’s industry has been re-assembled in a rough-and-ready manner above all in Chelyabinsk (western Siberia). The inhabitants say that they received letters from there, according to which the deportees face a desperate situation, lack of living quarters and hunger. Observations in other places, too, reinforce the impression that the disassembly and removal of machinery follows a detailed clearing plan with the objective of moving important bottleneck equipment to areas not endangered as much in order to restart the production of war materials in substitute factories. Thus, the Soviets not only disassembled and removed machinery, but also smaller equipment and tools.

Even before the war, the lot of the people exiled to the new industrial regions in the Urals and western Siberia was sad indeed. As elsewhere in the USSR, shoes and clothing were practically unavailable in 1939 already, and in 1940 even bread was rationed. Hospitals consisted of barracks, were without running water, brutally hot in the summer, ice-cold in the winter, rarely clean and always overcrowded. In 1938 still, only 25% of the population of Magnitogorsk was fortunate enough to live in houses, whereas 50% were crowded into barracks and other “temporarily constructed houses,” and 25%
had to be satisfied with so-called “semlianki” (Tatar huts. etc.).\textsuperscript{45} Into this region, deficient in even the most basic civilian infrastructure, the Soviets deported shortly before and after the outbreak of hostilities untold millions of Russians, Jews, Ukrainians and other nationalities of the western Soviet Union.

The hopeless situation of the deportees in Siberia is also evident in the words of the Soviet court historian Telpuchowski who said, referring to the evacuation of millions of civilians,

\begin{quote}
the accommodation of the masses going into the millions, who had been evacuated from the areas occupied or threatened by the enemy, posed a serious problem in the hinterland […] which lacked the most elementary lodging facilities; they had to live in tents and sod huts. Food was scarce.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

Obviously, there are no large differences between Telpuchowski’s description of the Soviet measures and the secret reports of the German Economy Staff East with regard to the desperate situation in the Soviet areas of retreat – with the one exception that Telpuchowski did not think it worth mentioning the application of the inhuman Soviet “scorched earth” policy even towards the infrastructure and supplies critically needed by the civilian population that remained behind.

\textit{Soviet Mass Deportations}

The Soviet rulers believed that hostilities would break out at the German-Soviet line of demarcation regardless. An evacuation of the “threatened” and “foreign” civilian population near the border was thus entirely possible before June 22, 1941, and was carried out, too, as we learned from Stalin’s speech. When the German naval attaché left Moscow on May 19, 1941 – five weeks before the beginning of the war – taking the train through Soviet-occupied former eastern Poland in the direction of Berlin, he met locked prison trains escorted by blue-uniformed GPU troops deporting “undesirables” from eastern Poland.\textsuperscript{47}

The extent of the Soviet deportation program is subject to the most contradictory speculations. Contrary to Edward C. Carter, president of the Russian War Relief, who mentioned 37 millions in September 1942,\textsuperscript{48} the \textit{Year Book} maintains that the German advance was so rapid that the Soviet railroad system was incapable of effecting evacuation to any noteworthy

\textsuperscript{45} Scott, \textit{Jenseits des Ural}, p. 262, 281, 301.
\textsuperscript{46} Telpuchowski, \textit{Die sowjetische Geschichte}, p. 82 and 88.
\textsuperscript{47} Irving, \textit{Hitler’s War}, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{48} Institute of Jewish Affairs. \textit{Hitler’s Ten-Year War}, p. 184.
degree.\textsuperscript{49} The Soviets, anyway, have never actually published figures on the magnitude of this human tragedy.

The task to obtain a somewhat reliable picture is complicated by the fact that there are no exact figures available for the total Soviet population at the beginning of the war in 1941; the census of January 1939 was outdated soon after, because of the Soviet annexation of huge regions on the western border in 1939 and 1940. Of course, the German administration carried out more or less detailed counts of the population present, but a comparison with pre-war figures is difficult, because the borders of the various German administrative districts in the occupied territories were rarely comparable to the administrative and political pre-war borders. The \textit{Reichskommissariat} (RK) Ostland contained the Baltic countries as well as parts of former eastern Poland and of the Soviet-Republic of White Russia. The RK Ukraine included parts of eastern Poland in the west (until Brest-Litovsk) but not Galicia. On the other hand, Rumania not only regained its former provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, but also annexed a part of the former Soviet-Republic Ukraine, calling it “Transnistria”; towards the east, large parts of the former Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) Ukraine was subject to German military and not civilian rule. For these reasons, it is necessary to scrutinize the pre-war population of the Soviet Union very closely.

The census of January 17, 1939, found a total population of 170.5 million.\textsuperscript{50} Since the last count on December 17, 1926, the population of the USSR had grown by 15.9\%, which corresponds to an annual rate of 1.2\%. The natural growth rate, though, must have been much higher, because the enforced collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s cost the lives of millions of people, especially in the Ukraine. Exact figures, of course, will never be available on the mass starvation of the early 1930s, but a comparison of the census of 1926 (before the forced collectivization) and of 1939 should provide some indications.

A comparison of the two censuses shows that between 1926 and 1939 there was an unbelievably large reduction of those born in the years 1919-1926 – the group which at the time of the Great Hunger in the early 1930s was still of childhood age. Between 1926 and 1939 (peacetime!), this population group shrunk 11\%, or 3.5 million, from 31.9 to 28.5 million. The age groups 1899-1918 numbered 60.4 million in 1926 but only 56 million in 1939 – a reduction of 4.4 million or 7.3\%! In short, of the 92.3 million Soviet inhabitants who were \textit{less} than 28 years old in 1926, only 84.4 million, or 91.4\%, had survived until 1939!

\textsuperscript{49} AJYB, 1947, Vol. 49, p. 395.
Even if one postulates a reduction by 2% as a consequence of a normal mortality for these young age groups in the period 1926-1939, there are still 6.6% whose disappearance must have been caused by the starvation policy; applied to the 92.3 million, this amounts to 6 million people. Applied to the 150 million Soviet citizens at the end of the 1920s, we obtain 10 million people who starved to death – and in this connection we haven’t even considered the much higher, hunger-induced infant mortality of those children born after December 17, 1926, but before and during the Great Hunger.

Without the more than ten million victims of the great starvation of the 1930s, the census of January 17, 1939, would have found far more than 180 million people. Compared to the 147 million Soviet citizens of 1926, this would have corresponded to a natural increase of over 22%; since emigration and immigration were almost impossible, this is equivalent to an annual rate of natural growth of 1.8%! Applying this growth rate to the 2½ years from January 1939 to June 1941, the actual Soviet population (excl. the inhabitants of the newly acquired western territories) would have increased from 170.5 million (January 1939) to 178 million (June 1941).

After the incorporation of the Ukrainian and White Russian regions of former eastern Poland and the annexation of Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina, the Soviet population rose by another seventeen million. In addition, there was the occupation and annexation of the Baltic countries in 1940 with a population of six million. Finally, many Polish citizens from

---


52 For 1926, *Wirtschaft und Statistik* provided figures for the age groups 1897/1906, 1907/1911, 1912/1918; for 1939, the age groups 1899/1908, 1909/1918. In order to match the age groups of 1926 and 1939 censuses, three average years were deducted from the group 1907/1911, and added to the group 1909/1918. The group 1899/1908 for 1926 was calculated in a similar fashion.

53 The sum does not add up to the final census figure for 1939; the difference applies to the extreme North of the Soviet Union where the census was taken somewhat later.

54 Normally, this young age group should have had a mortality of maybe 1% for a 12-year-period; in order to take account of the worse hygienic and social environment in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s, a mortality of 2% was assumed, even though this is probably too high.


western Poland – Jews in particular – fled in the first half of September 1939 to the eastern parts, which were occupied by the Soviet Union after September 17, 1939.

As a result, the population living in the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, must have reached at least 202 million. Thus, the findings of the American scholar Prof. Lorimer that the total population of Soviet Russia was about 200 million in those days matches just about our own calculations.\(^{57}\)

Besides these newly acquired Soviet territories with a population of roughly 23 million (excl. refugees), the German Wehrmacht succeeded in occupying the following “old” Soviet areas, wholly or in part:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1,000 sq. km</th>
<th>Population (in 1,000) as of January 17, 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Russian SSR</td>
<td>126.8</td>
<td>5,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>445.3</td>
<td>30,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea ASSR</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov Oblast</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>2,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel Oblast</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>3,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk Oblast</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>3,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronesh Oblast</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>3,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalinin Oblast</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>3,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk Oblast</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>2,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordzhonikidze Kray</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>1,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkar ASSR</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Osetin ASSR</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,275.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,491</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, large portions of the Stalingrad, Tula, Moscow and Leningrad districts (oblast) had been conquered, but the capital cities of these oblasts always remained outside German control. Without the urban population of Tula, Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, the population of these areas amounted to 11.6 million as of January 17, 1939. If the German forces occupied only a section containing just one fifth of their total population, another 2.5 million must be added; therefore, it seems that the “old” Soviet regions which were occupied by German troops in the course of the war were populated by 65 million people as of January 17, 1939.

Considering, furthermore, a natural increase of about 3 million until mid-1941, the population of all Soviet territory occupied by the Axis armies – including the newly acquired regions to the west in 1939/1940, must have numbered 91 million at the time German-Soviet hostilities began. This fig-

---

ure comes rather close to Lorimer’s own of 85 million;\(^{59}\) but Prof. Lorimer obviously didn’t allow for a natural population increase in the 2½ years between the last census and the outbreak of the war.

Telpuchowski wrote, “40% of the population of our country [lived] in the area occupied by the enemy until November 1941.”\(^{60}\) This means that official Soviet sources put the pre-war population of the territories occupied by the Germans until November 1941 at about 81 million (i.e. 40% of 202 million). If one adds the additional territory conquered in 1942, it seems that our calculations of 91 million people are almost too low.

German investigations during the war provide a similar picture. In the areas under German control on November 1, 1942, the pre-war population was calculated at 83.81 million.\(^{61}\) It should be noted that in the meantime there had been some losses of territory due to military reverses by the Germans, so that these figures were already reduced by several millions. If a natural increase until mid-1941 is taken into account, it would seem that 91 million is to be regarded as the absolute minimum prewar population of all the Soviet territories conquered by the German armies.

According to Prof. Lorimer, 31% of the population of occupied “old” Soviet regions was urban before the war;\(^{62}\) a similar situation existed in Estonia and in Latvia. However, in Lithuania the urban population was smaller, and it was still smaller in the areas taken from Poland and Romania.\(^{63}\) All in all, one may say that the total urban pre-war population of the occupied Soviet Union must have been at least 25 million.

Regarding the time and the number of the evacuated civilian population Prof. Lorimer wrote:\(^{64}\)

> Another wartime movement, begun on a relatively small scale at an early stage and augmented just before and after the German attack, was the selective evacuation of such persons as former army officers, government officials and executives, and, later, workers of various kinds from areas annexed by the U.S.S.R. to the interior of the Soviet Union. […] Kulischer estimates the total number of

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 194.

\(^{60}\) Telpuchowski, Die sowjetische Geschichte, p. 78.

\(^{61}\) Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Annähernde Angaben über die am 1. November 1942 besetzten Gebiete der UdSSR, (Date unknown), Bundesarchiv Koblenz: Bestand R 24/804.

\(^{62}\) Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 194.

\(^{63}\) Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Gebiet und Bevölkerung der UdSSR, (Date unknown), Bundesarchiv Koblenz: Bestand R 24/804. The urban population for the areas annexed by the Soviet Union in the years 1939 and 1940 (Baltic countries, eastern Poland, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia) is given as 3.42 million. In order to estimate the urban population before the outbreak of the war in the subsequent German-occupied Soviet territories, one has to add part of the urban population of those Soviet areas which were not fully occupied by German troops, like the oblasts of Stalingrad, Leningrad, Moscow and Tula; we also have to take into account that, since the last census in 1939, continued war preparations and industrialization measures may have forced at least another two million people into the cities.

\(^{64}\) Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 195-197.
civilians evacuated from the annexed areas at 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 persons...

Finally, we come to the most important population movement in the U.S.S.R. during the war – apart from the mobilization of military personnel, which we shall not attempt to estimate – namely, the planned, selective evacuation from the path of the invader. When the Germans crossed the frontiers, plans were immediately put into effect for the rapid removal of people and equipment. In fact, large-scale evacuation of persons from the annexed areas bordering on the German zone seems to have been initiated at least several days before June 22, 1941. Most of this evacuation was by railway. Whole factories were dismantled and set up in the interior; a large part of the farm machinery and much of the livestock were removed. There is no precise official information about the number of persons evacuated, and widely divergent estimates have been made by competent authorities. […]

In general, the population of Ukrainian cities in 1942 seems to have been half as large or less than it was in 1939. […] The depletion of urban population by evacuation may have been less marked in the most western districts of the annexed areas than in the Ukraine as a whole, but scattered Soviet references indicate far greater depletion of population in some other cities, such as Smolensk and Kalinin. German discussions of agricultural problems in the occupied area give added evidence of the large-scale removal or destruction of farm equipment, but indicate the shortage of agricultural labor was not serious except in certain districts. […] This evidence furnishes some reason for believing the thesis of the Chief of the War Economy Department in the German Economic Administration in the East [Assistant Secretary Dr. Rachner] that the evacuation from the area occupied in 1941 was equal to about half of the urban population, with refugee movements to rural districts about offsetting the evacuation of the rural population. This German authority estimated on this basis that the number of evacuated from occupied to free Soviet territory in 1941 was about 12.5 million persons.

Two estimates by independent authorities, based on an analysis of the railway carrying capacity, result in divergent figures for evacuation from areas occupied prior to 1942. Habicht estimates 15 million as a maximum, and Vassiliev places the total number of evacuees from 7.5 to 10 million. […] Kulischer estimates the grand total of evacuees from both the annexed and original Soviet territories at 12 million persons, excluding only military personnel mobilized before the German invasion. This is a very possible figure. […]

In general, these displaced people were located in the area of the Central Industrial Region which had been marked by most rapid expansion during the preceding decade. […] It would appear that large numbers were located in regions near the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, and that Tashkent was an important distributing point for refugees and evacuees. A great many were assigned to various established and relocated industries in the Central Volga Region, the Urals, western and central Siberia, Kasakhstan, Central Asia, and the Far North. The industrial output of the Ural region is reported to have increased threefold during the war.
Referring to these Soviet measures, the Zionist author Reitlinger wrote:65

[…] it became the Russian policy to remove the working population so that the towns should not benefit the enemy. […] Not to consent to be evacuated was regarded as a hostile act, often visited with dire consequences later.

And the Jewish Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau, S.A. Lesovsky, announced the official version of the Soviet Government with these gory words:66

In fact, the Germans never did occupy any territory with a population of 75,000,000. Well aware of the wolfish proclivities of the Nazi plunderers, ravishers and murderers, the mass of the Soviet population departed beforehand for the Eastern districts of the Soviet Union.

The fourteen large Ukrainian cities listed by Prof. Lorimer were evacuated by 53% on average. However, Prof. Lorimer did not take into consideration that these cities must have had a much larger population in mid-1941 than in early 1939. At the start of the First Five-Year-Plan (1928) blue- and white-collar workers represented just 17% of the Soviet population according to Molotov’s remarks at the 18th Party Congress in 1939, but eleven years later, in 1939, their percentage was 50%.67 This revolutionary industrialization policy of the Five-Year-Plans not only had an enormous effect on the societal composition of the masses, but on the growth of the cities as well. The 174 cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants in January 1939 contained a total population of 34.1 million (1939) compared to only 16.2 million in 1926; this is equivalent to a rate of increase of 6.5% annually during this 12-year-period.

But the 14 Ukrainian cities as listed by Prof. Lorimer registered “only” a per annum growth rate of 5.5% since 1926.68 There is no reason to assume that the expansion of Soviet cities slowed between 1939 and 1941 while preparations were made for the coming war with Germany; the opposite is true, as the feverish war preparations of the Soviets made a still more rapid industrialization necessary. The assumption is not far-fetched that the cities listed by Lorimer – Kiev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporoshye, Mariupol, Krivoi Rog, Nikolaev, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Poltava, Kirovograd, Kherson, Shitomir, Vinnitsa and Melitopol – evidenced large rates of growth after January 1939 also.

Assuming a rate of increase somewhat less than the average of the past twelve years, let us say 10% for the 2½ years from January 1939 to June 1941, those fourteen Ukrainian cities must have had a total population of over 4 million when the Germans crossed the border. Following the occu-

65 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 228.
66 Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 184.
67 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 2nd July-issue, p. 290.
pation of these cities, the Germans found only 1.69 million inhabitants; thus, the Soviets succeeded in evacuating almost 60% of their urban population. Applied to the entire urban population of more than 25 million, this would mean that only ten million inhabitants remained in the cities when the Germans arrived; the other 15 million had been removed by the Soviets before the Germans reached the cities.

Reitlinger, too, noted categorically in his book *The Final Solution*: “In most captured towns less than half the population stayed.”69 Dr. Rachner commented in the *Reichsarbeitsblatt*:70

[…] *in general, one can assume that the countryside in the occupied areas has suffered no loss of its population. Granted that the occupied regions contained a total population of 75 million before the start of hostilities, about 50 million of these were living in rural areas. If one assumes this population to be still present and needed – one should note that agricultural work had to change over in part to more manual labor because of the loss of machinery – then a figure of 25 million is left for the cities of the occupied areas. Investigations show, though, that only one half of the [urban] population was left at most; this is equivalent to 12½ million.*

One should not forget that Dr. Rachner’s remarks were made in early 1942 when German population counts had only started. To what extent political considerations colored his statements is uncertain. The Soviets in any case were busy exploiting the success of their policy of evacuation, destruction and sabotage propagandistically in every way. The Japanese Government was so impressed by the Soviet propaganda that the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, notified the German Government to this effect with the accompanying request to supply him with data on the raw material and production situation in the agricultural and industrial areas of the Ukraine and White Russia, as well as the size of the population under German administration, especially in the Ukraine; he wanted to forward this information on to Tokyo to counter Soviet reports.71 One should certainly assume, therefore, that Dr. Rachner’s evacuation figure of 12½ million people evacuated by the Soviets probably tended to be somewhat too rosy.

In any case, Inspector Krüger of the Chief Group Economy, Statistical Department, in the Economy Staff East noted on February 17, 1943, in a secret report that the population of the so-called “occupied eastern territories” contained a population of 70 million before the war and that only 50

---

69 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 228.
70 Rachner, Dr. “Der Arbeitseinsatz in den neu besetzten Ostgebieten,” *Reichsarbeitsblatt* (published by the Reichsarbeitsministerium), Berlin, 22nd Year, No.7, March 5, 1942, p. V 131.
million had been found.\textsuperscript{72} The “occupied eastern territories” mentioned by Krüger included only the \textit{Reichskommissariats} Ostland and Ukraine, which were under civilian administration, and the military-ruled areas east of them. They did not include the population of the district of Bialystok and Galicia, which was incorporated in the Government General of Poland, the provinces of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia regained by the Rumanians, and the so-called “Transnistrian” part of the former SSR Ukraine. The total population of these excluded former Soviet territories, which were administered neither by the Economy Staff East nor by the German military, probably contained at least 13 million people before the war. However, if one can assume that these areas, too, because of their proximity to the German border and their relatively small urban population, lost only 15\% of their population, which was the percentage missing in the RK Ostland, then the Soviets could have evacuated 2 million of these 13 million people.\textsuperscript{73}

Finally, adding a natural increase of perhaps 4 million likely to have occurred in the period between January 1939 and June 1941, it seems that the area which was in German hands as of February 17, 1943, must have contained 87 million people before the war, the whereabouts of only 61 million of whom, however, could be traced; 26 million, or almost 30\%, had disappeared!

Other German sources, too, point to a similar figure. The \textit{Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland}, for instance, reported in 1943 that the losses of the Soviet Union in terms of soldiers and resident population in the lost territories must be put at \textit{at least} 70 million.\textsuperscript{74} Deducting the many millions of Soviet prisoners in German custody and fallen Red Army soldiers, the remaining figure for the Soviet population in German-occupied territory was about 60–65 million.

Indications are that Dr. Rachner’s figures on the number of the deported Soviet population were too small and that Stalin’s propaganda of having denied the Germans a large portion of the human and industrial stock in the occupied areas – and, from the point of view of martial requirements, the most important part at that – matched reality more closely than the Germans might have wished.


\textsuperscript{73} The 1930 census recorded a total population of 2,864,402 in Bessarabia. Natural growth of this largely agricultural population probably was at least 1.2\% p.a. Thus, until mid-1941 there should have been an increase by over 380,000 to at least 3,245,000. But the Rumanian census of August 1941 taken immediately after that region’s liberation from the Soviet yoke found only 2,733,565 inhabitants (Publikationsstelle Wien, \textit{Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien}, p. 51) – more than half a million persons, including almost the entire Jewish population, was missing. This amounts to a loss of more than 15\%.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland}, “Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Verluste der Sowjetunion.” No. 14, 1/14/1943, p. 6.
These figures are supported by an analysis of the Chief of Supply of the 200th Rifle Division of the 5th Army on the “Perspectives on the Supply Situation of the USSR in the Winter Campaign 1942/1943.”75 The study notes that 65 million people lived under Axis administration in all of the regions taken from the Soviets (as of autumn 1942). The author of the analysis assumed, however, that 100 million people had populated that area before the war and thus arrived at an evacuation figure of 35 million – probably erroneous. If, as explained, that region actually contained only 91 million, this estimate, too, would arrive at 26 million evacuated.

On the other hand, it is rather interesting that this German figure of 35 million is almost a duplicate of the 37-million-number of the American Edward C. Carter. Carter’s number, however, apparently includes not only the evacuees from the German-occupied territories, but also the civilians evacuated from endangered cities near the frontline – i.e. Leningrad, Moscow, etc. – which were never conquered by the German armies. As vice chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and president of the Russian War Relief, Carter was indeed well placed to size up the entire extent of Soviet evacuation actions. The Russians knew why they decorated this gentleman with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.76 In any case, Carter’s figure is an indication that our computations of over 25 million evacuees from the German-occupied areas are about correct. Already in mid-November 1941 – less than five months after the Russo-German war began – Andrew Grajdanzev mentioned an evacuation and refugee figure of 10 to 20 million in the *Far Eastern Survey* published by the Institute of Pacific Relations; in this number the men called to arms from the occupied areas hadn’t even been included.77

In his distorted description of the German administration of the “occupied eastern territories,” the Jewish author Alexander Dallin, too, specifies the size of the population under German control at 65 million.78 But the “most official” Allied statistic on the number of the people remaining behind in German-occupied Soviet territory came from Wendel Willkie, the presidential candidate of the Republican Party in the United States. In September 1942 Willkie visited the Kremlin where he was briefed on the military and economic situation of the battered Soviet empire. On September 26, Stalin hosted a dinner for Willkie; other Soviet notables present at the dinner were Molotov (Foreign Affairs), Mikoyan (Foreign Trade), Beria (Secret

Police), Marshall Voroshilov, Admiral Kuznetsov and Information Director Alexander Sherbakaf.\textsuperscript{79} On that occasion Willkie detailed the requests and information provided to him by the Soviet leadership stating that at least 60 million Soviet citizens were now living in the Soviet areas occupied by the Germans.\textsuperscript{80} The release of this figure by Stalin to Willkie represents an official, though indirect, Soviet admission of the magnitude of their evacuations – up to 30 million people. It is not possible to pin down the evacuees to the exact million, but concluding the subject one may state that the people evacuated and deported to the Urals and Siberia – including the mobilized men – must have numbered more than 25 million; of these, over 15 million came from the cities in the occupied Soviet areas.

These evacuation and deportation measures of the Soviet rulers must be seen in the context of the Soviet policy to wage war. Everything which could aid the German enemy in any way had to be destroyed or at least removed. This strategy affected not only the countryside, the factories, the infrastructure, etc. but also, or rather especially, people; after all, it had to be prevented – by means of evacuation, deportation or mass murder – that the Germans could lay their hands on trained specialists ready to be integrated into their war machine. The leading and industrial sections of the population, of course, were given “preferential” treatment in this evacuation program. So far, the extent of this horrendous action has not been given the attention in the literature which it deserves.

\textit{Vacated Cities}

Soon after the occupation of the various Soviet cities, the German authorities began to initiate detailed counts of the remaining population. Obviously, the German occupiers had to obtain some information on the available stock of the working population. In this connection, Dr. Rachner wrote,

\textit{the labor service offices [...]} were instructed again and again to obtain exact data on the local population based on the methods used in Germany. [...] It should be noted that in most places not only the unemployed have been recorded but also those employed in the factories and in the public offices, classified by professional groups and types.\textsuperscript{81}

In addition, the Soviet policy of systematic destruction of food supplies caused a stinging crisis in feeding the local population; just to carry out an

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{New York Times (The)}, 9/29/1942, front page.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Baltimore Sun (The)}, “Willkie Urges Second Front at First Possible Moment” (An Associated Press report), September 27, 1942, p. 1; also see \textit{New York Times (The)}, “Willkie’s Statement about Russia’s Needs,” 9/27/1942, p. 3.

effective program of rationing, it was necessary to obtain an exact count of the population. Understandably, these population censuses were handed to the press only intermittently, and the war documents in German archives today are so incomplete that, as far as we know, there are only very few cities for which evacuation figures are available.

The Soviet cities listed on Table 6 have been grouped regionally former – Baltic, eastern Polish, Rumanian and “old” Soviet – in the rough order of their occupation. Quite noticeably, the Baltic cities’ evacuation rate of “only” 26% is very much lower than those of the “old” Soviet and former Polish cities. Furthermore, the table furnishes no evidence that the cities conquered later in time registered a higher deportation loss than those cities occupied in the very first days of the war.

It is not clear to what extent these listed cities are representative for all occupied urban centers; nevertheless, they constitute almost one fourth of the urban population present in the German-occupied areas at the beginning of the war. The average evacuation rate of 50% is almost certainly too low. Table 6 shows that the Slavic cities suffered much more extensive deportations; unfortunately, rates were available for only one-fifth of the urban inhabitants of the Slavic cities, which made up the lion’s share, while in the case of Baltic cities – whose urban population amounted to just six per cent of the pre-war population of all Soviet cities occupied by Germany during the war – data for more than half the urban population was available. In short, the Baltic cities are overrepresented in Table 6; but inasmuch as they registered relatively low evacuation losses, the average evacuation rate for the entire Soviet urban population turns out to be too low.
Table 6: Soviet Deportation of the Urban Population in World War Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities*</th>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Total Population before and after Deportation</th>
<th>Deported and/or Evacuated Population** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deported and/or Evacuated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>before deportation</td>
<td>after deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Baltic Cities:</td>
<td></td>
<td>before deportation</td>
<td>after deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>before deportation</td>
<td>after deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taurage ('34)</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaunas ('34)</td>
<td>11,106</td>
<td>49,700</td>
<td>24,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daugavpils ('35)</td>
<td>7,379</td>
<td>62,800</td>
<td>45,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lepaya ('35)</td>
<td>43,672</td>
<td>423,600</td>
<td>301,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riga ('35)</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>13,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovel ('31)</td>
<td>12,842</td>
<td>33,200</td>
<td>16,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baranowicze ('31)</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>2,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovel ('31)</td>
<td>17,366</td>
<td>42,700</td>
<td>16,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rovno ('31)</td>
<td>22,737</td>
<td>48,700</td>
<td>17,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernovitsy ('41)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>135,900</td>
<td>78,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishinev ('41)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>137,900</td>
<td>52,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Baltic" Cities app. 100,000 1,250,000 930,000 320,000 26

Former Eastern Polish Cities:

"Eastern Polish" Cities

"Eastern Rumanian" Cities
Table 6: Soviet Deportation of the Urban Population in World War Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities*</th>
<th>Jewish Population before and after Deportation</th>
<th>Deported and/or Evacuated Population** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Former “Old” Soviet Cities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk (‘41)(^m)</td>
<td>90,000(^c)</td>
<td>262,600(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novograd-Volynsk(^p)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shitomir (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>50,000(^q)</td>
<td>104,600(^s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proskurov (‘26)(^r)</td>
<td>13408(^c)</td>
<td>48,000(^s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamenets-Podolsk (‘26)(^r)</td>
<td>12,774(^c)</td>
<td>64,000(^s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnitsa (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>21,812(^c)</td>
<td>102,200(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>12,887(^c)</td>
<td>172,300(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovograd (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>18,358(^c)</td>
<td>110,400(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>180,000(^c)</td>
<td>664,600(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaev (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>30,000(^c)</td>
<td>183,800(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krivoi Rog (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>5,730(^c)</td>
<td>217,400(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>30,000(^c)</td>
<td>106,900(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dneprodzerzhinsk(^m)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>162,600(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dneprpetrovsk (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>100,000(^c)</td>
<td>550,700(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporoshye(^m)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>318,100(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozhaisk(^a)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>18,000(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>11,000(^c)</td>
<td>83,300(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigov (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>10,607(^c)</td>
<td>74,100(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>35,000(^c)</td>
<td>143,300(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev (‘39)(^m)</td>
<td>175,000(^c)</td>
<td>930,900(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>7,332(^c)</td>
<td>244,700(^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taganrog (‘26)(^m)</td>
<td>2,673(^c)</td>
<td>207,700(^n)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Old" Soviet Cities app. | 860,000 | 4,792,000 | 2,120,000 | 2,672,000 |

Soviet Cities app. | 1,200,000 | 6,604,000 | 3,297,000 | 3,307,000 |

Sources and Notes:

*) The annual figures listed right after the city name refer to the Jewish population only.

**) The deported and evacuated inhabitants of the Soviet cities were determined either on the basis of the difference between the number of inhabitants before and after the deportation or, if only the percentage of the deported and the figures for the pre-war population were available, by multiplying the latter two figures.


b) According to the Kauener Zeitung, “Die Stadt Kauen vor neuen Aufgaben,” No. 76, 3/31/1943, p. 5, the city’s population was 150,000 in 1939. In issue No. 87, 4/13/1943, p. 3, the population under German control within the same urban area was given as 117,000.


d) Zahl der Einwohner Lettlands für das Jahr 1941 (Stand 1.8.1941), Lettl. Statistisches Amt (Bundesarchiv R 92, Vorl. 1427). For the individual cities the following population figures were obtained for 1935 and 1941, respectively: Riga (385,063/301,391), Lepaya.
(57,098/45,982), Daugavpils (45,160/24,227), Jelgava (34,099/28,908), Ventspils (15,671/13,226), Rezekne (13,139/7,994). The “normal” increase since 1935 amounted to at least 10%.

e) Ibid.; eight of the listed towns of 5-9,000 inhabitants contained a population totaling 57,336 and 49,318, respectively (1935 and 1941), 19 of 2-5,000 inhabitants each possessed a total population of 67,517 and 55,743, respectively, and 20 townlets of 1-2,000 inhabitants each had a total population of 29,789 and 23,980, respectively.

f) Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung, Lutsk/Wolhynia, No. 7, 1/30/1942.


h) The last available census figures for Polish cities exist for 1931; from these it is possible to infer that the natural increase in Poland must have been around 1.5% annually. During the economic difficulties of the 1930s the rate of growth decelerated, but the pace of urbanization continued unabatedly. The average growth of the Polish cities during the 1930s was, nevertheless, set at only 20% in order to remain on the cautious side.

i) The population figures of the Polish census for the listed cities may be taken from Table 4.

j) Zentralblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine, Rovno, No. 2/2, January 9, 1943, p. 8-20.


kk) Publikationsstelle Wien. Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941 (Geheim), Vienna, 1943, p. 70-73: On August 16, 1941 – before the Rumanian deportations of parts of the Jewish population to Transnistria – a census was conducted in the regained provinces of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia: In Chernovtsy only 78,825 inhabitants (1930: 112,427) were found, and in Kishinev just 52,962 (1930: 114,896); the population of these cities must have increased by at least 20% between 1930 and 1941.


m) As mentioned in the text already, between 1926 and 1939 the Soviet cities experienced a population growth of 6.5% per annum (in the Ukraine 5.5%). For the listed “old” Soviet cities the figures were raised 10% above that of January 1939; considering the preparations for war against Germany and the continuing industrialization efforts, this must be viewed as a minimum.

n) Lorimer, Frank. The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects, Geneva: League of Nations, 1946, p. 250-253. Prof. Lorimer lists the following population figures for 1939: Kiev (846,293), Odessa (604,223), Dnepropetrovsk (500,662), Zaporoshye (289,188), Minsk (238,772), Mariupol (222,427), Krivoi Rog (197,621), Taganrog (188,808), Nikolaev (167,108), Smolensk (156,677), Dneprodzerzhinsk (147,829), Poltava (130,305), Kirovograd (100,331), Kherson (97,186), Shitomir (95,090), Vinnitsa (92,868), Melitopol (75,735), Chernigov (67,356).


p) The pre-war population of Novograd Volynsk is unknown, but must have been between 20,000 and 30,000. Regarding the number of the evacuated, there are contradictory reports, German investigations (for source see footnote j above) found 12,000 inhabitants, but the Zionist Institute of Jewish Affairs (Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 186), maintains that 90% of the population had withdrawn with the Red Army.

q) Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 196.

r) Census figures for 1939 are not available in the case of Proskurov and Kamenets-Podolsk; the last obtainable were for 1926. Even though the urban population in the Soviet Union more than doubled between 1926 and 1941, we assumed only an increase of 50%.

s) According to the Encyclopaedia Judaica (Vol. 13, p. 1195), 13,408 Jews lived in Proskurov in 1926, constituting 42% of the population; this means that the total population of the city in 1926 must have been 32,000. In Kamenets-Podolsk were 12,774 – 29.9% of the population; thus, this city’s total population must have amounted to 42,700.


w) Ibid., No. 175, 8/14/1942.
x) This figure probably is too low by one-quarter of a million because
(1) for some cities no Jewish population is known at all, and
(2) in the case of several "old" Soviet cities, only the population figures for 1926 could be ob-
tained; not only did the Soviet census of 1926 understate the Jewish population, since 1926
the huge industrialization program had been set in motion, in the course of which many rural
Jews migrated to the cities.

The weighted average – evacuation rates of Baltic and Slavic cities
multiplied by their share of the pre-war population – is nearer 55%:

| Rate of evacuation as shown in Table 6: | Baltic Cities | Eastern Eastern "Old" All Soviet Cities Soviet Cities |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Weight: Share of the Baltic, eastern Polish an "old" Soviet urban population in per cent of the entire urban population of the regions later occupied by Germany | 26% 60% 52% 56% 50% |
| Probable evacuation rate of the entire pre-war urban population of the occupied Soviet territories | 6% 11% 3% 83% 100% |

In order to show the varying degrees of evacuation more clearly, these 48 cities were divided into three groups – according to the severity of population loss – and entered on Chart I. As expected, the Baltic cities are to be found in the group with the lowest evacuation rates, while the Slavic cities – with few exceptions – showed high evacuation rates throughout. It even appears that the western Soviet cities suffered greater percentage losses than those further east!

The element of surprise, which is cited regularly today as one reason for the swift German advance, cannot be substantiated from the evacuation and deportation rates. Surprising is rather that the Soviet cities near the German frontier, occupied in part by German troops during the very first days of the war, had up to two-thirds of their population removed by the Soviets.

Certainly, the high rates of evacuation for the White Russian and western Ukrainian cities prove two points:

a) Prof. Lorimer’s findings, that the Soviets had begun to evacuate the civilian urban population near the frontier some time before war erupted, are correct, and

b) the assertion that the fast German advance delivered the largest part of local urban population into German hands is simply wrong!

These numbers show quite clearly that the clearing actions of the Soviets were extremely successful. Even though millions were evacuated by force, the Soviet measures were facilitated by the circumstance that a large number of the evacuees moved willingly, at least without much opposition. This is
especially true of Ukrainian communists in leading positions, and probably
even more so of the non-Ukrainians who controlled the peasant Ukrainian
population in this Soviet Republic in the name of Moscow – the Russians
and the Jews.

Ukrainians were in the minority in their own cities; only 47.4% of all city
people in the SSR Ukraine were Ukrainians, and the remaining 52.6% were
largely accounted for by Russians (25%) and Jews (23%). Both of these
latter two nationalities occupied most of the important positions in industry,
party and administration; in the eyes of the Ukrainians they represented the
long and heavy hand of Moscow. The entire grotesque situation is depicted
in the professional structure of Ukraine’s pre-war population:82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education and Professions</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Among 1,000 inhabitants were in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– primary colleges</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– secondary colleges</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Public officials and employees:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– enterprise management</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “arts”</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– doctors and medical aides</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mainly orderlies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mainly doctors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Industrial blue- and white-collar workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Construction</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Mining</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Servants</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naturally, the much larger income disparities in the Soviet Union en-
larged the gap between the masses of the Ukrainian population on the one
side and the Russians and especially the Jews on the other. John Scott, for
example, mentions the following earnings patterns for 1933:83

Untrained laborer 100 rubles monthly
Qualified worker 300 " "
Engineer (without experience) 400-500 " "
Engineer (practical experience) 600-800 " "
Administrators, directors, etc. 800-3,000 " "

Whatever changes in income may have occurred until 1941, it is certain
that there was no equalization of the drastic income disparities in the interim
period.

The Ukrainians not only constituted a minority in their own cities, they
were the real proletarians, while Russians and Jews occupied the socially

83 Scott, Jenseits des Ural, p. 63.
and economically more lucrative positions. The idea that the subjugated Ukrainian population might not behave very friendly towards the Russian and Jewish upper classes after liberation from the Soviet yoke certainly must have crossed the mind of many of these “foreigners.” Under these circumstances, an evacuation must have appeared as the lesser evil to large sections of both minorities in the Ukraine. In White Russia, the situation was not very different.

For the Soviet government this proved to be a favorable starting position from which to evacuate the urban population. The politically more reliable non-Ukrainian population groups accounted for more than 50% of the urban inhabitants. Secondly, the two large minorities – Russians and Jews – occupied mostly leading and specialist positions in industry and administration, whereas Ukrainians were to be found largely in the lower ranks. Thirdly, the two population groups which were most valuable under the circumstances on account of their better training, experience and attitudes, \textit{i.e.} the Russians and the Jews, showed a considerably greater willingness to go on the uncertain journey to the east.

The fact that the evacuated population included a relatively large share of women and children must be explained by the phenomenon of the eminent role of women in the economic life in Communist societies; no doubt even a dictatorship would find it difficult to separate these working mothers from their children. Also, considerations of maintaining morale in the case of these minorities certainly called for the evacuation of the closest relatives as well.

Quite obviously, the Soviet evacuation measures were very well organized in anticipation of the coming German-Soviet conflict. If, as happened in Melitopol and Mariupol, both of which fell into German hands in the autumn of 1941, a relatively large part of the population remained behind, this was simply the exception to the rule. German war reports mention that both cities were taken by surprise action – apparently catching the Soviets off guard – and that for this reason the destruction inflicted by the Soviets was relatively minimal. Another indication of the Soviet expectation of the German attack is the Soviet success of taking with them almost the entire rolling stock of their railways: 40% of the railroad network was in German hands, but they captured only 5% of the rolling equipment.

Finally, reports of the German administration of the conquered territories provide a glimpse of the single-mindedness with which the Communists carried out their evacuation program. We mentioned before that non-Ukrainian population groups dominated Ukrainian cities. German publications show, though, that this picture changed drastically in the course of these evacuations. Many cities, \textit{i.e.} Vinnitsa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kirovograd, Chernigov, Kherson, etc., all of a sudden had a Ukrainian majority, which in
some cases attained 80% and more.\textsuperscript{84} In other words, the Soviets geared their evacuation actions to very particular population segments, namely public officials, party functionaries, specialized industrial blue- and white-collar workers, artisans and the so-called intelligentsia. But since the Ukrainians had been regarded to be politically unreliable, educational and other training facilities were made available to them within narrow limits. As a consequence, the Ukrainian – unless he was active in agriculture – usually performed the less demanding jobs. In short, in their understandable attempt to save that part of the population which was most valuable for their own war effort, and \textit{vice versa} to prevent the Germans from making use of their skills, the Soviets evacuated above all the Russians and the Jews.

Therefore, the obviously much higher evacuation ratios for the Slavic regions as compared to the Baltic countries are not the result of longer periods of preparation before the war. Decisive was whether or not the cities contained large minorities which, at the same time, were dominant in the management of enterprises and in public administration. These criteria were met by the Ukrainian and the White Russian, but generally not by the Baltic cities. It is no coincidence that the Latvian cities of Daugavpils and Rezekne registered large evacuation ratios. In this exceptional case, the native Latvian population was in the minority in both cities, while the Russian and Jewish inhabitants together accounted for 40% to 50% before the war; in contrast, the remaining urban population of Latvia was largely of Latvian origin, with the Russian and Jewish elements averaging about 17%\textsuperscript{85}.

\textit{Chart 1} shows the eastern frontlines as of July 1, July 11 and August 20, 1941. It also shows which Soviet cities were occupied (or encircled) by Axis troops within the first ten days, during the second ten-day period, and the following 40-day period, and after the sixtieth fighting day. The evacuation ratios for the cities were taken from Table 6.

Comparing these four time periods with the average evacuation ratios of the Baltic and Slavic cities, one obtains a remarkable development (\textit{Table 7}). In general, Ukrainian and White Russian cities occupied during the first ten fighting days and containing large Jewish populations had been more thoroughly evacuated by the Soviets than the Slavic cities to the east, which were occupied as late as September and October.

Also, the fact that the evacuation ratios of the Baltic and Slavic cities did not increase as time elapsed but actually decreased, allows the following conclusions to be drawn:

a) The Soviets did indeed begin to evacuate the frontier towns before the start of the hostilities. This action was facilitated by the circumstance that

\textsuperscript{84} Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung, 2/15/1942, p. 3; 2/25/42, p. 3; 3/29/42, p. 3; 5/17/42, p. 3; 7/10/42, p. 3.
the western Soviet regions were not very highly industrialized and that the urban population was accordingly relatively small.

b) As the German military successes continued, the industrial areas were drawn into the fighting arena; consequently, it became more and more difficult to withdraw not only the retreating Red Army, but also the growing volume of machinery and the millions of the civilian population; as a result, the evacuation ratios for the cities began to decrease as the war progressed.

**Table 7: Soviet Evacuation of Baltic and Slavic Cities by Periods of Time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of German Occupation</th>
<th>Baltic Cities</th>
<th>Slavic Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st – 10th day of war (6/22 – 7/7/1941)</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th – 20th day of war (7/2 – 7/11/1941)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st – 60th day of war (7/12 – 8/20/1941)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the 60th day of war (after 8/20/1941)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chart 1 and Table 6.

The size of the cities was of no major consequence for the evacuation program. Large cities with a population of a quarter of a million and small towns with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants were treated alike; all of them averaged evacuation ratios of around 50%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Cities</th>
<th>City Size (in 1,000)</th>
<th>Pre-war Population</th>
<th>Evacuated Inhabitants Persons</th>
<th>Evacuated Inhabitants Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>&gt; 250</td>
<td>3,150,500</td>
<td>1,744,539</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>50-250</td>
<td>2,744,696</td>
<td>1,238,862</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>&lt; 50</td>
<td>658,900</td>
<td>299,679</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: The low evacuation rate of the smaller towns is due to the relatively large number of small Baltic cities in this group.)

There are no indications whatsoever that the distance from the German frontier or the size of the city had any direct connection with the extent of the evacuation. The Soviets concentrated their evacuation efforts above all on the White Russian and the Ukrainian cities with their large, dominant minorities – the Russians and the Jews.

**Depopulated Ukraine**

The German authorities embarked on a rather extensive program of registering the population that remained behind. Unfortunately, the largest part of these statistics is not obtainable. But even the sorry remains provide
enough clues to permit a size-up of the Soviet evacuation effort. Regretfully, precise pre-war figures which would allow an exact determination of the extent of the evacuation are not available either.

The local population living under German administration in the RK Ukraine numbered 16.91 million as of January 1, 1943. The total number of inhabitants – classified by general districts, areas and counties – was published in the Zentralblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine.86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General District</th>
<th>Area in sq.km</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Wolhynia-Podolia</td>
<td>80,508</td>
<td>4,211,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shitomir</td>
<td>64,800</td>
<td>2,916,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kiev</td>
<td>71,790</td>
<td>4,455,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nikolaev</td>
<td>46,880</td>
<td>1,920,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dnepropetrovsk</td>
<td>52,398</td>
<td>2,743,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Crimea (Tauria)</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>661,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RK Ukraine</td>
<td>339,276</td>
<td>16,910,008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

German estimates of the pre-war population pertain either only to January 1939 or else they just mention rough ranges within which the probable pre-war population size was estimated to have been. The Jahrbuch für Weltpolitik 1943, for example, cites the figure of 21.5 million without mentioning the year to which it applies.87 The context, however, makes it apparent that the above figure refers to the year 1939, as far as “old” Soviet areas are concerned, and to the year 1931 for the former eastern Polish areas located in the RK Ukraine. If one adds the population increase likely to have occurred between those dates and mid-1941 – perhaps 1.2 million – the pre-war population of the RK Ukraine must have numbered more than 22.5 million; however, the Germans found less than 17 million. One-quarter of the population had disappeared.

The secret documents of the German Economy Staff East put the number of the pre-war population in a range between 20 and 25 million; this, of course, could not be used as a basis for calculating the evacuation ratio.88

Luckily, the Soviet census of 1959 provided some comparable statistics for the year 1939.89 These indicate that those Ukrainian oblasts which remained outside the RK Ukraine under German military rule contained 10.98 million people in early 1939, 51% of whom lived in the cities. The oblasts later administered by the RK Ukraine were populated by 18.25 million in-

---

86 Zentralblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine, Rovno, No. 2, 2nd Year, 1/9/1943, p. 8-20, Bundesarchiv Koblenz: R 43 II/690c.
habitants, of whom only 27% were urban. The Rumanian-administered oblast Odessa contained 2.07 million people in 1939 (0.78 million in the cities). This means the area encompassed later by the RK Ukraine included only 60% of the 31 million inhabitants of the old SSR Ukraine. In the case of the urban population it was even less, namely 43%! The industrial part of the “old” SSR Ukraine obviously remained outside the RK Ukraine. Inasmuch as the Soviet evacuation efforts were concentrated on the urban population, it is to be expected that the share of evacuees in the RK Ukraine should have been below the general average of around 30%.

Of the 16.91 million people of the RK Ukraine, several millions lived in the former Polish provinces Polesia and Wolhynia as well as the former Soviet SSR White Russia. Fortunately, the German statistics on the RK Ukraine were detailed enough that it was possible to determine the population within those areas: In former Polish Polesia and Wolhynia there were 2.78 million, and in the part of the former Soviet SSR White Russia 0.48 million. Deducting both numbers from the 16.91 million of the total RK Ukraine, we obtain 13.65 million people in the “old” Soviet areas of the German-occupied RK Ukraine. Before the war, this area had a population of 18.25 million,\(^90\) hence, one-quarter of the total population had disappeared.

Before the war, the greater portion of the Ukrainian urban population, however, was concentrated in the eastern Ukraine, which remained under German military rule. Since the Soviets concentrated their evacuation efforts on the cities, and because the share of the urban population was over 50% in the eastern Ukraine, it is certain that the portion of the population evacuated there was comparably larger than in the western Ukraine. Quite probably, almost every third inhabitant of the Ukraine had been deported or evacuated by the Soviets before the Germans occupied that region.

The degree of urbanization in the Soviet Union increased from west to east, and Soviet evacuation measures concentrated above all on the urban population important to the armaments industry. Thus, as the German-Soviet battlefront moved eastward, an ever larger share of the population had been removed by the Soviets, despite the fact that the urban evacuation ratio tended to decrease at the same time. As a result, while westernmost areas lost “only” one-sixth of their total population, the western “old” Ukraine suffered a loss of one-fourth, and the highly industrialized Donets basin and eastern Ukraine may even have registered a population decline of up to 40%.

\(^90\) The figure of 18.25 million contains the oblast Vinnitsa with a population of 2.28 million. In part, this oblast stretched onto the area west of the Bug, which came under Rumanian administration during World War Two (northern Transnistria). It is possible that up to one-third of the population of the oblast Vinnitsa should be allocated to Rumanian Transnistria and not to the RK Ukraine. On the other hand, we should also take account of the natural increase of 4-5% for the 2½ years until mid-1941. Both corrections amount to about 750,000 persons and offset each other.
Chart 1

Eastern front:

- 11-29 % evacuated
- 30-59 % evacuated
- 60-90 % evacuated

on July 1, 1941
on July 11, 1941
on August 20, 1941

Chart 2

Eastern front:
- 00-15 % of the urban population
- 16-30 % of the urban population
- 31-53 % of the urban population

Source: Table 6 and Chart 1.
FOURTH CHAPTER:

The Jewish Fate in the Soviet Union: 1941-1945

Soviet Jews in the German Sphere of Influence

The Jewish population was accorded a very special attention within the framework of the Soviet clearing measures. The Zionist Institute of Jewish Affairs (Institute) wrote for instance:¹

In numerous cities and towns, particularly in the Ukraine and White Russia, Jews were among the first to be evacuated.

The reason for this preferential treatment was seen by the Institute to be connected with the high percentage of Jews in the Soviet administration, among the office and blue-collar workers and the intelligentsia; it added:

For this reason, despite the Army’s urgent need for transportation, thousands of trains were provided for evacuation. Thus, not only were hundreds of thousands of human lives saved, but military highways were quickly cleared of millions of refugees.

The Institute emphasized that there was no shortage of time to remove the civilian population, especially in the larger cities such as Kiev, Odessa, Smolensk, etc.:²

... there was time enough to evacuate the civilian population.

The technical prerequisites had been met, and the same means of transportation which brought the masses of the Red Army to the western front were used on their return trip for the evacuation and the deportation of the civilian population. Also, one must assume that the Soviets, following their own example of the spring of 1940 when they had deported the Polish-Jewish refugees from eastern Poland to Siberia, were not overly concerned with the comfort of the population scheduled to be removed.

Shitomir, which contained 50,000 Jews before the war, was presented by the Institute as an example of the relatively high percentage of Jews evacuated. Of these, 44,000 (88%) left with the Soviet troops; considering that

¹ Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 186.
² Ibid., p. 186.
53,000 of the 95,000 inhabitants (minimum) of Shitomir had been evacuated, the Jewish share amounted to four-fifths of all evacuees.

Minsk, too, confirms Zionist reports of a preferential treatment accorded the Jews by the Soviets in the evacuation program. After the occupation of Minsk within the first few days of the war, General Halder found no more than 100,000 of the former population of 240,000 (1939); the rest had fled, been evacuated or deported. Kube, the German Reich Commissar for White Russia, stated that all but a few thousand of the Jews of Minsk had gone with the Red Army. Before the war, there were approximately 90,000 Jews in Minsk. Assuming that the words “few thousand” referred to a figure of 5,000, we obtain the following picture. About 60% of all evacuees (85,000 of 140,000) were Jews, even though they constituted only 38% of the population; the Jewish population was removed almost in its entirety, in the case of the non-Jewish population it was just over one-third.

A Soviet Union specialist, Joshua Rothenberg of the Brandeis University, put it bluntly:

Much of the Jewish population of the conquered territories escaped annihilation by fleeing before the invading armies arrived.

The Judaica says that most of the 7,000 Jews of Lepaya (a few miles from the German border) escaped, before German troops occupied the city six days after hostilities began. In Lithuania, too, which was liberated from the Soviet yoke within a week, a considerable number of Jews escaped to the interior of the Soviet Union, even while the German invasion was in progress.

Baranowicze, a town with a very large Jewish population, was populated by just 10% of its former population, even though occupation by German troops occurred within days after they crossed the border. Of Vitebsk’s 100,000 Jews, only 22,000 remained behind according to a report by the Soviet Jewish author David Bergelson of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the Moscow newspaper Eyntkeyt dated 9/5/1942. Reitlinger, who es-

---

3 Ibid., p. 186; the census of January 1939 found a total population of 95,090 in Shitomir. Until mid-1941 the city must have grown by at least another 10,000. Since the German administration found only 42,000, at least 63,000 inhabitants must have been deported; of these, 44,000 were Jews. Thus the Jewish share among the evacuees probably was closer to 70% than 80%.

4 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 223.

5 Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 186.

6 Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 11, p. 57.


9 Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 186.

estimated the number of Jews in Soviet White Russia (borders of 1941) at 861,000, said the Germans found no more than 172,000 of them.11

Kishinev in Bessarabia was occupied by the Axis on July 17, 1941. The Rumanian count of August 16, 1941, however, found only 201 Jews of the former 70,000 living there before the war.12 The non-Jewish population apparently suffered a loss of roughly 15,000 because of deportations; this is equivalent to a rate of “only” 20-25%. Of the approximately 200,000 Bessarabian Jews, the Soviets had removed all but 6,882; fewer than 5% could be traced by the census.13

The situation was very similar in the Ukrainian town of Novograd Volynsk, which also was located very close to the border and contained a very large Jewish population. Only 10% of the town’s inhabitants remained behind when the Germans occupied it three days after war broke out. As for Kiev, the Institute said:14

_in Kiev, practically the entire Jewish youth left the city together with the Soviet Army. Only elderly people remained behind._

The Zionist sources are unanimous that the evacuation or deportation of the Baltic Jews and the native population was started some time before the war began. The Institute dates the initiation of mass arrests and deportations in Lithuania at ten days before hostilities started.15 The _Judaica_ declared that _the phase before the German attack on Lithuania was marked by deportations to Siberia. [...] In mid-June 1941, one week before the German-Soviet war, many people, including Jews, were hastily reported as politically unreliable [...]_16

And the _Year Book_ complained:17

_The evacuation of Baltic Jews was not started until a week before the actual invasion._

German investigations after the conquest of the Baltic countries confirm these reports. It was found that the Soviets had initiated sudden arrests, deportations and murders in the night from June 13 to 14, 1941. These atrocities continued until the liberation of these countries by the German army.18

Thus, if in a larger town like Dnepropetrovsk only 20,000 of the former 100,000 Jews remained behind19 — German reports, however, mention less

---

11 Reitlinger, _Final Solution_, p. 498.
12 Publikationsstelle Wien. _Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941 (Geheim)_ , Vienna, 1943, p. 73.
13 _Ibid._ , p. 51.
14 Institute of Jewish Affairs, _Hitler’s Ten-Year War_, p. 186.
15 _Ibid._ , p. 177.
16 _Encyclopaedia Judaica_, Vol. 11, p. 385-386.
19 _Encyclopaedia Judaica_, Vol. 6, p. 141.
than 1,000\textsuperscript{20} – then this is not very surprising in view of the Soviet preparations for a mass removal in case of war and the available time interval until German troops reached the larger cities. Melitopol and Mariupol, two large cities on the Sea of Azov where only a quarter of the total population was missing because German troops had taken these cities in a surprise action, are just the exception to the rule; still, in the first city only 18\% of the Jewish population was present, and in the second it had disappeared completely.\textsuperscript{21}

However, it is truly remarkable that the towns which were located far to the west and which contained often very large Jewish populations had been almost completely denuded of their Jewish inhabitants by the time the German troops took control of them. This was only possible because – as Zionist sources confirm – the evacuation program had been put into action long before the war began and because the Soviet clearing measures even allowed for a removal of the population as the German invasion was in progress.

The large degree of urbanization and concentration of the Jewish population certainly aided this effort. In the “old” Ukraine, 39\% of the Jews lived in just four cities – Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk – none of which were occupied or cut off until 7½ weeks after June 22, 1941.\textsuperscript{22} In total, 85.5\% of the Ukrainian Jews lived in the cities in 1939; in White Russia it was 87.8\%.

This advantage was reinforced by the circumstance that the population group upon which the Soviets put the greatest emphasis in their evacuation efforts consisted of government officials, party functionaries, specialists and office workers; in this group the Jewish share was far in excess of their numerical size.\textsuperscript{23}

No wonder that David Bergelson was able to declare at the end of 1942 (!) that 80\% of the Jews in the conquered areas had been evacuated. He continued in the Moscow newspaper \textit{Eynikeyt} of December 5, 1942 – 1½ years after the war started: \textsuperscript{24}

The evacuation saved a decisive majority of Jews of the Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania, and Latvia. According to information coming from Vitebsk, Riga and other large centers which have been captured by the Fascists, there were few Jews there when the Germans arrived. [...] This means that a majority of the Jews of these cities was evacuated in time by the Soviet government.

The Soviet poet Itzik Feffer declared formally in New York during the war that the Red Army “saved a few million Jews!” On March 15, 1943(!),

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung}, 2/611942, p. 3, reported that the population count found only 702 Jews.


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Encyclopaedia Judaica}, Vol. 15, p. 1515.

\textsuperscript{23} Institute of Jewish Affairs, \textit{Hitler’s Ten-Year War}, p. 185.

\textsuperscript{24} Aronson, \textit{Soviet Russia and the Jews}, p. 18.
Eynikeyt reported D. Zaslavsky telling a plenary session of the Soviet-sponsored Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee:\(^{25}\)

*The Red Army saved the Jewish people at the most critical hour of its history.*

Also, the fact that in many cities for which Jewish evacuation ratios were ascertained – e.g. Baranowicze, Lepaya, Novograd Volynsk, Minsk, Kishinev – much more than 80% of the Jewish population was gone, even though these cities were occupied by German forces within days after hostilities began, points toward an almost total evacuation by the Soviet authorities.

In this connection, we should refer back to the findings in the Third Chapter which show that the evacuation ratios of the Baltic cities were far below those of the Slavic Cities. It is truly astonishing how close the relationship is between the evacuation ratios of the urban population and the relative size of the Jewish population in those cities. On Chart 2 we recorded the Jewish population share of individual Soviet cities – to the extent available. Quite obviously, in the center area of the war theater where the evacuation ratios were very high (see Chart 1), the Jewish share of the urban population also was very large.

**The Evacuation of Wolhynia**

The General District Wolhynia-Podolia in the RK Ukraine encompassed not only the “old” Soviet areas in Podolia, but also the former Polish province of Wolhynia and the largest part of former Polesia. The northern sections of Polesia had been incorporated in the RK Ostland. Thus, the only area for which we can obtain relatively exact population figures for the periods before and after the German occupation is Wolhynia.

The territory of the former Polish province of Wolhynia included in the General District of Wolhynia-Podolia covered the areas of Dubno, Gorochov, Kostopol, Kovel, Lutsk, Kremianets, Lubomil, Rogno, Sarny and Vladimir Volynsk.\(^{26}\) In this region the Polish census of 1931 registered a total population of 2,085,574, including 207,792 Jews.\(^{27}\)

For years the birth rate of the non-Jewish population was around 2.7%, or even slightly more, while that of the Jewish population was only 1.8% in

---

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 18.

\(^{26}\) Zentralblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine, Rovno, No. 2, 2nd Year, 1/9/1943, p. 8-20, Bundesarchiv Koblenz: R 43 II/690c.

1931 – a drop by 33% since the early 1920s. Applying a mortality rate of 1.2%, the surplus of births over deaths must have registered 1.5% in the case of the non-Jewish and 0.6% in the case of the Jewish population. It may be assumed that this positive growth rate was reduced in the course of the economic crisis of the 1930s, especially as far as the Jews are concerned. For the period after 1932 one should, therefore, apply natural population changes of 1.4% and 0.5%, respectively.

In the First Chapter we referred already to the enormous emigration of young male Jews in the inter-war period. For the years 1932-1939, we also calculated a Jewish emigration loss of 15%. To be sure, there is no reliable information as to whether or not this emigration was as high among the eastern Polish Jews, but the even more unfavorable male/female ratio of 86/100 (after adjusting for men in military service) of the age group “15 to 29 years” in Wolhynia indicates that emigration among the eastern Polish Jews was possibly even higher than that of all Polish Jews, certainly not lower.

Table 8 provides details on Wolhynia’s total population as recorded by the Polish census of 1931, as well as adjustments for population growth and Jewish emigration thereafter. Furthermore, both population groups have been classified by age in order to show that age group separately which later became subject to Soviet military draft calls. On this basis, one should have expected to find 2,374,663 inhabitants in Wolhynia in 1942 under “normal” circumstances, including 186,585 Jews and 585,134 males (Jewish and non-Jewish) of the years of birth 1897-1926.

The German count, however, found only 1,984,406 inhabitants as of January 1, 1943;28 more than 16%, or 390,257, were missing. But since this figure included those former Red Army men who had been released from prisoner-of-war camps in the meantime, the actual number of missing people right after the occupation must have been somewhat larger yet. The question is which nationalities and which age groups accounted for the bulk of these 390,257 missing persons.

If it were true that the Soviets were unable to evacuate the civilian population because of the rapid German advance, all or most of the 390,257 missing should be allocated to the young men of the years 1897-1926 subject to the Soviet draft. In this case, of the 585,134 in this age group only about 200,000 remained behind; the majority would have gone with the retreating Soviets. Applied to all male age groups, the Soviets would have taken one-third of the entire male population with them, and the male share of the population would have fallen from 49% to 39%.

---

28 Zentralblatt, 1/9/1943, p. 8-11.
Table 8: Development of the Wolhynian Population: 1931 until the German Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) According to Polish Census of December 9, 1931:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years 1897-1926</td>
<td>1,217,412</td>
<td>595,630</td>
<td>621,782</td>
<td>539,427</td>
<td>559,007</td>
<td>56,203</td>
<td>62,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Years</td>
<td>868,162</td>
<td>425,418</td>
<td>442,744</td>
<td>382,515</td>
<td>396,833</td>
<td>42,903</td>
<td>45,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,085,574</td>
<td>1,021,048</td>
<td>1,064,526</td>
<td>921,942</td>
<td>955,840</td>
<td>99,106</td>
<td>108,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Population after correction for the number of births over deaths for the period 1931 to 1942 (1.4% and 0.5% p.a., for the non-Jewish and Jewish natural rate of increase):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years 1897-1926</td>
<td>1,217,412</td>
<td>595,630</td>
<td>621,782</td>
<td>539,427</td>
<td>559,007</td>
<td>56,203</td>
<td>62,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Years</td>
<td>1,190,176</td>
<td>586,425</td>
<td>603,751</td>
<td>537,663</td>
<td>551,981</td>
<td>48,762</td>
<td>51,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,407,588</td>
<td>1,182,055</td>
<td>1,220,533</td>
<td>1,077,090</td>
<td>1,110,988</td>
<td>104,965</td>
<td>114,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Population after correction for Jewish emigration of 15%, for the period 1932 to 1939 (two-thirds of the immigrants were applied to the years 1897-1926 and one-third to the other years):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years 1897-1926</td>
<td>1,195,461</td>
<td>585,134</td>
<td>610,327</td>
<td>539,427</td>
<td>559,007</td>
<td>45,707</td>
<td>51,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Years</td>
<td>1,179,202</td>
<td>581,177</td>
<td>598,025</td>
<td>537,663</td>
<td>551,981</td>
<td>43,514</td>
<td>46,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,374,663</td>
<td>1,166,311</td>
<td>1,208,352</td>
<td>1,077,090</td>
<td>1,110,988</td>
<td>89,221</td>
<td>97,364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This interpretation contradicts the fact that, even though German reports tell of huge losses among the male population of the occupied territories, no deportation of this magnitude among the economically most active population part has ever been mentioned. Fortunately, German population counts in the Baltic countries which, like eastern Poland, were incorporated into the Soviet empire just prior to the war gave separate figures for the two sexes; the statistics indicate that thousands of families were deported by the Soviets before the Germans arrived, but that the majority of the evacuees were male. And still, the male share of the total Baltic population had shrunk to only just over 46%, even though large parts of the Baltic countries, especially Estonia, were conquered as late as eight weeks after the occupation of Wolhynia.

The Soviets deported especially the urban minorities – by family – which belonged to the pillars of an industrial society; in Wolhynia, this was true particularly of the Jews. The enormous evacuation ratios of the former eastern Polish cities – e.g. Brest Litovsk, Vladimir Volynsk, Kovel, Baranowicze, Lutsk, Rovno, Sdolbunov and Pinsk, all of which registered rates of between 25 and 90% (see Table 6) and may have averaged 50%, if we...
allow for an increase in the urban population since 1931 – prove that the roughly 400,000 missing persons in Wolhynia were not to be found predominantly among the male age groups subject to the Soviet draft.

Everything seems to indicate that the above mentioned evacuation ratios for the eastern Polish cities were quite typical. If we assume that the urban population of this region had increased by 50,000 since 1931 and if we add the population of the Jewish “shtetls” as well, we obtain a total urban population of roughly 400,000 for the former Polish province for mid-1941; of these, 200,000 were deported by the Soviets.

The gender composition of Wolhynia’s population probably was similar to what we found in the Baltic countries after the German occupation; there, the male/female ratio was 46/54. Consequently, Wolhynia’s remaining population before and after the German occupation looks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before occupation</td>
<td>2,374,663</td>
<td>1,166,311</td>
<td>1,208,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After occupation</td>
<td>1,984,406</td>
<td>912,827</td>
<td>1,071,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing persons</td>
<td>390,257</td>
<td>253,484</td>
<td>136,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, the question is, how these missing persons should be divided between the Jews and the non-Jews. Between 1931 and WWII, urbanization proceeded in eastern Poland as almost everywhere else, and then there was the emigration of large numbers of Jews. Thus, the Jewish population constituted roughly 50% of the Wolhynian urban population in 1931, but just before WWII this was hardly the case; by then, their share must have been less than that. On the other hand, it is a fact that the Jews were much more affected by the Soviet evacuation program than other population segments.

The large number of women among the missing persons (35%) points to the evacuation of tens of thousands of families. The population group in this category probably consisted of artisans, doctors, specialists, the intelligentsia, office workers, etc., among all of whom the Jews may have had an absolute majority. Also, the willingness to be evacuated probably was much greater among the Jewish families than among the Polish and Ukrainian.

In view of the almost grotesque relationship between evacuated Jews and non-Jews in Soviet cities – e.g. Minsk, Shitomir, Lepaya, Dnepropetrovsk – and the political unreliability of the Polish and Ukrainian population segments in Wolhynia, it would indeed have been very surprising, if less than 60% of the evacuated female civilians would have belonged to the Jewish group, particularly as almost half the urban population was Jewish. Applying a matching male share corresponding to the composition of the pre-war Jewish and non-Jewish populations, and finally subtracting the evacuated family members (as calculated) from the total number of missing persons, one obtains 125,243 young men subject to the draft; these males probably
were drafted directly from the countryside into the Red Army. In table-form it looks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population before the German occupation</th>
<th>of which: Missing (%)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Population group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,374,663</td>
<td>390,257 (16)</td>
<td>253,484</td>
<td>136,773</td>
<td>(Missing females: 60% Jewish, 40% non-Jewish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186,585</td>
<td>157,265 (84)</td>
<td>75,201</td>
<td>82,064</td>
<td>Jewish civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,188,078</td>
<td>232,992 (11)</td>
<td>53,040</td>
<td>54,709</td>
<td>non-Jew. civil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>125,243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men subject to draft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The computed figure of 125,243 “drafted” individuals, of course, is much too low since some of the male “civilians” certainly were also drafted into the Red Army).

Thus, it seems that more than 80% of Wolhynia’s Jewish population was removed by the Soviets. Considering that the vast majority of the Jewish population of many Soviet cities conquered by German troops during the first ten days of the war had been removed by the Soviets, the computed ratio of 84% evacuated Jews in Wolhynia is quite realistic. To be sure, compared to the “old” Soviet cities which registered Jewish evacuation ratios of over 80% (Table 9), the Soviet evacuation of the Jewish population of these Wolhynian cities close to the German frontier is quite impressive, but not surprising (see Chart 1).

Before the war, 2.03 million Jews lived in the “old” Soviet areas occupied by the Axis troops (Second Chapter). More than half of them were concentrated in the cities listed on Table 9, and fewer than one-fifth fell into German hands. Reitlinger put it like this:

> Not only did the bulk of the three million Jews of pre-war Soviet Russia escape into the interior, but also a very large proportion of the 1,800,000 Jews of the annexed territories. […] in the historic towns of the pre-industrial Russian Ukraine, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Berdichev, Uman, Nikolaev, and Kherson, only a quarter or a fifth of the Jews stayed on, and this was equally true of the enormous Jewish agglomerations to the East, the towns along the Dnieper, Kiev, Kharkov, and Dniepropetrovsk. Further East still, in the Donetz and Kuban basins and North of the Caucasus, only a small percentage of the Jews awaited the Germans.

The picture unfolding here is one where Wolhynia fits perfectly into the overall clearing and evacuation program of the Soviet leadership. No matter whether we turn to the Baltic countries, former eastern Poland, White Russia or the Ukraine, the bulk of the Jewish population of all of these Soviet areas had been removed either before hostilities started or withdrew together with the retreating Red Army to the east on a more or less voluntary basis. Reitlinger’s admission certainly is not subject to suspicion and matches the

---

30 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 227-228.
evacuation ratios for the Jewish population of the “old” Soviet cities as listed on Table 9.

The fact that the main area of settlement of the urbanized Soviet Jews was still concentrated in the western Soviet Union at the beginning of the war did not hinder the Soviet efforts to remove the Jewish population to the east. Quite the opposite is the case; because urbanization was much lower in the west than in the east, and the bulk of industry was to be found in the eastern Ukraine, the Soviets were in a position to devote a greater proportion of their efforts to the evacuation of the urban population of the western territories than was possible in the industrial east.

Table 9: Soviet Evacuation of the Jewish Population of “Old” Soviet Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Jewish Population before Evacuation</th>
<th>after Evacuation</th>
<th>Evacuation in percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>5,000 (est.)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shitomir</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novograd-Volynsk</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnepropetrovsk</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>30-60,000</td>
<td>67-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkov</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovograd</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>min. 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemigov</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taganrog</td>
<td>2,70</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnitsa</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>50-62,000</td>
<td>75-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uman</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdichev</td>
<td>28,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,045,500</td>
<td>173-215,000</td>
<td>79-83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Ibid., p. 241.
32 Ibid., p. 237.
33 See Table 6. Reitlinger, however, arrived at only 175,000.
34 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 240: He says that two-thirds of the Odessan Jews left by train for the eastern Soviet Union before the city was encircled by Rumanian troops on 8/13/1941. It was not captured by German and Rumanian troops until 10/16/1941. In the meantime, the Soviets deployed their Black Sea Fleet to deport tens of thousands of civilians, including many Jews.
36 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 227; writes that the number of those remaining behind in Vinnitsa, Kiev, Uman and Berdichev was about one-fourth or one-fifth.
Sources and Notes (Table 9)

(a) Reitlinger\textsuperscript{32} said the last Jewish census figures for Kharkov pertain to 1926 (81,139); until 1939, Kharkov’s total population more than doubled to 833,400, but it is unlikely that the city’s Jewish population doubled, too. On the other hand, the \textit{Judaica}\textsuperscript{21} notes that Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk contained 39\% of the Ukraine’s Jewish population in 1939. This means that 585,000 of the 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews were accounted for by these four cities; the Jewish population of the last three towns added up to 455,000. Consequently, 130,000 remain for Kharkov.

(b) For these cities no more recent population data for Soviet Jews are available. The listed Jewish population figures pertain to the year 1926, and in the case of Taganrog, Mariupol, Vinnitsa, Chernigov and Kirovograd they have been taken from \textit{Table 6}; for Uman and Berdichev Hilberg’s\textsuperscript{38} Jewish population figures refer to 1920 and 1923, respectively. It is all but certain that the Jewish population of these cities was considerably higher in the year 1939 than in 1920, 1923 or in the census year 1926, because the census of 1926 tended to underestimate the Jewish population and because many Jews had moved from the smaller country towns into the larger cities in the course of the enforced Soviet industrialization program.

(c) The stated evacuation rate of 79-83\% is almost certainly too low for the following reasons: (i) for some cities the higher 1939-population figures were not available, and the utilized 1926-figures are known to be too low; (ii) Reitlinger writes in the case of Odessa that two-thirds of that city’s Jews had been removed by train.\textsuperscript{39} Odessa was encircled on August 13, 1941, by the Rumanians and taken on October 16. In the meantime, the Soviets evacuated tens of thousands of Red Army men and civilians, 86,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilians just in the period from October 1 to 10. The number of civilians evacuated in August and September is not known to the author, nor is the percentage of Jews among them. In view of the obvious preference for the Jews in the evacuation of other cities, their share must have been large. For these reasons one should assume that the number of Jews who fell into Rumanian hands must have been less than 50,000.

\textbf{Some Remained Behind}

Reitlinger’s data are rather informative when attempting to pin down the number of those Jews who remained behind to face German occupation. Providing many examples, including evacuation ratios, he wrote that the “bulk” of the Jews of pre-war Russia escaped. Since one-third of the Jews found in the Soviet census of 1939 lived outside those areas later to be conquered by Germany, only a small number of the remaining Jews – in absolute and relative terms – of the pre-war Soviet Union can possibly have fallen into German hands. In addition, “a very large proportion,” as he puts it, of the 1,800,000 Jews of the annexed areas escaped German control. The conclusion thus is compelling that Reitlinger himself believes the number of Jews who remained behind to be less than a million. Actually, this puts Reitlinger in direct opposition to the usual post-war literature on Soviet Jews.

In early 1941, 3,597,000 Jews lived in the Soviet areas occupied by Axis troops in the course of WWII (see Second Chapter). If only 80\% of this

\textsuperscript{38} Hilberg, \textit{Destruction of the European Jews}, p. 190.
\textsuperscript{39} Reitlinger, \textit{Final Solution}, p. 240.
number were evacuated during the war, this would be equivalent to 2,877,000. Subtracted from the 3.6 million, one obtains a mere 720,000 as the number of Soviet Jews remaining under German administration. In this connection, a report by the Canadian-Jewish journalist Arthur Raymond Davies is rather interesting, who spent the war years in the Soviet Union as a correspondent and published his impressions and experiences after the war in New York. Besides his words of praise for the valor of the Jewish Red Army men and partisans, he mentioned a plenary session of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the autumn of 1944 (!), on the occasion of which its secretary Shachne Epstein reported the evacuation of 3.5 million Jews from the territories occupied by Germany.\(^{40}\) Epstein’s figure of 3.5 million evacuees – which apparently also included the three-quarters of a million Jewish refugees from Poland deported to Siberia in the spring of 1940 – matches our own computations on the number of Jews removed by the Soviets until 1941 and 1942 very well.

We should also remind ourselves that most of these 720,000 Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory belonged to the older age groups, because the Soviets had little interest in the evacuation of additional eaters, and also, as one witness before the investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives put it, because “the older people who knew the Germans from World War I, they thought that the Germans are not so bad and that they can live better with Germans than the Soviets.”\(^{41}\) The natural mortality rate of a population group consisting mainly of older people is of course far higher than for a normal age structure. This should not be forgotten when considering those events, particularly because in this case births were practically non-existent.

Certainly, a large number of these roughly 700,000 remaining Soviet Jews did not survive the war. The age structure itself must have effected a considerable negative natural change. The extremely hard, often fanatical battles between German and Soviet troops happened to take place to a large extent in and around the cities; since almost 90% of the Jews were city dwellers, it is quite probable that the remaining older Jews suffered proportionately greater civilian losses. In addition, there were many pogroms against the Jews initiated by the local populations the Baltic countries, White Russia and in the Ukraine after the Soviet troops had pulled back. Only the decisive action taken by German and allied troops put a stop to these murderous activities.\(^{42}\) Shootings of Jewish hostages in retaliation for

---


\(^{41}\) Treatment of Jews by the Soviet, 1954, p. 40.

the murder of German soldiers by the partisans, among whom the Jews were very active according to their own accounts – Soviet statistics mention more than 500,000 German soldiers murdered by partisans – were not at all unusual.

To what extent the taking of hostages among the Jewish population was practiced in the sense of a systematic annihilation program is not our subject. All one needs to do is to check the pertinent literature of the post-war period in order to appreciate the extraordinary role Jews played during the war as partisans against the German Wehrmacht. Even Dr. M.W. Kempner does not question the taking of hostages as “in accordance with international law.” He writes:

*Hostages are taken in periods of occupation, in order to keep the population of the occupied territories from committing crimes against the occupation forces.*

Lastly, hunger, cold, epidemics and lacking medical attention among the mainly elderly remaining Jews probably caused many losses.

The Zionist Gregor Aronson mentioned that the Soviet Jew Lev K. Zinger reported in his book *Dos Oifgekumene Folk* (Moscow, 1949) that tens of thousands of Jews could be found in early 1946 in the various smaller and larger towns of the Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia, Latvia and Lithuania. He cited the following cities:

- Kharkov 30,000
- Dnepropetrovsk 50,000
- Odessa 80,000
- Mohilew-Podolsk 3,000
- Novograd Volynsk 3,000
- Malin 1,000
- Czernowitz 70,000

Reitlinger, who based his figures on the Moscow newspaper *Eynikeyt*, mentioned the same figures for Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk and added:

---

43 Most of the Jewish publications mention with pride a strong Jewish participation in partisan activities during the last war; examples may be found in almost all volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*.

44 Telpuchowski, *Die sowjetische Geschichte*, p. 284, asserts that White Russian partisans alone murdered about 500,000 German soldiers and officers and 47 generals.

45 *WER IST WER?* (Walter Habel, ed.), Frankfurt, 1975, describes this gentleman, inter alia, as follows: “after the war dept.head of chief prosecutor (Jackson) at Intern. Mil. Tribunal Nu- remberg, asst. prosec. against Reichs-Min. of Interior Frick, beg. 1947 American dep. chief prosec. Wilhelmstr.Trial against cabinet members and diplomats of the III. Reich.” The American professor A.R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, Los Angeles, however, arrived at vastly different conclusions in 1977; see in particular pages 29, 160-161, 163-169, 194, 195, and 244.


Kiev 100,000
Vinnitsa 14,000
Shitomir 6,000

He remarked, furthermore, “these figures were recorded at a time when the homeward trek from the deep interior had only begun.” It is also interesting that Shitomir’s population size of 1946 equaled exactly that of the Jews who remained behind to face German occupation in 1941.

In other words, these listed cities, which contained a total of about 360,000 Jews in the former German-occupied parts of the Soviet Union, represent largely the Jews who survived the war and the German occupation. Also, a homeward trek must be understood to mean that these people had been evacuated previously; here, too, Reitlinger contradicts the current literature, according to which the rapid German advance prevented the Jews to escape in appreciable numbers.

Nobody knows the number of Jews who survived in the western parts of the Soviet Union at the time the Red Army proceeded to reoccupy that territory. But this extract of only ten cities with a population of 360,000 Jews (in early 1946!), as well as the fact that other Soviet republics – e.g. Moldavia, Lithuania and Latvia, which Zinger mentioned by name without providing figures – also were inhabited by thousands of survivors, show that the vast majority of the three-quarters of a million Soviet Jews under German administration survived the war.

The extent of the losses suffered by the Soviet Jews who remained under German control is debatable. It seems that because of their age structure – elderly people predominated – the natural excess of deaths must have reached at least 3% per year; in three occupation years, this adds up to a reduction of 65,000. This means that the Jewish population under German control – the figure of 720,000 probably is too high – was reduced to 655,000. Other losses could have occurred on account of the general negative environment as described above, and because of the Jewish participation in partisan activities in violation of international law. All of this makes a further reduction by roughly 10%, or 65,000, to about 590,000 possible. Thus, it would seem that, if 360,000 Jews were found in just ten cities in former German-occupied territories in early 1946 and many other thousands

49 Compare Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler’s Ten-Year War*, p. 186.
50 The Jewish mortality rate in the Soviet Union must have been greater than 1.2%. Since natural deaths occur primarily in the age groups 50 years and over, and these age groups accounted for roughly 30% of the population, it may be presumed that at least 3.5% of the population over 49 years of age died annually of natural causes. We based our calculations on a rate of 3%, because the exact composition of the remaining Jews is not known, but the older age groups nevertheless constituted the vast majority.
survived in other, not specified Soviet cities, our figure of 590,000 surviving Jews after the German retreat seems realistic.

Death in Siberia

Fate was much worse for the Jews living under Soviet domination during the war. Among the 750,000 Polish-Jewish refugees, 150-250,000 died from hardships on the way to the east and the north. Those who arrived in Asia were put into labor and concentration camps. As mentioned already, among these unfortunates was also Menachem Begin, the subsequent Jewish IRGUN-terrorist in Palestine and recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Even the *Universal*, which was quite sympathetic to the Soviet cause in 1943, spoke of “Siberia, where they underwent great hardships.”\(^5\) The Joint Distribution Committee, which aided the Jewish victims in Siberia and the Russian North during the war with food and medicine, was a little more outspoken. In its Bulletin of June 1943 it informed us that the survivors of the deportations had to put up with further privation:\(^5\)

> The [Soviet] government gives each refugee from a half to one pound of bread each day. […] Food can only be bought with things. Money has lost its value.

Apart from the monotony of this kind of food supply, those tortured people received less than a third of the calories needed for survival – a fatal deficiency in the inhumane environment of Siberian labor and concentration camps. The Jewish author Reitlinger commented:\(^5\)

> In Southern Siberia, the death-rate was very high for […] Jews […]

The small number of 157,500 Polish-Jewish refugees returning from Siberia to Poland in 1945/1946 gives us an idea of the terrible fate Jewish deportees from Poland met in Siberia. 600,000 have disappeared. Even if one includes those few who unimaginably preferred to remain in the Soviet Union, the total of the Jewish victims of Soviet labor camps hardly would be affected. The argument that the Soviets forced most of them to stay there after the war does not hold up. The 157,500 returnees left Poland soon after their arrival from Russia to move on to the West. They would have known if a considerable number of their compatriots had been kept in Soviet Russia against their will. But there are no indications of this to be found in post-war literature. Everything seems to point to the horrible fact that 600,000 Polish-Jewish refugees died in and on the way to Siberia.\(^5\)

---

\(^5\) Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 499.
\(^5\) Understandably, there are no exact figures on the extent of this vast number of deaths. But the fact that post-war literature contains no hints to the effect that a considerable number of former
Another 2.9 million were evacuated to Siberia shortly before and after the start of the German-Soviet war. The fate of these people is unknown, but the sacrifice of the Jewish refugees from Poland is not a good omen. Certainly, in 1940 foreigners were deported after having refused the citizenship of the workers’ and peasants’ paradise, proving in this way that they were truly enemies of the glorious Soviet Union, whereas in 1941 the USSR’s own citizens were moved to “safety.” On the other hand, in 1941 the circumstances were such in many places that the Soviets had to introduce hasty measures; after all, their primary goal was to deny these trained people to the Germans and, in the second place, to save as many good workers for their own war effort. The transport of millions of people in a few weeks across a distant and rather primitive railroad network simply must have been costly in terms of human lives. These people, too, faced a life of hardship and misery in Siberia.

How badly those evacuated and deported Soviet citizens fared in Siberia in 1941/1945 may be gleaned from the words of the Soviet court historian Telpuchowski:

The provision of accommodations for the millions evacuated from the enemy-occupied territories to the areas of the hinterland posed a serious problem. [In re-constructing the transplanted factories the evacuated people] worked under the open sky, quite often in rain and snow. The most elementary lodging facilities were lacking; they had to live in tents and sod huts. Food was scarce. Work continued throughout the day. The workday often lasted from 12 to 14 hours and more.

No comments.

Referring to the mass deportation measures initiated in Lithuania one week before June 22, 1941, the *Judaica* says that the deported people were interned in forced labor camps and set to work in coal mines, wood cutting, and other heavy labor. Without question, death must have reaped a terrible harvest under those conditions. After the liberation from the Soviet yoke, the shocked Baltic population told of unimaginable occurrences during the deportation and evacuation measures initiated on June 13/14, 1941. Thousands upon thousands of people simply were shot to death. If persons the Soviets were looking for could not be found, another family member or person living in the same house was taken in their place. The arrested people Polish-Jewish refugees remained behind in the Soviet Union after the war, allows us to conclude that, except for those 157,500 returnees, almost all the others died in Siberia. The Jewish economist Jacob Lestschinsky (*AJYB*, Vol. 49, p. 397) puts the number of those who died in Siberia and central Asia at 500,000 Jews, while Gédéon Haganov (*Le Communisme et les Juifs*, Supplement de CONTACT, Paris, May 1951) arrived at about 450,000. The American Jewish Committee noted that only 200,000 had died in Siberia (*AJYB*, Vol. 49, p. 394).

---

55 Telpuchowski, *Die sowjetische Geschichte*, p. 82 and 88.
were crowded into cattle wagons in batches of 50 to 60, the men were separated from their wives, the children torn from their mothers. Doors and ventilation openings were nailed shut; there were no benches. The locked-up people were left to themselves, without food or drink. Many died on the way east. In a car left behind at the Oger railroad station, 60 suffocated children were found. These people were treated worse than cattle.57

Some deportees managed to return to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; they told of terrible conditions in Soviet territory. People, they said, were being forced to work in the icy cold of the north and east with no other clothes and shoes than those they wore when they were arrested. Medical attention was lacking completely, and the persistent undernourishment caused people to die in huge numbers.58

It is all but impossible to place a figure on the total number of Jewish victims in Siberia and the Urals. One should keep in mind that the evidence given by Western Zionist sources on the extent of Jewish losses in Siberia can hardly be called objective. The Soviets would never assume moral or financial responsibility. The temptation to keep that number as low as possible is obvious; after all, defeated Germany presented an easy scapegoat to be blamed for all of the Jews who were missing, killed in action or murdered by the Soviets.

The Hungarian Minister in Moscow, Prof. Szekfu, provided a vivid description of the shape in which the Jewish deportees and evacuees returned from Siberia; he said to Dr. Zoltan Klar from the Council of the Budapest Jewish Community:59

> [...] these people arrived from Siberia in Moscow in a desperate situation, sick and enfeebled, starved and bedraggled, in rags, without clothes or any other possessions.

If the condition of the Jews in Siberia was this terrible in 1946, what might the situation have looked like during the war? Obviously, putting the number of Jewish dead in Siberia at 700,000 probably is not enough to allow for all the victims of the barbarian Soviet policy.

But the war itself also created huge gaps in the Jewish population. From 1939 to 1942, 200,000 Jews fell in all Allied armies.60 Deducting the Polish-Jewish soldiers killed in action and the unknown number of killed Jews in the British, French and U.S. forces – in the U.S. Army 550,000 Jews are said to have served during WWII – then it is quite possible that the Red Army

59 Treatment of Jews by the Soviet, 1954, p. 86.
suffered 100-150,000 Jewish soldiers killed in action during the first 1½ costly years of war against Germany. In any case, the *Judaica* maintained as late as 1971 that the Soviet-Jewish losses among the soldiers killed “in action” amounted to 200,000.61

The “loss” of 157,500 returned Polish-Jewish refugees after the war was compensated by the Soviets by chalkling up “gains” among other European Jews. As will be shown in the Sixth Chapter, 65,500 Hungarian Jews disappeared in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets annexed Ruthenia in 1945 with a Jewish population of probably less than 100,000.

Adding it all up, one obtains the following picture: Of the 5.3 million Jews under Soviet domination in 1939/1940, at least 700,000 lost their lives during the deportation to the east or in the Siberian “accommodations,” labor and concentration camps. 200,000 were killed in combat while serving in Red Army and partisan units, and a further 130,000 may have died because of the fighting in the cities, pogroms of the native population, hunger, epidemics, lack of medical attention, over-aging and, last but not least, because of German retributions against Jewish hostages in retaliation for Germans murdered by partisans. All of these developments may well have caused a loss of over one million. For this reason, one should not expect that more than 4.3 million Jews survived the war in the Soviet Union – a loss of 20% compared to early 1940. In table-form the development looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under Soviet domination – 1939/1940</th>
<th>5,337,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>deduct:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War and deportation losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Jewish Red Army men killed in combat</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Deportation and concentration camp losses in Siberia</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses in the German-Soviet theater of war</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total losses</td>
<td>–1,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining</td>
<td>4,307,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other changes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Jews retained in the USSR62</td>
<td>65,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexation of Ruthenia62</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish refugees returned from the USSR</td>
<td>–157,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population in the USSR at the end of WWII (max.)</td>
<td>4,301,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

62 See Sixth Chapter.
FIFTH CHAPTER:

The Jews in the Post-War Soviet Union

The Survivors

Post-war literature usually puts the number of surviving Jews in the Soviet Union at about two million or even fewer. The Year Book arrived at 2,032,500,\(^1\) and other Zionist sources mentioned figures as low as 1,500,000. They simply deny the established historical fact that the Soviets succeeded in evacuating the bulk of the Jewish population before and after the German “surprise” attack. If 600,000 Jews served in the Red Army,\(^2\) then this must probably be explained by the Soviet evacuation of the male Jews of military age.

Age-specific data on the Jews living before the war in areas never occupied by Germany are not available as far as we know; for this reason, the age structure of the Polish Jews of 1931 was used. On this basis, males aged 16-45 years composed 22.7% of the total Soviet-Jewish population.\(^3\) Before the war, 1.6 million Jews lived in those parts of the Soviet Union never occupied by Germany (see Second Chapter). 22.7% of 1.6 million amounts to 357,000.

Post-war Jewish sources provide somewhat lower figures for Jewish Red Army soldiers; Solomon Grayzel mentions only 500,000 Jews in the Red Army in his book *A History of the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1948, p. 766). Unfortunately, Grayzel does not indicate the source where his figure originated; the *AJYB* however refers expressly to Soviet reports. It is interesting that Grayzel also mentions 550,000 and 17,000 Jews, respectively, in the armed forces of the United States and Canada. Relative to the entire Jewish population in those two countries (for more details see the Seventh Chapter), this is equivalent to a rate of about 10%. The same applies to South Africa. In the case of Great Britain, 60,000 Jews are said to have served in Her Majesty’s armed forces; this is an excellent indicator that the actual size of the Jewish population in England during the war was not 350,000, as Zionist sources maintain, but probably around 600-700,000. Since the Soviet Union had a somewhat larger Jewish population at the beginning of the war than the USA, and as the Soviets mobilized a relatively larger share of the male population, even the figures published in Moscow seem to be on the low side. But Grayzel’s figure is lower yet, and thus even less likely.

---

2. *Ibid.*, 1942, Vol. 44, p. 234. Other Jewish sources provide somewhat lower figures for Jewish Red Army soldiers; Solomon Grayzel mentions only 500,000 Jews in the Red Army in his book *A History of the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1948, p. 766). Unfortunately, Grayzel does not indicate the source where his figure originated; the *AJYB* however refers expressly to Soviet reports. It is interesting that Grayzel also mentions 550,000 and 17,000 Jews, respectively, in the armed forces of the United States and Canada. Relative to the entire Jewish population in those two countries (for more details see the Seventh Chapter), this is equivalent to a rate of about 10%. The same applies to South Africa. In the case of Great Britain, 60,000 Jews are said to have served in Her Majesty’s armed forces; this is an excellent indicator that the actual size of the Jewish population in England during the war was not 350,000, as Zionist sources maintain, but probably around 600-700,000. Since the Soviet Union had a somewhat larger Jewish population at the beginning of the war than the USA, and as the Soviets mobilized a relatively larger share of the male population, even the figures published in Moscow seem to be on the low side. But Grayzel’s figure is lower yet, and thus even less likely.
to 360,000 male Jews aged 16-45 years in 1941 in the “free” Soviet territories.

It is not likely that all Jews of military age were drafted into the armed forces. Deferments on account of the necessity to leave specialists in industry and administration, physical impairments, etc. hardly permitted more than 70%, i.e. 250,000, to be inducted. This means that 350,000 must have come from the occupied areas. Assuming the same deferment ratio for them, the Soviets must have evacuated 500,000 Jewish males of military age from the occupied territories.

On the basis of these calculations we arrived at 2.1 million. Deducting from it the 200,000 Jews killed in combat and adding the supposedly very few Jews who survived German occupation, one obtains about 2 million or even fewer surviving Soviet Jews. The contradiction of so many Jews serving and dying in the Red Army, even though most Jews supposedly fell into German hands, can only be resolved in this way.

But there is a catch to it. All in all, 860,000 male Jews of military age were available to the Soviets; most of them were drafted, and 200,000 never returned. At the end of the war, only 660,000 male Jews of this age group remained. Now, if the Soviets restricted themselves to evacuating just half a million male Jews of military age and left the bulk of the elderly, women and children behind to face German annihilation, the surviving 660,000 male Jews would have faced only about 400,000 Jewesses of the same age group – a ratio of 66 to 40! However, such an “upside-down” gender ratio never has been reported in post-war literature – which is very strange.

The opposite proved to be true. The Soviet census of 1959 recorded a gender distribution for the Jews as is “normal” for a population that suffered huge losses of men in two world wars; similar developments occurred in other countries affected by these terrible wars. Specifically, the male/female ratio for Soviet Jews in 1959 was 45.4% (i.e. 1,030,629) to 54.6% (i.e. 1,237,185). Ten years later the Soviet census of 1970 began to show the first slight indication of a normalization of the gender structure among the Jews: It was 45.9% to 54.1%.

On the basis of the age distribution of the Jews in the RSFSR, 705,290 Jews of the recorded 2,267,814 Jews in the Soviet Union (1959) belonged to the age group “0-28 years,” which, at the end of WWII, either had not been born yet or was too young for military service. Its gender structure should have been more or less balanced. The male/female composition among those 29 years and older thus was 677,984 and 884,540, respectively:

---

For the age groups over 28 years this corresponds to a male/female ratio of 43.4/56.6, which is far better than the overall Soviet ratio (1959) of 38.4/61.6 for those aged 30 years and more.\(^7\)

In any case, the age groups which participated actively in both world wars showed a gap of 200,000 in favor of the fair sex. Several tens of thousands of this difference, no doubt, must be attributed to the lower life expectancy of men; further tens of thousands are accounted for by World War One. The Second World War cannot be responsible for very many more than 100,000 men killed in action.

As mentioned above, Zionist sources put the number of Jews who died in the Soviet armed forces at at least 200,000. It is obvious that the Soviet census of 1959 did not register the Jewish population in its entirety; otherwise we would have found more than 100,000 or maybe even 125,000 male casualties of WWII.

The following facts crystallize:
1. More than half a million male Jews served in the Red Army during WWII.
2. It would have been impossible to draft 600,000 soldiers from a population of only two million; therefore, the largest part of the Soviet-Jewish population must have been evacuated by the Soviets to areas outside the German sphere of influence.
3. The contention that the Soviets removed only the male population of military age, leaving the elderly, women and children behind to be annihilated, is untenable; if so, the number of male Jews would have had to be far larger after the war than that of the Jewesses despite the many men killed in action. This, however, is not the case as is shown by the census of 1959 which – 14 years after the war – still evidenced a gender ratio of 43% to 57% in favor of the female sex for the age groups subject to military duty in the Second World War.

The Soviet census of 1959 thus can serve as proof that the mass evacuation of the Jewish population by the Soviets did indeed take place in 1941. At the same time it provides information on the relative size of losses incurred by Jews in the Red Army.

How reliable is the Soviet census? The stigma of manipulation attaches to all Soviet statistics. But even leaving this argument aside, the greatest

\(^7\) Statistisches Bundesamt. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Wiesbaden, 1962, p. 29.
disadvantage must be seen in the manner in which the census was conducted. It was left up to each individual to register for statistical purposes under any nationality desired. In this way, the Soviets provided an opportunity not only for the assimilated Jews but also for those who still maintained ties to Judaism, not to appear to the outside world as Jews; in view of the anti-Semitic attitudes of large sections of the Slavic and Baltic populations, many Jews tried to evade recognition by having themselves recorded as Russians, etc.8

Fortunately, other means exist for verification. During the 1970s a growing number of Jews left the Soviet Union for Israel. Contrary to the immigrants of the first post-war years – mainly from Europe – whose male/female ratio among those aged 50-64 years averaged 49/51,9 the elderly Jewish immigrants from the USSR in the years 1976-1979 recorded a male share of only 37-40%:10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, the Jews arriving in Israel from the Soviet Union showed a gender ratio roughly in line with that indicated by the Soviet census of 1959.

We can summarize as follows: The Soviet census of 1959 is reasonably correct as far as the gender and probably also the age distribution of the Soviet Jews is concerned, but it vastly understates the total number of Soviet Jews.

The figures published before 1959 in post-war literature of about two million surviving Jews in the Soviet Union are by no means based on official Soviet statistics. The way this number was “created” originally is described by the Year Book:11

Statistics concerning the Russian Jews were meager and not always reliable even before the war. […] Pieced together from a wide variety of unofficial Soviet data and other sources, available information is necessarily fragmentary and often hypothetical. There is no adequate basis for presenting a complete picture of present-day Soviet Jewry or assessing the far-reaching changes caused by the war and the period of post-war reconstruction. […]

---

9 Israel. The Central Bureau of Statistics and Economic Research. Statistical Abstract of Israel 1951/52, No. 3, Table 9, p. 27: Between May 15, 1948, and Dec. 31, 1951, 77,536 Jewish immigrants aged 50-64 were registered; of these, 49% were male.
In 1939-40 the eastern part of Poland, Bessarabia and Bukovina, and the Baltic states were incorporated into the USSR. [...] the total number of Jews within the boundaries of the Soviet Union before the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June 1941 can therefore be taken as about 5,500,000, including about 350,000 war-refugee Polish Jews. Corliss Lamont (The Peoples of the Soviet Union, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1946) estimates the number of Soviet Jews at this period as 5,300,000, exclusive of non-Soviet refugees. But these figures by themselves contribute little to an estimate of present Jewish population of the Soviet Union. For this we would have to know not only the number of those who lost their lives as a result of Nazi atrocities, but the birth rate of the Soviet Jews, the number of Jewish soldiers who fell during the war, mortality among those deported and evacuated to Central Asia and Siberia, and the scope of postwar repatriation to Poland and Rumania. Only on the last of these points, however, do we have accurate information. Of about 350,000 Jews from Eastern and Central Poland who sought refuge in the Soviet zone in 1939-40, the vast majority were deported by the Soviet authorities to Siberia, Central Asia, etc. (a substantial number to concentration camps). It must be emphasized that these people went as compulsory exiles, not as refugees. A few thousand left the USSR with the Polish army evacuated to Iran in 1942, approximately 150,000 returned to Poland in 1946, and only a few thousand elected to stay in the USSR. The remainder – about 200,000 – probably died there.

The most conspicuous discrepancies concern the estimated number of victims of the German mass-murders. These estimates range between 1,500,000 (Corliss Lamont, op. cit.) and 3,000,000 (Jacob Lestschinsky). Only an insignificant percentage of Jews (perhaps only 1 per cent) who remained in the territories overrun by the Germans managed to escape alive. The number of Jews evacuated from these territories prior to the German occupation is, therefore, exceedingly important, but this cannot be accurately determined. It seems certain that the optimistic estimates published outside the Soviet Union both during the war and at its close were exaggerated. The German occupation of the Baltic states, the Ukraine and White Russia – all areas with large, concentrated Jewish settlements – proceeded very quickly, and the Soviet transportation system was unable to carry out the evacuation speedily enough, nor on a sufficiently large scale. Many evacuation transports were overtaken by the swift German offensive.

Kulischer, in his study The Displacement of Population in Europe (International Labor Office, Montreal, 1943), estimates that 1,100,000 Jews from the pre-1939 territory of the Soviet Union, 30,000 from the Baltic States, and 500,000 from Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine, were evacuated into unoccupied Soviet territories. In this latter figure he includes those forcibly deported in 1939-1940. Others consider these figures excessive.

These discrepancies naturally lead to different estimates as to the number of Jews living in Russia. Even Dr. Frank Lorimer of Princeton, an outstanding authority, in his work, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Pro-
spects (Geneva, League of Nations, 1946), does not venture such an estimate. Unofficial Soviet publications mention 2,500,000 as the present [1947] Jewish population of the USSR. This figure, which is also Kulischer’s estimate, (Rescue, July-August 1946), appears to be exaggerated. [...] These unofficial estimates are severely criticized by the Jewish economist Jacob Lestschinsky. According to his analysis, the total number of Jews within the present Soviet boundaries does not exceed 1,500,000 (The New Leader, March 8, 1947, New York). He claims to have calculated, on the basis of unofficial Soviet information, that the maximum number of Jews living in the 60 major settlements of European Russia is 800,000. To the smaller settlements of the European part of the USSR, Lestschinsky ascribes a figure of less than 100,000 Jews; to the Asiatic parts, 500-600,000 Jews. Thus he arrives at his total of 1,500,000 Jews in the Soviet Union.

This figure, when compared to the 5,500,000 Jews on Soviet soil before the outbreak of the war in 1941, shows a difference of 4,000,000. To explain these missing 4,000,000 Jews, Lestschinsky estimates that about 200,000 Jewish Red Army men lost their lives in the fighting, and about 500,000 Jews died in Siberia and Central Asia (principally from among the deported and evacuated). It would thus follow that the Germans massacred more than 3,000,000 Soviet Jews. Lestschinsky’s figures are also, obviously, hypothetical.

The Research Department of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in New York estimates the present number of Soviet Jews as 1,800,000. This includes the Asiatic provinces, but is exclusive of the Baltic states [Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia] where there are reported to be 32,500 Jews. (The pre-war Jewish population of these countries was 255,000.)

The estimates of the JDC appear to be closest to the facts; however, until the publication of official, reliable statistics, the actual present Jewish population of the USSR cannot be definitely determined.

In the following year’s issue the Year Book wrote again:12

[...] neither the Russian-Jewish organizations nor the general USSR statistics contain information on this very important subject. Our estimates, based on a careful study of Russian and Jewish material concerning persons evacuated to the unoccupied part of the country [...] 

Here is the confirmation of a leading Zionist publication that the information on Soviet Jewry is fragmentary at best, that the number of Jews supposedly killed by the Nazis is totally unknown, and that the guesswork about the number of Jewish survivors in the Soviet Union has led to great differences of opinion and figures of a purely speculative character. It is even admitted that the number of only two million or fewer surviving Jews rests on two hypotheses: First, the Germans allegedly killed most of the Jews who remained behind in German-occupied territory. Secondly, it is assumed that only a small part of the Jewish population managed to escape. The “esti-

---

mates” for the number of the deported supposedly have been arrived at by a “careful study” of Russian and Jewish material on the number of people evacuated to the unoccupied territories. The lack of diligence applied becomes obvious when one observes that the enormous evacuation carried out by the Soviets in 1941 is simply denied. That’s how history is fabricated.

Revised Estimates

The number of two million surviving Jews in the Soviet Union is seen to be without foundation, as the “creators” of that figure freely admit. Still, they had to wait until 1959 for an official confirmation of this hypothetic figure when the Soviets conducted a census in 1959; the published figure of 2,267,814 was not all that different from Zionist “estimates.” To be sure, it was known that the Soviet method of taking a census leads perforce to too low a Jewish population figure, but, said the Year Book, there is nothing one can do but accept it. It continued:13

The question of the number of Jews in the Soviet Union was to a large extent answered by the publication of the January 1959 census of Soviet population.

However, the following census of January 1970 recorded only a Jewish population of 2,151,300 – 117,000 fewer than eleven years before.14 The Soviet demographer A.M. Maksimov commented, in the USSR there is going on “a process of fusion of nations which, under the conditions of a socialist society, has the character of friendship […]”

Shaken by this process of friendship, the Zionists noticed that the Soviets were engaged in having the Jews disappear statistically in a slow but steady manner. The Year Book objected: “[…] a ‘hidden’ Jew, or an assimilated Jew, remains a Jew and should be counted as such,” and “it is questionable whether one should accept improbable figures supplied by a not overly friendly source.”15 An excellent question. In any case, the Year Book is again of the opinion that under the circumstances it is impossible to specify at present the exact number of Soviet Jews.

To be sure, already prior to 1970 the press carried reports that there are probably more Jews in the USSR than “estimated” until then; but ever since about that year, reports are regularly being published which draw an entirely different picture of the numerical size of post-war Soviet Jewry. Among the most prominent was the Year Book, which admitted that well-informed Russian Jews in the USSR and Soviet emigrants continue to assert that there

14 Ibid., 1971, Vol. 72, p. 403.
15 Ibid., 1972, Vol. 73, p. 536.
are up to 4,000,000 Jews in the Soviet Union. Similar figures were mentioned by the *New York Times* on January 22, 1975. Prof. Shapiro, who is in charge of the Jewish world demographic statistics published by the *Year Book*, wrote:

The estimate of the emigrants is also important since all of them (with whom I spoke) suggest a more or less similar figure, which they say is current among the Jews in Russia.

The *Judaica*, too, behind which there are Zionist personalities of the stature of an Arthur J. Goldberg and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, speaks of 3 to 4 million Jews in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1970s. Prof. Michael Zand, who is teaching at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem today and who left the Soviet Union after a great many difficulties some years ago, said, according to a report by the Israeli newspaper *Beth Shalom*, that there are still 4.5 million Jews in the USSR as far as he knows. In his opinion, the official statistics of the Soviet Union reflect merely those Jews who are willing to acknowledge their Jewish nationality.

We should note at this point that a Soviet census does not represent the official Soviet version on the question of the actual number of the Jewish population. In that society the purpose of a census is not at all to determine the numerical size of a particular people in an ethnic sense. It was possible, for instance, that, due to a change in the definition of nationality between 1926 and 1939, the share of the Russians increased from 52.9% of the total population to 58.1% despite the fact that the fertility of the Russians was not only below the national, but also below the Ukrainian and the White Russian averages. Following the territorial expansion in the years 1939/1940, the Soviet Union acquired another 25 million inhabitants – Ukrainians, White Russians, peoples from the Baltic countries, Rumanians (but only very few Russians). One should have expected, therefore, that the Russian share would have dropped back to about 51% before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. Since then the Russian surplus of births over deaths was

---

18 Private letter dated January 3, 1980, from Prof. Leon Shapiro who is in charge of population statistics at the *American Jewish Year Book*.
20 Kern, Erich. *Die Tragodie der Juden*, Preussisch Oldendorf, 1979, p. 260. With letter dated 8/15/1980 Prof. Zand (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) was requested to confirm the figure of 4.5 million in the Soviet Union ascribed to him; since no answer was forthcoming, another letter was sent to him on 1/2/1981. Thereupon, Prof. Zand answered with letter dated 2/13/1981 asking to have the question sent to him on 8/15/1980 repeated; he promised to reply if at all possible. Unfortunately, he failed to do so in spite of repeated reminders (letters dated 2/25/1981 and 6/18/1981).
below the average, yet still, the census of 1959 recorded the Russian share to be 54.6% of the Soviet population.\footnote{Fortune, New York, 8/14/1978, p. 158.}


Unfortunately, Western Zionist circles still have not come around to accepting “for the record” a higher estimate of the Soviet Jewish population. Nor is this very surprising, because the overdue correction would, of course, invite inconvenient questions.

Nevertheless, one can observe a slow, almost unnoticeable turn of attitude, if one is willing to scratch below the surface. The Judaica, for example, published under the guidance and cooperation of prominent Jewish and Israeli personalities,\footnote{Research Foundation of the Encyclopaedia Judaica: Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, Hon. Chairman; Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Hon. President; Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz; Prof. Salo W. Baron, Consulting Editor.} cites the Jewish population figure in the usual manner as published in Soviet statistics for 1970, but then arrives at the significant conclusion that hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews were not recorded as Jews during the Soviet census; it continued, “for more correct estimates, see articles on individual cities.”\footnote{Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 14, p. 482.}

Well, we did; and we found fifteen Soviet cities for which Jewish population figures were published in the Soviet census of 1959 and for which the Judaica listed corresponding Zionist estimates as well. The comparison is depicted in Table 10.

According to the Soviet census of 1959, these fifteen cities included 906,479 Jewish inhabitants, or 40% of all “official” 2.27 million Soviet Jews. The estimates of the Judaica arrive at 1,493,000 Jews for the same fifteen cities – 65% more than recorded officially. In other words, among ten Soviet Jews only six acknowledged their Jewish nationality at the time the census was taken. Now, there is no reason why the Jews living in other Soviet cities behaved very differently; the logical conclusion is that leading Zionist circles put the number of Soviet Jews in 1970 at 3\(\frac{3}{4}\) million (i.e. 165% of 2.27 million).

Considering that cautious estimates for the Soviet-Jewish population are still in the Zionist interest, one may presume that leading and knowledgeable world Zionist personalities themselves believe that the real size of the Jew-
ish population in the Soviet Union is as high as 4 (four) million! One example of the restraint with which these estimates for Soviet cities listed on Table 10 have been arrived at, is offered by another unsuspicious Zionist source, the American Jewish Year Book: It put the Jewish population of Leningrad, for instance, as high as 325,000 in 1963 already; this is 60% more than admitted to by the Judaica, and 100% more than the number found by the Soviet census of 1959.25

The complete lack of credibility for the official Soviet statistics on the number of Soviet Jews can also be demonstrated by the example of Moscow. In 1940, this Russian city contained at least 400,000 Jews (see Second Chapter), but in 1959 only 239,000 were reported by the census. This is strange. The Germans never occupied Moscow, and the attractiveness of this hub of Soviet life with its incomparable career possibilities more likely than not increased during these decades. A reduction of the Jewish minority by 40% (!) between 1940 and 1959 is completely out of the question. To the contrary, reinforced by a migration to this city from other sections of the country, Moscow’s Jewish population should have been expected to increase, and even the Judaica’s estimate of 500,000 Jews in 1970 appears conservative.

According to the calculations of this study, the USSR was inhabited by 4.3 million Jews at the end of World War Two. Is there a logical explanation

---

for a possible reduction of this number to 4 million or less during the 25 years between 1945 and 1970? There are many indications that the Soviet Jews suffered indeed a drastic numerical decline during the post-war period. The huge war losses among men and the enormous children mortality rate in the course of the Soviet evacuations in the years 1940/1941 were mentioned already. These developments were compounded by the high degree of urbanization (96%) of Soviet Jews.\(^\text{26}\)

Another factor – probably the most important today – for a negative growth balance is the trend toward assimilation through mixed marriages; this development set in long before WWII, and grew in strength after the war. As a rule, the children born to these couples are lost to the Jewish nationality.\(^\text{27}\) In 1926 already 26% of all Jewish males living outside the Ukraine and White Russia married gentile women; in the latter two provinces, the percentage was only 4.6 and 2.0%.\(^\text{28}\)

The shift of the Jewish population center from the traditionally anti-Semitic regions (Ukraine and White Russia) to the north and east persisted ever since the Revolution, and was further reinforced by the mass deportations of 1940/1941. *The Year Book* complained:\(^\text{29}\)

> According to a reliable source, intermarriages involving Jews in Moscow and in Leningrad had reached about 50 per cent in the early 1960s. The same source indicated that in the new cities of Siberia – many with a young academic population – the rate remained extremely high.

Of course, mixed marriages do not change the nationality of either partner. But if the children from these marriages are lost to the ethnic minority, the effects on the natural growth of this ethnic group are the same as if those marrying outside their group remain childless.

If, as the *Judaica* maintains, 20% of the Soviet Jews of the postwar period lived in Leningrad and Moscow,\(^\text{30}\) where every second member of the Jewish community married outside his nationality, the effect is the same as if 10% of all young Jews of marriageable age remain without children. Zionist literature claims, however, that these two cities are not unique in this respect. In the 1920s the percentage of mixed marriages involving Jews was less than 5% in the traditionally anti-Semitic regions of the Soviet Union. Assuming that the native population of these non-Russian areas continues to exhibit those attitudes even today, although possibly in a milder form, the share of mixed marriages among the Jews living there – about 45% of all Soviet Jews – might have risen to, let us say, ten per cent.


\(^\text{29}\) *AJYB*, 1973, Vol. 74, p. 481.

\(^\text{30}\) I.e. 700,000 (see Table 8) of about 3-4,000,000 (see footnote 19).
Conceding furthermore that the Jews living outside the traditional settlements in the south and west, but excluding Moscow and Leningrad, did not experience the enormous mixed marriage rate of the two metropolitan areas, one can use a rate of 30% as a starting point; in this case, the incidence of mixed marriages among the Soviet Jews might appear as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of Jews in the USSR</th>
<th>Percentage of mixed marriages</th>
<th>“Childless” Jewish mixed marriages partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow and Leningrad</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other areas in the north and the east</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia and Baltic area</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following this hypothetic example, every fourth Jew in the Soviet Union remains “without children” – at least as far as the growth of his nationality is concerned – because he is marrying outside his ethnic group and because the children born to these mixed couples are lost to the Jewish minority as a rule. Now, the purpose of this exercise was not at all to pinpoint the exact percentage of “childless” Jews (as defined); it does not matter at all whether the average percentage of mixed marriages among Soviet Jews is closer to 20 or 30% or even higher. The fact is that mixed marriages are extremely common among the Jews of the USSR. Inasmuch as the highly urbanized Soviet Jews had a preference for the small family in the 1920s already (as shown by Prof. Lorimer), and total births in those days barely managed to cover natural mortality, one has to presume that the enormously strong trend toward mixed marriages in the post-war period must have resulted in large annual excesses of deaths over births.

The Israeli demographer and professor U.O. Schmelz of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem reported that only 7% of the Jews in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) belonged to the age group “0 to 10 years,” and 26.5% were sixty years and older – a very high “aging” indeed. For the sake of comparison: the Federal Republic of Germany, which does not have a “young” population, had percentages of 13.5 and 19.7%, respectively, in 1977. The extent of “aging” of the Soviet Jews and their lower birth rate is shown in the table below:

Jews in the Russian Federated Republic (RSFSR)  
Distribution by Age – 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Average Share per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10 years</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19 years</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 years and older</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering that the men in the age groups from 40 to 59 years had suffered huge losses during the war, their share would have been even larger without this external effect. It is fairly obvious that the decline of births is not a post-war phenomenon but that it started decades before the war. In the 1960s, finally, the birth rate seems to have fallen to 6 per 1,000 Jewish persons; but in order just to maintain their population size, the share of the youngest age groups would have had to be more than twice as large!

The very large proportion of the older age groups indicates also a rather high natural mortality rate. Prof. Schmelz wrote that the natural decrease of the Soviet-Jewish population amounted to 1 (one) per cent per year between 1959 and 1970! The above age distribution shows furthermore that a population decline must have been recorded in the 1950s already. And there are no signs whatsoever that this situation has improved during the past ten years. Even if there had been a surplus of births over deaths right after the war, this must have been of a very short duration due to the catastrophic losses of men in the war and the difficult post-war conditions; this is definitely indicated by the relative size of the age group “20 to 29 years.”

The size of the average excess of births over deaths in the post-war period cannot be determined with the data available. Prof. Schmelz argues that the Jewish population of the other Soviet republics registered essentially the same age distribution as the RSFSR. All we know is that since 1945 the Jewish population must have suffered substantial negative average growth rates. Whether this deficit averaged a rate below or above minus 0.5% is impossible to determine, given the paucity of Soviet statistics.

As mentioned above, the number of Soviet Jews at the end of WWII must have been 4.3 million at most. Applying various average negative growth rates for the period since 1945, and accounting for the roughly 250,000
Jewish emigrants between 1970 and 1980\textsuperscript{32} – before 1970 emigration was negligible – we obtain the following alternative developments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average decrease per annum since 1945</th>
<th>Jewish Population in the Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) –0.3 %</td>
<td>3.98 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) –0.4 %</td>
<td>3.88 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) –0.5 %</td>
<td>3.77 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) –0.6 %</td>
<td>3.69 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, it is not just a possibility, but there is a high degree of probability that the Soviet-Jewish population fell by more than 10\% below 4.3 million by 1970. This figure is completely in accord with statements by Soviet Jews on the size of their ethnic group in Russia; Prof. Shapiro from the \textit{Year Book} confirmed this in writing.

Even the \textit{Judaica}, whose estimates of the Jewish inhabitants of individual Soviet cities point to a total population of just under 4 million, concludes that this number of present-day Jews in the USSR is not the result of a positive natural growth; it wrote:\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{Moreover, there are fragmentary indications and a general likelihood that the growth of the Jewish group in the U.S.S.R. since the War has been small, if there has been any at all (because of aging, enhanced by war losses; low fertility; intermarriage; assimilation pressure by the majority population; etc.)}

This is putting it very cautiously. The Judaica could have said as well that at the end of WWII there were at least as many Jews in the Soviet Union as there are today, probably even more – over 4 million!

In this connection we received an interesting admission from Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the one-time chairman of the World Jewish Congress. He declared without qualifications that the Jewish population group in the USSR numbered about three to three-and-one-half million people in 1980.\textsuperscript{34} This figure corresponds to a population size which might have been expected considering the emigration of a quarter million Soviet Jews in the 1970s and a negative growth rate of at least 0.5\% per year since 1970. Now, since he is probably one of the last persons who would tend to exaggerate the size of the Soviet-Jewish population, we are confronted with the following facts: In 1970, the number of Soviet Jews was probably somewhat less than 4 million, and today it is around 3.5 million, after several hundreds of thousands of Jews had left the USSR in the interim period.


\textsuperscript{34} In reply to a personal letter dated Feb. 5, 1981, Dr. Nahum Goldmann replied in writing through his secretary on Feb. 13, 1981, that “the Jewish population of the Soviet Union counted approximately three to three-and-one-half million persons.”
The Jewish Cost of Lives and Overall Soviet Losses

Obviously, our calculated number of 4.3 million surviving Soviet Jews is confirmed by respectable and knowledgeable Jewish sources. The remaining question is thus how the losses suffered by the Jews in the USSR compare to the overall losses of the Soviet population. The American engineer John Scott, who worked for years in Stalin’s armaments industry and was married to a Russian woman, published a book upon his return from Magnitogorsk. There he describes how the inhuman Soviet “work methods” caused millions of men and women in Siberia to die of hunger and cold while further millions succumbed to the unspeakable living conditions.35

Following the huge losses of the Red Army, the Soviets mopped industry ruthlessly for men needed in the formation of armies which were to replace those annihilated. In their place, women were mobilized who had to work day and night in two shifts like Stakhanovites. In order to muster the last bit of energy, the so-called “Marshall-Plan” – honoring Stalin’s self-appointment to Marshal of the Soviet Union – was initiated: Every Soviet resident aged 14 to 70, regardless of sex, was obligated to double his output, even if he was working at maximum capacity already. People died like flies.36

Willkie, who visited the Soviet Union in September 1942, described the conditions he found there as follows:37

Food in Russia this Winter will be scarce – perhaps worse than scarce. […] Fuel will be little known this Winter in millions of Russian homes. Clothing except for the army and essential war workers is nearly gone. Many vital medical supplies just don’t exist. Russian women by the millions side by side with their children – some of them as young as eight and ten – are manning machines in the war factories and running the farms. Every able-bodied man is in the army or giving the maximum hours of hard work […]

The magnitude of this human tragedy was reported in 1943 by Paul Holt, the Moscow correspondent of the London newspaper Daily Express. Returning to London after a 15 month stay in the Soviet Union, Holt wrote that until then the Soviets had lost 30 million fallen and wounded soldiers, prisoners-of-war and civilians who had died of hunger and illness.38 It is not known how this huge figure should be divided between military and civilian losses, but certainly the bulk must be attributed to the Red Army. At that time, 5.4 million Red Army men were taken prisoners-of-war by the Ger-

38 Daily Express, “Your Questions about Russia – Answered by Paul Holt,” London, (a few days before) May 6, 1943.
mans, and a similar number must be allowed for the fallen soldiers. Adding several millions of wounded, there remain 10-15 million civilians who died of hunger, epidemics and cold. Further losses running into the millions occurred until the end of the war.

We noted in the Third Chapter that the total population in the Soviet Union numbered at least 202 million at the beginning of the war in June 1941. We do not know its size as of May 1945, since the first post-war census was taken in 1959, followed by a second in 1970. Between 1959 and 1970, the Soviet population increased by 33 million from 209 million to 242 million – a growth rate of 1.3% p.a. But, inasmuch as the Soviet peoples, too, experienced a decline of their fertility following the first baby boom years after WWII, one has to presume that the natural growth rate was somewhat higher between 1945 and 1959 – let us say, 1.5%. This means that there must have been an increase by 39 million in those 14 years. In other words, there could have been no more than 170 million people in the USSR by the end of the war – 32 million fewer than at the beginning of the war.

Red Army losses during WWII are said to have totaled 13.6 million; accordingly, 18.4 million dead must have been suffered by the civilian population. The respective figures for the Soviet Jews were 200,000 and 830,000 for a total of 1,030,000. In relation to the total population, the Soviet Jews registered a rate of military losses of “only” 3.8% (200,000 of 5.3 million) compared to the horrendous 6.7% (13.6 million of 202 million) of the overall Soviet population. Obviously, the Soviet Jews were engaged to a much smaller degree in the actual fighting, because they were sorely needed in the armaments industry. These facts explain why the census of 1959 showed the overall Soviet population having a considerably smaller percentage of men (of the war generation) than was true for the Jewish segment, namely, 38.4% to 43.4%.

However, the Jews registered a much higher overall and civilian loss:

- Civilian losses of the
  - entire Soviet population 9.1% (18.4 million of 202 million)
  - entire Jewish population 15.7% (830,000 of 5.3 million)

- Total losses of the
  - entire Soviet population 15.8% (32 million of 202 million)
  - entire Jewish population 19.4% (1,030,000 of 5.3 million)

This method of analysis does not pay attention to the fact that large portions of the Slavic and Baltic populations, but only relatively few Jews, remained behind in German-controlled territory. We found only about 65 million people in the occupied areas, including almost three-quarters of a

---

millions of Jews. Looking at it from the other side, 137 million Soviet residents were under Soviet domination, including 4.61 million Jews outside the German sphere of influence. Comparing this Soviet-controlled population to the human losses, one obtains the following figures:

**Civilian losses of the**
- Soviet population outside the German sphere of influence: 13.4% (18.4 million of 137 million)
- Jewish population outside the German sphere of influence: 18.0% (830,000 of 4.61 million)

**Total losses of the**
- Soviet population outside the German sphere of influence: 23.4% (32 million of 137 million)
- Jewish population outside the German sphere of influence: 22.3% (1,030,000 of 4.61 million)

Thus, while the military losses of the non-Jewish population were considerably larger than those of the Soviet Jews, the civilian losses of the Jews and non-Jews who remained under Soviet control showed the opposite development. Reasons for this phenomenon are not difficult to find: Already in 1940, the Soviets deported a relatively large segment of the Jews from the western territories to Siberia; of the three-quarters of a million Jews in question, hundreds of thousands died on the way, and many others of these “foreign elements” lost their lives in Siberian labor and concentration camps due to cold, undernourishment and physical exhaustion. Children especially were affected by this barbarous treatment. In the case of the evacuated Slavic population in 1941, large portions were men of military age; as a result, the proportion of the very old and children was relatively small. Both factors affected the disproportionately larger civilian losses among the Soviet Jews.

Yet, it is interesting that the total losses of the population remaining under Soviet control were just about equal for Jews and non-Jews – roughly 23%! However, since Stalin had evacuated about 80% of the Jewish population, but only a fourth of the other, mainly Slavic residents, the Jewish total losses were noticeably higher (20%) than those of the entire Soviet population (16%). In short, the massive Soviet evacuation during WWII proved to be the single most important cause of the huge human losses suffered by Soviet Jewry.

The calculated number of 4.3 million surviving Soviet Jews thus turns out to be quite realistic: Statements by Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the *Judaica* and the Soviet-Jewish dissidents confirm it. For the purpose of this analysis it is of no significance whether the actual number is closer to 4 or 4½ million. Whatever the case may be, the Jewish losses are quite in line with the
decimation experienced by the entire Soviet population as a result of Stalin’s evacuation, forced labor and battle strategies.
PART II

THE WESTWARD DRIVE
SIXTH CHAPTER:

The Jewish Fate in German-Occupied Europe

France, Benelux Countries, Denmark, Norway and Italy

The victory of German arms in the West affected almost half a million Jews in Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, including more than 90,000 refugees, according to the American Jewish Committee. Reitlinger arrives at a similar figure:

In the six weeks between May 10th and June 25th, 1940, not less than 350,000 Jews of Western Europe passed under German rule. [...] a further 130,000 Jews came indirectly under German orders in Vichy territory.

If one adds the 8,000 Jews of Denmark and Norway to these 480,000 in France and the Benelux countries, one does indeed obtain the “nearly half a million” of the American Jewish Committee.

Yet, some reservations are in order as far as the actual number of Jews in these countries is concerned. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Jewish refugees from Greater Germany and eastern Europe were to be found in all western European countries. After the fighting erupted, many Jews – mainly foreigners – fled from Holland to Belgium. Native and other Jews living in Belgium escaped together with those from Holland to France; in many cases, they were rounded up by the Belgians, forcibly interned – affected were mainly male refugees with German passports – and transported by rail to France, where they were put in French concentration camps and subjected to terrible hardships, if we may believe Zionist reports. The American Jewish Committee estimated the number of refugee Jews living in Belgium and in Holland before the “invasion” at 25,000 and 23,000, respectively. The total number of Jews escaping from the Benelux countries to France during the few weeks of fighting reached perhaps 30-40,000, but the reports differ greatly from each other.

The number of Jews in France was augmented in November 1940 by an additional 10,000 German Jews deported from the Palatinate and Baden; it is

---

2. Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 71.
3. AJYB, 1941, Vol. 43, p. 324.
possible that up to 100,000 German, Czech and Polish Jews lived as refugees in France.\(^4\) In turn, many Jews left France for other countries in the course of time: Switzerland, Portugal, Spain. The Institute of Jewish Affairs places the number of Jews who escaped from France until August 1943 at 30,000.\(^5\)

There are no precise pre-war figures available on the native Jewish population of France and the Benelux countries. Only Holland counted its Jews in the census of 1935, and found 111,917.\(^6\) Estimates of Belgium’s, France’s and Luxemburg’s Jewish population for the pre-war period – refugees from Germany and eastern Europe excluded – show great differences. In any case, the total number of Jews we are concerned with in the case of these four countries is 460,000 (i.e. 350,000 plus 130,000 plus 10,000 minus 30,000).

Denmark and Norway counted 8,000 Jews; of these, 7,000 fled to Sweden in 1943.\(^7\) Italy’s census of 1931 found 47,825 Jews,\(^8\) but in 1938 the figure was much higher at 57,425,\(^9\) because Italy, too, was a target of Jewish migration before the war. Until September 1943, when Germany occupied the peninsula after Italy’s defection, the country’s Jewish population had decreased by 9,000 to 48,000 as a result of flight and emigration (Switzerland, North Africa, etc.).\(^10\) In total, the number of Jews in these seven countries within the German sphere of influence reached 525,000 in 1941.

If one can believe Reitlinger, the German authorities carried out the following deportations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>25,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark and Norway</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>212,113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these, the following returned:

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 325.
\(^5\) Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 265.
\(^6\) AJYB, 1939, Vol. 41, p. 585.
\(^7\) Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 349 and 351.
\(^8\) AJYB, 1940, Vol. 42, p. 602.
\(^9\) Ibid., 1939, Vol. 41, p. 585.
\(^10\) Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 352.
\(^11\) Ibid., p. 329.
\(^12\) Ibid., p. 494.
\(^13\) Ibid., p. 87 and 494.
\(^14\) Ibid., p. 328.
\(^15\) Ibid., p. 349 and 351.
\(^16\) Ibid., p. 495.
According to Reitlinger these Jews survived:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Surviving Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>36,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark and Norway</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>238,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total surviving Jews</strong></td>
<td><strong>375,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reducing the total number of 525,000 Jews (1941) by the 7,000 who fled from Denmark and Norway and by the 9,000 Jews who escaped from Italy until September 1943, only 509,000 remain; if one subtracts from these the surviving 375,000 Jews, the number of “missing” Jews is reduced to “only” 134,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France and Benelux countries</td>
<td>460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark and Norway</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1941 total</strong></td>
<td><strong>525,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{deduct:}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish and Norwegian Jews in Sweden</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaped Italian Jews</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total “missing” Jews</strong></td>
<td><strong>509,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Purported survivors} = 375,000

\textit{“Missing” Jews} = 134,000

Reitlinger, however, asserts that he found at least 201,200, but at most 210,200 “annihilated” Jews, and the Anglo-American Committee even claims to have discovered 341,000!\(^{26}\)

The urban Jews of these western European countries showed all the characteristics typical of populations of large cities: Rising mortality rates

\(^{17}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 329.
\(^{18}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 494.
\(^{19}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 328.
\(^{20}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 495.
\(^{21}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 329.
\(^{22}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 342 and 344.
\(^{23}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 494.
\(^{24}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 328.
\(^{25}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 352 and 495.
\(^{26}\) Reitlinger, \textit{Final Solution}, p. 501.
and falling birth rates. These four countries – France, Holland, Belgium and Italy – are supposed to have had a total Jewish population of 400,000 in the early 1930s. Looking at this figure a little more closely, it begins to evaporate. The *Universal* published the following mortality figures (Norway, Denmark and Luxemburg were not listed, probably because of the small numerical size of their Jewish populations):27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mortality Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applying a mortality rate of 1.1% per annum, the Jewish populations must have recorded the following sizes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total       | 318,000    |

It is unfortunate that the *Universal* rounded these numbers to a full 500. In the case of Belgium and Italy, the computed population size is somewhat lower than is usually given by Zionists, but they are still acceptable. For the Netherlands, the calculated figure of 91,000 compares with the census listing 112,000 – a large gap; but this may be explained by the fact that the mortality figure was rounded off to 1,000.

As for France, it does not matter whether we round up or off, whether the mortality rate is pushed down to 0.9%, and whether the number of mortality cases per year is increased even to 1,700; the resulting population figure would always remain below 200,000. Since the mortality figures given for other countries by the *Universal* are generally acceptable, there is no reason why we should reject them in this instance. Consequently, one must conclude that the estimates for the Jews of pre-war France – usually given as 240,000-260,000 (excl. refugees) – are completely wrong and that France probably contained 50-100,000 fewer Jews when war broke out than certain people would like us believe. The only other explanation for this discrepancy is that tens of thousands of eastern European Jews had immigrated in France in the early 1930s – at a time when only few Jews had left Germany. If this is the case, we would have another confirmation for the mass emigration from eastern Europe as mentioned by the pro-Zionist Institute for Contemporary History.

---

Greece and Yugoslavia

Emigration has far exceeded the positive growth rate for Greek Jews ever since the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. The result was a continuous decrease in the number of Jews in Greece. This persistent emigration pattern, reinforced by economic misery, probably caused the Jewish population to drop further since the census of 1931 found 67,200 Jews.\(^{28}\) Precise figures are not available for 1940. For this reason, we assumed only a small decline of the Jewish inhabitants to 65,000 during the 1930s.

How many of them were deported? A report by the International Red Cross mentioned only that all male Jews between the ages 18 and 45 years were registered in July 1942 and, after a temporary incorporation in labor battalions, were deported to Germany in May 1943.\(^{29}\) Nothing in the report was said about Jewesses being deported as well. At the end of the war, the Zionist scholar Hilberg claimed to have found only 12,000.\(^{30}\) The rest of 53,000 is said to have been deported. There is a good probability that this figure is untenable in view of the IRC Report, but we accepted it, because we want to base this analysis on Zionist sources, if at all possible.

Hilberg insists that “mass emigration from eastern Europe was easiest in non-Communist Greece and in the neighboring states of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.”\(^{31}\) Disregarding his own words, this splendid scholar begins to cite statistics which leave no room at all for emigration from these countries between 1945 and 1948. The assumption that tens of thousands emigrated between 1945 and 1948 – in part, already during the war – and that, finally, only 12,000 remained in Greece in the year 1948 probably is not far-fetched; and yet, these 12,000 of 1948 are listed as the only survivors.

The Yugoslavian case is not very different. There, too, we find exaggerations regarding the Jewish population size at the beginning of the war, understatements as to the number of survivors, an inflation of the number of deported and, lastly, no figures at all – not even estimates – on the number of those who emigrated right after the end of the hostilities by way of Italy or Austria to Palestine, overseas or to other European countries.

The census of 1931 counted 68,405 Yugoslavian Jews. Reitlinger believes that emigration could have decreased their number until the beginning of the war or, at least, allowed no further growth.\(^{32}\) Communist post-war Yugoslavia’s census of 1946 found only 10,446 Jews. Hilberg, however,

\(^{28}\) Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 496.
\(^{30}\) Hilberg, *Destruction of European Jews*, p. 737.
\(^{32}\) Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 495-496.
who apparently had finished his count prior to this “census,” discovered 12,000 survivors.  

One can safely assume that many thousands succeeded in fleeing to Italy and from there to Palestine or overseas, as Yugoslavia, too, belonged to those countries where mass emigration was easiest after the war according to Hilberg. Reitlinger admits to this and says that the census of the Communist government of Yugoslavia hardly can be taken seriously, because many Jews had lived as gentiles during the war years and did not choose to reveal themselves as Jews after the war.

How many tens of thousands survived for the reasons mentioned and are listed as “missing” in the statistics? And how many emigrated right after the war? We do not know. The number of “missing” Jews for both of these countries adds up to 109,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1939)</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (1939)</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>133,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purported survivors in 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Missing” 109,000 Jews

**Germany and Austria**

As of January 1933, the number of Jews living in Germany was 522,700. If one adds the 16,600 Jews of the Saar, Memel and Danzig, their total number was 539,300. 281,900 emigrated from the “old” Reich until December 1939, 13,000 from the Saar, Memel and Danzig; another reduction by 38,400 occurred because of an excess of deaths over births. As a result, only 206,000 remained in Germany (“old” Reich) at the end of 1939. The emigrants consisted mainly of the young; most of the elderly remained behind.

The Jewish statistician Dr. Bruno Blau wrote in the *Wiener Library Bulletin* that the Reichsvereinigung Deutscher Juden (Reich Union of German Jews) published data in October 1941 according to which 164,000 Jews were living in Germany at the time. This was prior to the large deportations of German Jews to Russia. Dr. Blau said that, of these remaining 164,000, about 13,800 may have died of natural causes. It seems though that

---

34 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 496.
37 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 492.
the mortality rate of 2.4% per annum for the 3½ years until the end of the war probably is too low. A population mainly composed of older people where births naturally were the exception simply must have had a much greater natural decrease.38

Be that as it may. Applying the same rate of 2.4% p.a. to the period 1939 to mid-1941, one obtains a natural excess of deaths over births of around 7,000. Thus, if 206,000 Jews lived in Germany in 1939 (“old” Reich), the natural excess of deaths amounted to 7,000, and 10,000 were deported to France in November 1940, then another 25,000 must have emigrated prior to 1941.

19,000 Jews remained at liberty in Germany throughout the war, and a mere 8,000 are supposed to have returned from the various concentration camps after Germany’s defeat.39 This leaves 123,000 German Jews unaccounted for.

As for Austria, its Jewish population decreased since 1934 because of a negative net birth rate by 10,000 to 181,778 at the time of the unification of Austria with Germany in March 1938.40 The ensuing massive emigration (117,000) and further excesses of deaths over births (8,000) reduced the Jewish population to 57,000 at the end of 1939.35

According to reports in the Zionist press, German statistics published on February 5, 1941, put the number of Austrian Jews at 50,000.41 Applying Dr. Blau’s data for the “old” Reich to Austria, the difference of 7,000 must have consisted of a natural decrease by 2,000 and emigration by another 5,000. Reitlinger, though, mentions 4,000 emigrants after 1939. For the remaining four war years, the mortality excess may well have amounted to a further 5,000 (2.4% p.a. of 50,000 in four years).

As for the survivors, Reitlinger has this to say:42

[…] there survived on October 24th, 1947 [!], some 8,552 Austrian-born Jews in Vienna and a few hundred in Linz and other towns."

But he, too, is silent on the number of Austrian Jews who left the camps after the war to proceed directly to Palestine and overseas. The development of the Jewish population in these two German countries appears as follows:

---

38 According to Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, for example, the mortality rate (in West Germany) for 1977 was 3% p.a. for those aged 47 years and more.
39 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 492.
40 AJYB, 1940, Vol. 42, p. 595.
41 Ibid., 1941, Vol. 43, p. 663.
42 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 492.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany (1933)</th>
<th>Austria (1934)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>539,000</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>731,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*deduct:*

*a) Development until 1939*

- Emigration:
  - Germany (“old” Reich) 295,000
  - Austria 117,000

- Excess of deaths over births:
  - Germany (“old” Reich) 38,000
  - Austria 18,000

- Total in 1939 263,000

*b) Development 1939-1941*

- Emigration:
  - Germany (“old” Reich) 25,000
  - Austria 5,000

- Excess of deaths over births:
  - Germany (“old” Reich) 7,000
  - Austria 2,000

- Deportation to France (1940) 10,000

- Total 1941 214,000

*c) Development 1941-1945*

- Emigration/flight unknown

- Excess of deaths over births:
  - Germany (“old” Reich) 14,000
  - Austria 5,000

Calculated remainder in 1945 195,000

Purported survivors after the war:

- Germany 27,000
- Austria 9,000

“Missing” Jews 159,000
Hungary

The census of 1930 recorded a Jewish population of 444,567.\textsuperscript{43} In 1941, the census listed 725,007 Jews in Greater Hungary enlarged by the acquisition of neighboring territories.\textsuperscript{44} A direct comparison between the two counts is difficult, because many districts which had been reduced in size as a result of post-WWI border changes were again reconstituted to their former size. Not affected by border changes were the districts located in Hungary’s interior; they contained 147,177 Jews in 1930,\textsuperscript{45} but only 132,495 in 1941\textsuperscript{46} – a reduction by 10%. Budapest’s Jewish population decreased in the same period from 204,371 to 184,453 – also a minus of 10%. Applying this rate to all of Trianon-Hungary’s Jews of 1930, there was a reduction by 44,500 to 400,000 in 1941.\textsuperscript{47}

From 1930 to 1939, deaths exceeded births by 14,436, and another 1,600 should be allowed for 1940, bringing the total natural decline between 1930 and 1941 to about 16,000 (0.3% p.a.). Changes in religious preference resulted in a loss of 21,125 between 1930 and 1939 and possibly a further 2,000 in the year 1940. On balance, these changes reduced Trianon-Hungary’s Jewish population by about 39,000 until 1941. This leaves another reduction of about 5,500 due to emigration.\textsuperscript{48} Greater Hungary’s Jewish population in 1941 thus was distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census of 1941</th>
<th>725,007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Old” Trianon-Hungary</td>
<td>−400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly acquired territories</td>
<td>325,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Slovak areas</td>
<td>42,000\textsuperscript{49}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banat (from Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>25,000\textsuperscript{49}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Transylvania (from Rumania)</td>
<td>148,621\textsuperscript{50} −215,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenia (from Czechoslovakia)</td>
<td>109,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the usual post-war version concerning the developments in Hungary, the Germans deported about 400,000 Jews from Greater Hungary by rail between mid-May 1944 and early July 1944 from the areas outside the capital of Budapest, killing almost all of them in Auschwitz-Birkenau.

---

\textsuperscript{43} Annuaire Statistique Hongrois 1931, Nouveau Cours XXXIX, l’Office Central Royal Hongrois de Statistique, Budapest, 1933, Tab. 10, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{44} Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv 1942, Új Folyam L, A Magyar Kir Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 1944, Tab. 11, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{45} Annuaire Statistique Hongrois 1931, Tab. 10, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{46} Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv 1942, Tab. 11, p. 14-17.
\textsuperscript{47} Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, p. 24, estimated Hungary’s Jewish population at the end of 1939 at 403,000.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 25; the Universal mentions 5,250 Jewish emigrants until 1939.
\textsuperscript{49} Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 415.
\textsuperscript{50} Publikationsstelle Wien. Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941 (Geheim), Vienna, 1943, p. 20.
The killing was supposedly the main purpose of these deportations. With the exception of Budapest, where Jews were left in peace more or less, this operation “cleansed” Hungary of almost all Jews. On January 31, 1941, the number of Jews in Budapest numbered 184,453, a reduction by 15,000 from the 200,000-figure published by the Jewish statistician Arthur Ruppin for the year 1930.51

Now, it just so happened that the International Red Cross (IRC) was represented in Budapest during the war and that the Jewish Senate’s headquarters was in the buildings of the IRC. In 1948, the IRC published a report on the events in Hungary during the war, paying special attention to Jewish fate.52 It is certain that the IRC knew about all the anti-Jewish measures either through its own sources or else through the Jewish Senate quartered in the same buildings. The report mentions some deportations for the period March to October 1944 without specification of figures. It said:53

[…] from March 1944 onwards, the position of the [Hungarian] Jews became critical, […] On October 8, the Hungarian authorities, in conformity with the undertaking given to the Committee, announced the final suspension of deportations and made known that the Kistarcea Camp for Jewish intellectuals doctors and engineers, had been broken up and the internees released.

Only after the arrest of the war-weary Horthy-government by German troops did the real misery of the Hungarian Jews begin. The IRC Report continues:54

A few days later [after October 8, 1944] the full tide of the great tribulations of the Hungarian Jews was to set in. […] The replacement, in October 1944, of Horthy’s Government by one in bondage to Germany provoked a violent crisis; executions, robberies, deportations, forced labour, imprisonments – such was the lot of the Jewish population, which suffered cruelly and lost many killed, especially in the provinces. […] It was immediately decided to remove them from Budapest and to confiscate their property. Sixty thousand Jews fit for work were to be sent to Germany, on foot, in parties of one thousand, by way of Vienna. Moreover, among the able-bodied, men between sixteen and sixty, and women between fourteen and forty were commandeered for forced labour in building fortifications in Hungary. The rest of the Jewish population, including the disabled and sick, was confined in four or five ghettos near Budapest. The only Jews to escape evacuation were those in possession of passports with visas for Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal or Spain. […] In November [1944], one hundred thousand Jews poured into Budapest from the provinces.

51 Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, p. 149.
52 Ibid., p. 133.
53 Ibid., p. 138.
54 Ibid., p. 138-139.
To repeat: There were certain events before October 1944, including deportations, which were too unimportant for the IRC Report even to bother mentioning the figures; but the IRC Report emphasizes that the really dangerous occurrences for the majority of the Jews began in October 1944. The maximum number which the report says were to have been deported was given as 60,000, and nowhere do we find any trace whatsoever that this number was exceeded or even attained. To the contrary, there are indications that the actual number of deportees was even less.55 Still, in this analysis we will assume that, including those deported between March and October 1944, the total number of deported Jews from Hungary reached 100,000, which is probably much too high.

Jews were not allowed to serve in the armed forces; the mobilization law prohibited that. Instead, Jews were drafted into an auxiliary service, the Hungarian military labor force. According to Dr. Rudolf Kastner, the former associate president of the Zionist Organization of Hungary, this labor force included at times 80,000 Jews; all in all, about 130,000 Jews had been drafted into this service. Dr. Kastner estimated that 30-40,000 Jews fell while serving in this force.56 But the Judaica mentioned that in January 1943 alone, after the great Don-breakthrough of the Red Army, when the 2nd Hungarian Army practically disintegrated, 40-43,000 of the 50,000 Jews serving in the military labor force lost their lives in the panic that followed.57 If that many died in this one military catastrophe, further losses certainly occurred during the battles of retreat until Budapest. The total number of fallen Jews in the Hungarian labor force must have exceeded the 50,000-mark by far – if Zionist statistics are correct.

Dr. Zoltan Klar, former elected member of the Council of the Budapest Jewish Community, testified under oath at the hearings of the investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives of September 22 and 23, 1954, looking into the treatment of Jews by the Soviets. Klar said that the Hungarian Minister in Moscow, Prof. Szekfu, visited the Jewish Council in 1946 and declared that 30,000 Hungarian Citizens, former members of the military labor force, were still in Soviet prisons, as far as he knew; of these, 90% were Jews. Prof. Szekfu thought that they would return home soon. In actual fact, no more than 1,500 ever returned according to Dr. Klar. 25,500 Hungarian Jews had disappeared in Soviet prisons without a trace.58

These developments have been summarized in table-form (in 1,000):

---

55 Ibid., p. 144.
56 Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 517.
57 Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 8, p. 1098.
The Jewish losses in the Hungarian military labor force were divided proportionately among all the regions, because no information is available as to the origin of the victims. The same procedure was followed with regard to the 100,000 (max.) Jews deported to Germany in 1944. But Dr. Klar’s testimony was quite specific concerning the Jews who were in Soviet prison, and that most of them had disappeared. These were former residents of the “old” Hungary (Trianon-borders), and for this reason we entered the entire figure of 25,500 in the column “Trianon-Hungary.” The above table indicates that 292,000 Jews should have been found in Hungary after the war.

As for the natural demographic development during the war, one has to pay due regard to the generally insecure and economically precarious situation of the Hungarian Jews, and to the fact that at times up to 22% of the entire male population (i.e. 80,000 of about 360,000 males) was serving in the military labor force. These circumstances must have had a considerable negative impact on the birth rate, which had been too low during the 1930s already.

As was shown in the First Chapter, Greater Hungary’s Jewish net birth rate was -0.3% in 1942. This negative figure came about, because the relatively high fertility of the Ruthenian Jews was more than offset by the very unfavorable net birth rate in the other regions. In particular, the Jews of “old” Trianon-Hungary had reached a net natural decrease of 0.5% in 1938 already. Also, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that the fatal circumstances of the war caused a further drop in the birth rate. In Germany and Austria, the negative Jewish natural growth rate was much worse before the war, and it is safe to assume that the situation of the Hungarian Jews during the war was much more difficult than the one faced by German and Austrian Jews before 1938. Between 1930 and 1935, the annual Jewish excess of deaths over births in Germany and Austria was 5,500 and 2,500
respectively.\textsuperscript{59} This is equivalent to an annual decrease of about 1.0 and 1.3\%! Following this line of thought, it is probable that the natural decrease of the “old” Hungarian Jewish population during the five war years was near 1\% annually, causing a decrease totaling 20,000.

We noted above that Jewish sources claim 2,113 Jews had switched annually from the Mosaic to a Christian faith between 1930 and 1939. It stands to reason that many more Jews must have taken advantage of this possibility during WWII in order to secure a greater personal and economic security for themselves and their families. Even assuming only the same annual number of changes, there would still have been 10,000 conversions during the five war years and a corresponding reduction in the number of adherents to the Jewish faith. Another 6,000 have been found after the war in Rumania.\textsuperscript{60} It is quite possible that these 6,000 Hungarian Jews in Rumania had tried to reach Turkey by way of Bulgaria or the port of Constanza in Rumania. As we go on, evidence will be forthcoming on the massive emigration via these two channels.

As was pointed out, the number of Jews deported to Germany reached at most 100,000; of these, about 55,000 should be applied to “old” Hungary. We know that thousands returned to Hungary after the war from the German camps. Their number, however, is not known. In this connection, the Hungarian Jew Dr. Klar testified before the U.S. investigating committee that the Soviets prevented many of the returning Jews from entering Hungary after the war; instead, they arrested them at the border and transported them, male and female, to the east. He put their number at 40,000 Hungarian Jews!\textsuperscript{61}

Today’s “official” version of the Jewish fate in Greater Hungary is that, with the exception of the Jews of Budapest, almost all the other Jews were deported before early July 1944. Budapest contained 184,453 Jews as of January 31, 1941. But even if one allows for some deportations, natural population decrease, emigrants, proportionate losses incurred in the military labor force, etc., it is still impossible that Budapest was populated by fewer than 150,000 Jews when deportations ceased (July 1944 according to the Zionist version). If one adds those few Jews who survived on the countryside, then it would have been possible indeed that Hungary’s Jewish population had shrunk to only 200,000 by war’s end, as the Anglo-American Committee claims.

This figure is subject to some doubt. First, the International Red Cross was quite clear when it said:\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{In November [1944], one hundred thousand Jews poured into Budapest from the provinces.}

\textsuperscript{59} Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{60} Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{61} Treatment of Jews by the Soviet, 1954, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{62} Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, p. 139.
In other words, these people fled from areas from which, according to the Zionist post-war version, all Jews supposedly had been removed already! This happened at a period of time when even Zionist reports say the deportations to Germany (“Auschwitz”) had ceased. The U.S. War Refugee Board under the leadership of the Zionist Morgenthau admitted that, as a result of the negotiations between Saly Mayer from the Joint Distribution Committee and SS-Colonel Kurt Becher, the deportation of the more than 200,000 Jews living in Budapest in August 1944 did not take place. This means, of course, that far more than 300,000 Jews must have survived in Hungary (Trianon-borders) according to the best of sources. We should remember that the IRC Report did not say either that all of the Jews had left the provinces and come to Budapest in November 1944.

Secondly, there is no question that thousands of Jews fled west after the war. Hilberg confirms this expressly. Thirdly, figures for the surviving Hungarian Jews as provided by the Anglo-American Committee (200,000) pertained not to the end of the war but to April 1946. If the figure of 200,000 for 1946 is correct, then this would mean that more than 100,000 Hungarian Jews must have left Hungary during the interim twelve months and gone to the West (Austria and Italy)!

Considering all the fallen, deported and escaped, the number of Jews in Hungary should have been expected to be around one-quarter of a million (see the summary below) – about 50,000 fewer than the more than 300,000 who were actually there. The only possible explanation for this discrepancy is that it reflects the Jews who poured into Hungary from other countries – Poland and Czechoslovakia – looking for a place to hide and relative security. Until April 1946 more than 100,000 had left Hungary – if the figure of 200,000 as published by the Anglo-American Committee is correct.

The following is a statistical summary of the Jewish fate in Hungary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish population at the end of 1939</th>
<th>400,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deduct:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Fallen Jews in military labor force</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Missing as Soviet prisoners-of-war</td>
<td>25,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Deported east by the Soviet in 1945</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Negative net birth rate during the war</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Hungarian refugees in Rumania</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Conversions to Christian faiths</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder</td>
<td>271,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purported “survivors” April 1946</td>
<td>–200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Missing” Hungarian Jews</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

65 Reitlinger, *Final Solution*, p. 497.
Czechoslovakia

This state, forcibly established by the “Treaty” of Versailles, experienced a very lively history during its short existence. Its subsequent division makes a separate treatment of the various regions mandatory.

The census of 1930 recorded 356,830 Jews on the basis of religion, regionally distributed as follows:\footnote{Sčítání Lidu V Republice Československé Ze Dne 1. Prosince 1930 (Díl I.: Rust, Koncentrace A Hustota Obyvatelstva, Pohlaví, Věkové Rozvrstvení, Rodinný Stav, Státní Příslušnost, Národnost, Náboženské Vyznání), Vydal Státní Uřad Statistický, Československá Statistika – Svazek 98, Řada VI., Sešit 7, Prague, 1934, p. 156-190.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech areas (Bohemia and Moravia)</td>
<td>117,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>136,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenia</td>
<td>102,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>356,830</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of low birth rates, the first two regions registered a slow decrease of the Jewish population, whereas the Jews in Ruthenia proved very fertile. After the Munich Accord, a huge emigration set in, especially from the Czech areas. Reitlinger, who in turn refers to the Anglo-American Committee, reports that at the end of 1939 only 315,000 Jews lived in the former Czechoslovakian territory.\footnote{Reitlinger, p. 492.}

As was pointed out in the First Chapter, Ruthenian Jews were quite fertile; on the other hand, they suffered from a migratory loss of young males who left for the industrial Czech areas. In any case, the Hungarians found only roughly 109,000 Jews in Ruthenia after the dismemberment of the artificial Czechoslovakian state.

In other words, the Jewish population of the first two regions may have been 206,000 in 1939 (\textit{i.e.} 315,000 minus 109,000). This means that the Jews of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia decreased by 48,288 (\textit{i.e.} 117,551 plus 136,737 minus 206,000).

Even before the war, Hungary had annexed a section of Slovakia containing 42,000 Jews.\footnote{Institute of Jewish Affairs, \textit{Hitler’s Ten-Year War}, p. 304.} The remaining independent Slovak state is reported to have registered 85,045 Jews in 1939 according to the \textit{Year Book}, which, in turn, referred to news published in \textit{Der Grenzbote} (Bratislava) of January 18, 1940.\footnote{AJYB, 1940, Vol. 42, p. 597.} Consequently, the total Slovak area must have had 127,000 Jews at the end of 1939. If correct, this would point to a net emigration of 9,700 (a small excess of deaths over births cannot be excluded, though). Thus, the Czech areas cannot have contained more than 79,000 Jews at the end of 1939 (206,000 minus 127,000). Emigration, flight and a negative net birth
rate added up to a reduction of 38,600 between 1930 and the end of 1939 (i.e. 117,551 minus 79,000). Further population losses ensued in 1940.

Reports in the Zionist press, according to which German statistics published on February 2, 1941, put the number of Jews remaining in the “Protectorate” at 70,000, confirm these calculations. Reitlinger adds that until 1942 another reduction of 7,000 Jews occurred because of emigration from Bohemia and Moravia and continuing low birth rates. All in all, 4,000 Jews are said to have succeeded in emigrating during the war. But as one has to assume that the excess of deaths over births accelerated throughout the war period of 1942-1945, a further deduction of maybe 2,000 should be made. In summary, the Jewish population of the “Protectorate” decreased after 1939 by 4,000 as a result of emigration, and by 5,000 as a result of negative net birth rates.

In 1946(!), one whole year following the defeat of Germany, after Jews had left Bohemia and Moravia in huge droves for the American zone of occupation in Germany – we will come back to this later – Reitlinger still found 32,000 Jews in the former “Protectorate.”

In Slovakia’s case, it is somewhat more difficult to trace the development because of the loss of large areas to Hungary just before the war began. At the outbreak of the war, 85,000 Jews lived in the smaller independent Slovakia. Apart from the 52,000 deported, the remaining Jews lived relatively securely until the end of 1944. The IRC wrote:

[…] at certain periods, Slovakia was even looked upon as a comparative haven of refuge for Jews, especially for those coming from Poland. Those who remained in Slovakia seem to have been in comparative safety until the end of August 1944, when a rising against the German forces took place. The consequence of this uprising was that many Jews were deported. In post-war Slovakia – again, including the areas formerly occupied by Hungary – Reitlinger found 45,000 Jews, whereas Gregory Frumkin managed to discover even 60,000. Let us agree on 50,000. The fate of the Jews in the Hungarian-occupied Slovak regions was covered in the context of the Hungarian Jews.

Ruthenia, which was part of the Czechoslovakian state until its dismemberment, was first annexed by Hungary, and after the war by the Soviet Union. For this reason, the local Jewish population shared the fate of the Hungarian Jews just like part of the Jews of Slovakia. The human losses of all the Rumanian, Slovak and Serbian Jews under Hungarian domination

---

70 Ibid., 1941, Vol. 43, p. 663.
71 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 492-493.
72 Ibid., p. 492.
73 Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, p. 208.
74 Ibid., p. 137.
75 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 493.
who were made Soviet prisoners-of-war as former members of the Hungarian military labor force is not discussed in the pertinent literature. All we know is that 27,000 Hungarian-Jewish labor force members were in Soviet prisons, and that only 1,500 ever returned. In the case of the Jews of Ruthenia their number would have to be reduced by those who disappeared in Soviet prisons. The remainder of the Ruthenian Jews has been added to the Soviet Union in the Fourth Chapter. Consequently, we will exclude the Ruthenian Jews on account of the annexation of that region by the Soviet Union after the war. The developments in Czechoslovakia can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech areas (Bohemia and Moravia – 1930)</td>
<td>117,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (1930)</td>
<td>136,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenia (1930)</td>
<td>102,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1930)</td>
<td>356,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenia annexed by the USSR in 1945</td>
<td>−102,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia without Ruthenia (1930)</td>
<td>254,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deduct:**

Emigration (incl. excess of births over deaths before the war):

- Czech areas: 38,600
- Slovakia: 9,700
- Total: −48,300

Jews in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia in (1939): 206,000

**Deduct:**

Changes after 1939:

- Emigration from Czech areas: 4,000
- Excess of deaths over births in Czech areas: 5,000
- Fallen Slovakian-Jewish members of the Hungarian military labor force: 3,000
- Total: −12,000

Remainder: 194,000

Purported “survivors”: −82,000

“Missing” Czechoslovakian Jews: 112,000

**Rumania**

The Rumanian census of December 29, 1930, recorded the population on the basis of language, nationality and religion. Accordingly, the “Jewish” figures were 518,754, 728,115 and 756,930, respectively. Since many Jews had already given up Yiddish and, despite their Mosaic faith, considered
themselves of other than Jewish nationality, the figure of 756,930 represents 
the best indication of Rumania’s Jewish population.76

In 1940, three neighboring countries acquired slices of Rumanian terri-
tory: The Soviet Union on June 28 (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina), 
Hungary on August 30 (northern Transylvania) and Bulgaria on September 
6 (southern Dobrudja). The remaining Rumanian territory – Core-Rumania 
– counted 328,930 persons of the Mosaic faith at the time of the last census 
of 1930,77 northern Transylvania 148,660, southern Dobrudja 846,78 Bes-
sarabia 206,958,79 leaving 71,536 for northern Bukovina. In total, the area 
seized by the USSR in 1940 thus had a Jewish population of 278,494 as of 
December 29, 1930. Of course, until mid-1940 these figures were subject to 
change due to natural growth patterns, emigration and a large migration from 
the country to the cities, especially to Bucharest.

In the seven-year period from December 1930 until early 1938, an aver-
age of 724,600 Jews lived in Rumania.80 An average growth rate of 0.2% 
– as suggested in the First Chapter – would have resulted in an excess of 
births over deaths of 10,200. Thus, about 74,900 Jews must have emigrated 
during this time:

Census of 1930 756,930
Excess of births over deaths from December 1930 until 
early 1938 10,200

767,130

Jewish population in early 193881 –692,244

Emigration 1930 – early 1938 74,900

During these seven years, 10,700 Jews left Rumania annually. The 
German Institute for Contemporary History in Munich also counts Rumania 
among those countries where, because of the poor economic situation, Jews 
were forced to emigrate in large numbers. It is obvious that the worsening 
conditions in Rumania in the latter part of the 1930s caused more and more 
Jews to look for an improvement in their personal lives abroad. Among 
these were especially the Jews of Bessarabia where many Jewish refugees 
from the Russian civil war had fled after WWI. Many other Jews sought to

76 Recensământul General Al Populației României Din 29 Decembrie 1930, Volumul II: Neam, 
Limbă, Maternă, Religie; Institutul Central de Statistică, București, 1938, p. XXIV.
77 Wirtschaft und Statistik, October 2, 1941, No. 20, p. 392.
79 Recensământul General..., p. LXXXV.
80 In early 1938, the Rumanian Jews numbered 692,244 (see next footnote) compared to 756,930 
at the end of 1930; this amounts to an average of 724,600 for the years 1931 to 1937.
81 The Institute of Jewish Affairs (Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 83) wrote that under the law of 
January 21, 1938, all Jews in Rumania had to submit proof of citizenship, if they wanted to keep 
it. 617,396 registered, 44,848 abstained and 30,000 were not qualified to register. This adds up 
to 692,244 for early 1938.
escape from the growing anti-Semitic tendencies by merging into the larger Jewish communities of the big cities.

The size of emigration in the years 1938, 1939 and 1940 is unknown. However, one may be sure that the deteriorating economic and political situation persuaded even more Jews to emigrate. Even if we limit ourselves to the average emigration rate of the years 1931-1937 and apply that to 1938-1940, and if we concede furthermore that the small excess of deaths over births did not expand in 1939 and 1940, then the number of Jews living in Rumania in mid-1940 could have been 665,500 at most:

| Jewish population in early 1938 | 692,244 |
| Emigration from 1938 until mid-1940 | –26,750 |
| Jewish population in mid-1940 | 665,500 |

By 1940, it seems, Rumania’s Jewish population had decreased by 91,400, or 12.1% since 1930.

On April 6, 1941, a census found only 315,509 Jews in Core-Rumania, 291,674 of whom were urban. Unfortunately, these figures are not entirely comparable to the census of 1930, because the 1941 census defined “Jews” as including all persons with at least one parent of Mosaic faith. It is unlikely that the latter factor accounted for more than several thousand persons. Deducting this “external” factor from the total of 315,509, only about 300,000 “comparable” Rumanian Jews were left in April 1941.

Thus, whereas Core-Rumania lost 28,930 Jews during the interim ten years, or 9%, Greater Rumania’s loss of Jews between December 1930 and mid-1940 totaled 91,430, or 12%. Furthermore, the areas ceded to Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 recorded 428,000 Jews at the end of 1930 (148,660 in northern Transylvania, 846 in southern Dobrudja, and 278,494 in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina combined), but during the 1930s a decrease by 62,500, or 15% had occurred:

| Jewish Population in Rumania |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
|                             | December 1930   | Before the war  | Changes          |
|                             | number          | number          | number (%)       |
| Greater Rumania             | 756,930         | 665,500 (mid-1940) | –91,430 (-12)   |
| Core-Rumania                | –328,930        | –300,000 (April 1941) | –28,930 (-9)    |
| Ceded territories           | 428,000         | 365,500         | –62,500 (-15)   |

This considerably smaller decline in Core-Rumania compared to the regions ceded in the summer of 1940 probably has two reasons: First, eastern Rumania contained many Jews who had fled from the Ukraine during the Russian civil war; but Bessarabia’s agricultural economy was not developed

---

enough to absorb these people, and emigration, therefore, often was the only possibility to escape poverty.

Secondly, the beginning industrialization and the accompanying urbanization lured many rural Jews to migrate to the cities – and in Rumania there was only one with more than 100,000 inhabitants, namely, the capital of Bucharest. The total population of this city had grown from 639,040 (December 1930) to 999,658 (April 1941), *i.e.* by 56.4%. In the course of the general migration from the rural areas, the Jewish population of Bucharest increased as well, although not as rapidly as the Rumanian, because the Jews preferred emigration to a migration to the cities. Still, Bucharest’s Jewish population rose by 14,788 from 76,480 (December 1930) to 91,268 (April 1941), that is, by 19.3%.\(^83\) Obviously, the Jewish population of the area where the census was taken in April 1941 (Core-Rumania) would have declined much more than 9%, were it not for the internal migration from the regions to Bucharest and other larger central cities.

The admission of tens of thousands of Polish-Jewish refugees in September 1939 poses great difficulties in determining the Jewish population of the ceded territories precisely. To be sure, there is an official Rumanian estimate of 148,621 Jews for the ceded portion of Transylvania as of January 1, 1940,\(^84\) compared to the census of 1930, which found 148,660, but it is completely unknown how many Jewish refugees from Polish Galicia were included in the 1940 estimate. Nevertheless, it appears that the Jewish population of Transylvania was stagnant during the previous decades already. The *Jüdisches Lexikon* (Jewish Encyclopedia), for instance, mentions that the censuses of 1910 and 1920 for Transylvania, the Transylvanian foreland and the Banat recorded 172,294 and 181,340 Jews, respectively,\(^85\) – an increase of only 9,000 during that decade, or one half of one per cent annually. But the *Jüdisches Lexikon* also says that there had been a large Jewish immigration from Galicia at the time. Without this immigration, Transylvania and the Banat obviously would not have registered any increase at all. For this reason, it is probable that Transylvania – like all the other regions of Rumania – recorded a decrease of its Jewish population until 1940. Even assuming a rate of decrease only half the Rumanian average – *i.e.* 6% – no more than 140,000 native Jews could have been living in northern Transylvania when it was ceded to Hungary. But the Rumanians insist that 148,621 Jews populated the area, and this figure agrees very well with a similar figure produced by the Hungarians for the Jews in their newly

---

\(^83\) *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 10/2/1941, p. 392.
\(^84\) Publikationsstelle Wien. *Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941 (Geheim)*, p. 20.
acquired territory.\textsuperscript{86} The difference of 8,621 (148,621 minus 140,000) thus must consist of Jewish refugees from Polish Galicia of September 1939.

Given the above information, one can now determine the native Jewish population of the areas ceded to the Soviet Union:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930 1940 Number (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ceded territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428,000 365,500 –62,500 –15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deduct:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Transylvania (excl. Polish-Jewish refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–148,660 –140,000 –8,660 –6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Dobrudja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories ceded to the USSR (excl. Polish-Jewish refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278,494 225,088 –53,406 –19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A decrease by 53,406 Jews, or 19%, in the areas handed over to the Soviet Union is not particularly large, considering that the majority of those 278,494 Jews of 1930 lived in Bessarabia, a poorly developed region.

Yet, it appears the Soviets acquired many more Jews than those 225,088 when they occupied the Rumanian areas. In September 1939, Polish Jews fled \textit{en masse} not only to the Soviet Union but also to Rumania. Reports on the number of refugee Jews in Rumania are very vague, however. An informative account, but unfortunately poor in statistics, of the flight of Galician Jews to Rumania is J.G. Burg’s \textit{Schuld und Schicksal}.

We assumed that at least 100,000 Polish Jews found their way to Rumania, because reports in the Zionist press – if true – make this number seem quite realistic. We found 9,000 Polish-Jewish refugees in northern Transylvania. Furthermore, up to 65,000 Jews – apparently consisting mostly of Polish-Jewish refugees – are said to have changed over to Soviet territory when the Soviet Union occupied northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in 1940.\textsuperscript{87} These 65,000 Jews must have lived in southern Bukovina and Moldavia since their arrival from Poland, which is not improbable in view of the geographic proximity of Galicia. Many other Jewish refugees from Poland were living in the northern Bukovina and in Bessarabia when the Soviets annexed those areas. For these reasons, it is quite probable that more than 90,000 Polish refugee Jews fell under Soviet domination in the course of the Soviet occupation of large parts of Rumanian territory. Thus, it seems that the Soviets acquired a total Jewish population numbering 316,000 at the time of Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (225,000 native Jews plus 91,000 Polish-Jewish refugees).

But even after the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), there were still many possibilities for Jews to leave Rumania, often

\textsuperscript{86} Reitlinger, \textit{Final Solution}, p. 497.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{AJYB}, 1941, Vol. 43, p. 330.
taking strange and risky routes. One escape route led from the port of Con- 
stanza to neutral Turkey: Many ships left this port under German protection  
at times – trying to reach extra-European destinations. In this connection,  
the tragic fate of the steamer Struma comes to mind; this ship had left Con- 
stanza for Istanbul on December 16, 1941, and was hit by British mines off  
the coast of Turkey; except for two saved, all of the 769 Jewish passengers  
died; other ships met a similar fate.  

Reitlinger referred to this route as follows:  

[...] it was possible to run a daily small steamer from Constanza to Istanbul [...]  

Even if one allows only 100 persons per trip, a minimum of 100,000 Jews  
must have left Europe during the war on this route. The composition of the  
passengers is not known. But since the Jewish population of Rumania still  
numbered more than 400,000 after “liberation” by the Red Army, it would  
appear that the majority of the Jewish refugees leaving Constanza by ship  
during the war must have been of Polish, Hungarian, Czech or Slovak na- 

tionality.  

A second escape channel ran on land from Rumania through Bulgaria to  
Turkey and from there to Palestine, Persia or overseas. Reliable figures on  
the entire exodus by way of Rumanian ports and Bulgaria are not available.  
All we know is – this will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter –  
that tens of thousands of European Jews from all countries within the  
German sphere of influence escaped this way. The Universal commented:  

[...] during the Second World War [...] the State Department of the United  

States [helped] many Jews fleeing from Rumania to find a haven in Turkey and  

Palestine.  

Assessing the number of Rumanian Jews escaping this way between  
mid-1940 and the end of the war at only 20,000 is just to keep this exodus on  
record, because the actual number of Jewish refugees leaving Rumania  
during this period must have been much larger, probably many, many times  
larger.  

A comparison of the Jewish population of April 1941 with the purported  
survivors at the end of the war allows no conclusions as to the extent of  
flight from Rumania during the war. In 1945, Rumania regained northern  
Transylvania. The areas annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and recon- 
quered in 1941, however, were again occupied by the USSR. The post-war  
“estimates” thus refer to the Rumania within its post-war borders – an area  
which contained maybe 451,000 Jews in August 1939:  

88 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 405.  
89 Ibid., p. 409.  
Jewish population in early 1938 692,244
Emigration from 1938 until mid-1939 app. –16,000
mid-1939 (borders of 1939) 676,244
Rumanian Jews in the areas ceded to the USSR –225,088
Jewish population in mid-1939 (borders of 1945) ca. 451,000

The number of Jews found in northern Transylvania after the war is not known. Our calculations show that 21,000 were deported to Germany during the war, but according to Reitlinger 20,000 returned from German camps. On the other hand, it is probable that at least 10,000 died in the Hungarian military labor force, and the number of those who disappeared in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps – as in the case of the Hungarian Jews – is a total mystery. Reducing the original figure of 148,621 for Transylvania by those 1,000 failing to return from German camps and the 10,500 killed in action, the remainder of 137,000 probably is still too large; but this is the best one can do.

As for the “survivors,” Dr. Isaac Glickman, former member of the executive committee of the Federation of the Jewish Communities of Rumania, gave evidence before the investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1954. Dr. Glickman says he left Rumania at the end of 1947. He estimated the number of Jews in Rumania at 425,000 at the “time of liberation.” Mr. Hilberg, though, found 430,000 in post-war Rumania.

It is all but certain that the figure of 430,000 Jews in Rumania is too low by several tens of thousands. If Dr. Glickman put the number of Jews in Rumania at the “time of liberation” at 425,000, this must be a low figure. After all, Reitlinger mentioned 20,000 who returned from German camps after the war, i.e. after the “time of liberation,” and further thousands are supposed to have returned from the USSR after the war. All of this adds up to far more than 450,000 – at least 20,000 more than Hilberg claims to have found.

Following our own cautious calculations, we should have found 433,000 Jews (or even less, because we had no clues as to the number of former members of the Hungarian military labor force who did not return from Soviet prisons, and our imputed figure of only 20,000 emigrants between 1941 and the end of the war is probably only a fraction of the real number). In other words, when war drew to a close in Rumania, tens of thousands of

---

91 Millman, Ivor, “Romanian Jewry: a Note on the 1966 Census,” Soviet Jewish Affairs, No. 3, May 1972, p. 105; this Jewish author asserts that the Communist census authorities of post-war Romania put the size of the Jewish population within today’s borders at 452,000 for the time of the 1930 census. If this estimate were correct, our figure of 451,000 Romanian Jews in 1939 (in today’s borders) would be too large by at least 20,000!

92 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 497.

93 Treatment of Jews by the Soviet, p. 53.

94 Hilberg, Destruction of European Jews, p. 737.
Jews were living in that country who had arrived there during the war. And, indeed, there is a report by the International Red Cross published in 1948 about its activities during the war, saying that after the retreat of the Germans 6,000 Hungarian Jews had been found in northern Transylvania in December 1944. This obviously vast immigration of non-Rumanian Jews during the war is another indication that Rumania was a real gateway for untold numbers of European Jews to leave Europe by water and by land. Statistically the development looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population in early 1938</td>
<td>692,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration from 1938 until mid-1939</td>
<td>-16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1939</td>
<td>676,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of Polish-Jewish refugees (1939)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1939</td>
<td>776,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**deduct:**

- Taken over by the Soviet Union:
  - Polish-Jewish refugees                                           | 91,000  |
  - Native Rumanian Jews                                             | 225,088 |
  - Total                                                              | 316,088 |
- Acquired by Hungary                                                 | 148,621 |
- Acquired by Bulgaria                                                | 412     |
- Emigration 1940                                                     | 10,700  | -475,821 |
- Total                                                               | 300,423 |

Persons considered Jewish according to the changed census definitions of 1941 (est.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population – census of April 6, 1941</td>
<td>315,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration: April 1941– end of war</td>
<td>-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews in Core-Rumania at end of war (maximum)</td>
<td>295,509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**add back on:**

- Recovery of Transylvania                                             | 148,621 |
- Recovery of southern Dobrudja                                        | 412     |
- Total                                                               | 149,033 |

**deduct:**

- Fallen Jews in Hungarian military labor force                        | -10,500 |
- Jews failing to return from German camps                             | -1,000  | +137,533 |
- Calculated number of Jews in post-war Rumania                        | ca. 433,000 |
- Purported “survivors” according to Hilberg                           | -430,000 |
- “Missing” Jews                                                       | ca. 3,000 |

**Bulgaria**

The census of 1934 recorded 48,398 Jews. In 1947(!), their number had been reduced to 46,500 according to the *Year Book.* The difference of

---

95 *AJYB*, 1941, Vol. 43, p. 668.
1,898 must be attributed to emigration and/or an excess of deaths over births, because not a single Jew was deported from Bulgaria during the war.97

We will show in the next Chapter that 48,642 Jews emigrated to Israel from Bulgaria between May 15, 1948, and December 31, 1970. The number of Bulgarian Jews who might have left their country during or immediately after the war is completely unknown. But Bulgaria, too, belonged to those countries where large-scale emigration was easiest after the war according to Zionist scholar Hilberg. It is thus not far-fetched to assume that thousands (or tens of thousands?) made use of this possibility before 1947 in order to emigrate to Palestine and overseas. Also, there is no reason to believe that all of the Bulgarian Jews had left for Israel after May 15, 1948.

In 1970, there were still 7,000 Jews in Bulgaria.98 Since Bulgarian Jews were not known for their great fertility, it becomes quite obvious that Bulgaria’s Jews did not number 46,500 at the end of the war, as Zionists want us to believe, but many thousands, even tens of thousands more. In any case, 56,000 (48,642 plus 7,000) is a minimum figure. This is another piece of evidence that Bulgaria – just like Rumania – was a transit country during the war for Jewish refugees from Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia and Poland! More than that, these contradictory figures show the relative magnitude of understatement contained in the “survivor”-figures as published by Zionist sources.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population (1934)</td>
<td>48,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Survivors” (1947)</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Immigrants”</td>
<td>7,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

At the beginning of the 1930s, all the European countries (excl. the USSR and the Baltic countries) which later fell within the German sphere of influence contained about 6 million Jews (Table 11). Anti-Jewish measures and economic misery resulted in a massive emigration of over 1.1 million Jews from just five countries – Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania (see also First Chapter). The largest part of this emigration was directed toward Palestine and overseas (more about that in the next chapter) and, to a smaller degree, to western Europe. Other unfavorable developments (negative population growth in Germany and Hungary, conversions in Hungary) more than compensated for the relatively meager excess of

---

97 Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 379.
births in other parts of Europe – if there was any at all. At the outbreak of the German-Polish war (end of 1939), the Jewish population in these European countries had dropped to about 5 million.

The *Year Book* committed a serious error when it placed the number of Jews in these countries at 6 million for the year 1939.\(^9^9\) A comparison would show that the *Year Book* did account for emigration from Germany and Hungary (in part, at least), but not for that from Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. To the contrary, the Jewish populations of these latter three countries were “increased” by assuming unrealistically high birth rates. The result is grave. In actual fact, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia contained only 3.6 million Jewish inhabitants at the end of 1939, but the *Year Book* insists on 4.5 million! Since there were 956,000 fewer Jews in the area of the subsequent German sphere of influence in 1939 (*Table 11*), 90% of this difference must be attributed to just those three countries. In other words, here we have almost one million Jews who were not even in Europe at the start of WWII, but who are nevertheless included in the “Final Solution” according to the Zionist statistical method.

However, in 1941 – just prior to the German invasion of the USSR – only 2.8 million Jews lived within the German sphere of influence. The decrease by 2.2 million was largely the result of the annexation of large parts of Rumanian and Polish territory by the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940, when those regions’ numerous Jewish populations together with many hundreds of thousands of Jews fleeing before the German armies disappeared into the Soviet empire. It is well known today that the Soviets succeeded in keeping the vast majority of their Jews outside the reach of German military power – for reasons of self-interest. Therefore, it is simply misleading to calculate the number of “missing” Jews by deducting the “survivors” after WWII – in most cases figures are available only for 1946 and 1947(!) – from 1939-figures which, to make it worse, are exaggerated by 1 million. There have been many changes between 1939 and 1945 due to emigration, low birth rates, conversions, deaths in combat, evacuation etc. Also, Poland and Rumania had suffered large losses of territory and population to the Soviet Union.

Our investigation in the Second and Sixth Chapters found 1,443,000 “surviving” Jews compared to 1,410,000 of the *Year Book* (*Table 11*). These “survivors” should be compared with the Jewish population in the European countries in 1941, taking into account the many changes which occurred in those countries during the war. On this basis, we arrived at a “missing”-figure of 1,269,000. This number is about 3.3 million smaller than that of the *Year Book*. The reason is clear: The *Year Book*’s pre-war figure is too large by almost one million, and did not take into account the Soviet net

---
acquisition of 2.1 million Rumanian, Polish, Hungarian and Ruthenian Jews. Just these two “mistakes” added up to an exaggeration of about 3.0 million “missing” Jews.

Let us summarize: In 1941, 2,847,000 Jews lived within the German sphere of influence in Europe (excl. the USSR and the Baltic countries). After allowing for war losses, those missing in Soviet prisons, emigration and very low birth rates during the war, annexation of Ruthenia by the USSR in 1945, and the return of Polish-Jewish refugees from the USSR after the
war, 2,712,000 (1,443,000 plus 1,269,000) Jews should have been counted in those countries after the war. On the basis of Zionist statistics – which refer to a large extent to 1946 and 1947, not to 1945 – we arrived at only 1,443,000 “survivors.” A similarly large number of Jews, namely 1,269,000, is not accounted for.
SEVENTH CHAPTER:

Jewish Emigration after World War Two

Following the defeat of Germany, a flood of non-German refugees poured from the East into the three Western zones of the occupied and divided country. Among them were many Jews. British General Sir Frederick Morgan, head of the UNRRA operations in Germany, declared in a press conference in Frankfurt/Main at the end of 1945 that an unknown Jewish organization was bringing masses of Jews from the East to Germany and that all of them were well fed and well dressed. The Zionist Hilberg, too, commented:¹

_In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary many Jews chose not to wait; they decided to embark on their journey. [...] From Poland the exodus began through Czechoslovakia to the American zone in Germany. From Hungary and even Rumania the Jews began to arrive in Austria. By November 1945, the flow was beginning to thicken, and thousands of refugees were spilling over into Italy._

In this connection, one should always keep in mind that the statistics on Jewish “survivors” do not pertain to May 8, 1945, but to the years 1946 and 1947. The 1.4 million “survivors” thus cannot possibly include this huge number of refugees leaving their native countries in eastern Europe.

Immediately after the war, more than 250,000 Jews inhabited the DP-camps in Germany, and in July 1947 more than 400,000 refugee Jews are said to have remained in western Europe.² These figures apply only to certain fixed points in time, because in the interim periods hundreds of thousands of Jews left Europe in the direction of Palestine, North and South America and other places!

These uncontrolled arrivals and departures in the chaotic post-war period prevented an official count of the wandering, fleeing and uprooted Jews. The only possibility to obtain a somewhat reliable picture of this mass migration is to determine the post-war Jewish immigration in the main countries of destination.

¹ Hilberg, _Destruction of European Jews_, p. 729-730.
² Butz, _Hoax of the Twentieth Century_, p. 232.
United States

Official U.S. statistics put the number of Jews in 1926 at 4,081,242; another official count in 1936 found 4,641,184. Both figures refer only to communities with synagogues. As Special Agent of the United States Bureau of the Census, Dr. Harry S. Linfield made a study of all the communities without synagogues and found that 4,228,029 Jews lived in the United States at the end of 1927. A similar investigation by Dr. Linfield in the same capacity produced 4,770,647 Jews for 1937.

It is not certain to what extent immigration and natural growth contributed to the population increase of 543,000 in the ten-year interval. In the previous decades millions of Jews had entered the United States: About 1.8 million between 1899 and 1924. At least three-fourths of them originated in Poland and Russia, countries with a very fertile Jewish population in those days. A large portion of the other fourth, too, hailed from countries such as Rumania, whose Jewish population had shown large natural growth rates.

But the changes in the U.S. immigration laws in the 1920s are supposed to have led to a drastic reduction in the flow of Jewish immigration from eastern Europe.

Besides, the new urban American environment soon began to show up in sharply dropping birth rates. It is thus quite reasonable to assume that the annual natural increase of American Jews amounted to 0.5% at most between 1927 and 1937. Even this rate seems somewhat high, particularly in view of the 0.8% net growth rate of the total U.S. population – with its large and fertile colored and white rural sections between 1930 and 1939.

It would seem that an excess of births over deaths could have increased the U.S. Jewish population from 4,228,029 in 1927 to at most 4,444,000 in 1937. In actual fact, however, 4.77 million Jews were found in 1937 – 326,000 more than natural growth would have warranted. A check of U.S. immigration statistics reveals, though, that only 81,212 Jewish immigrants were recorded in this period. An explanation for this wide discrepancy will be forthcoming below.

The Year Book’s post-war Jewish population statistics for the U.S. are as follows:

---

4. AJYB, 1976, Vol. 77, p. 268
5. Ibid., p. 271-274.
These figures are fictitious. The purported population size for 1946 was simply maintained without change for ten years, at a time when hundreds of thousands of central and Eastern European Jews found shelter in the United States. Finally, when it was decided to proceed with the long overdue correction, the increase by just 197,000 was barely enough to explain the net natural growth between 1946 and 1957. Obviously, these figures are politically inspired.

Already in 1943, the Jewish historian and former secretary of the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (Relief Association of German Jews), Dr. Mark Wischnitzer, who was employed by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee since 1938 and figured prominently in the edition of the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, wrote in an article in The Jewish Quarterly Review that the Jewish population of the United States had reached 5,199,200. The rise by 429,000 from 4.77 million since 1937 amounts to an annual growth of 1.45% (!) – much too large for any possible natural increase. The answer to this contradiction was provided by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.

In March 1943, Long declared in the name of the U.S. Government that 547,775 refugees had entered the United States since 1933. Eight months later, on November 26, Long testified before an investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

*The United States has admitted about 580,000 victims of persecution by the Hitler regime since it began ten years ago. [...] the majority of the refugees admitted were Jews [...]*

It is not known what was meant by the term “majority.” If he meant at least 70%, 406,000 of the 580,000 victims of persecution accepted by the United States must have been Jews. Unfortunately, the official immigration statistics show only 163,583 immigrant Jews between 1933 and 1943, which is

---

about 240,000 fewer. The explanation for this further discrepancy is very simple.

First, the Jewish statistician Arthur Ruppin pointed out that U.S. immigration statistics for Jews do not mean very much; the reason is that they do not include those Jewish immigrants whose culture and ordinary language makes them appear as members of the people of their country of origin. The Jewish immigrants from Germany, for example, were not registered as “Hebrews” but as Germans, whereas Galician Jews from Poland often appeared very “Jewish” because of their everyday language, looks, etc., and thus were registered in the column for “Hebrews.”

Secondly, Long told the investigating committee that the United States allowed Jews to enter the United States on visitors’ visas before and during the war. This is of course another very important reason for the fact that US immigration statistics show only 165,583 Jewish immigrants between 1933 and 1943 instead of more than 400,000.

One way to arrive at the real number of Jewish immigrants before and after 1937 may be – despite unavoidable inaccuracies – to divide those estimated 406,000 immigrant Jews on the basis of the registered Jewish immigrants between 1933 and 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Calculated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933-1937</td>
<td>27,374</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-1943</td>
<td>138,209</td>
<td>339,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1943</td>
<td>165,583</td>
<td>406,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adding the calculated Jewish immigrants numbering 339,000 between 1938 and 1943 to the 4,771,000 Jews of 1937, one obtains a total of 5.11 million, or 89,000 fewer than mentioned by Dr. Wischnitzer for the year 1943. This difference is equivalent to a natural growth rate of about 0.3% p.a. – possibly somewhat low, but still quite plausible for an urban population whose birth rate was negatively affected by economic need during the Great Depression (1937-1940) and men absent on military duty (1941 to 1943).

According to the Year Book, however, the American Jewish population reached only 5,197,000 in 1957. This figure is still smaller than found in 1943 by Dr. Wischnitzer, who was in an excellent position to judge the actual size of Jewish immigration. Meanwhile, though, further hundreds of thousands of homeless European Jews entered the United States since 1943. Also, it is a matter of statistical record that the Jewish population, too, was

---

affected by the baby-boom following WWII, although for a much shorter time period. The figure produced by the *Year Book* for 1946, therefore, is just plain wrong.

In 1970, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds sponsored a nationwide sampling survey of the Jewish population, the so-called National Jewish Population Study (NJPS). The survey did not aim at tracing all American Jews but only those who were still connected with Jewry in any form whatsoever. Jews who had broken completely with their Jewish past and retained no further ties to their Jewish identity were not included. We shall attempt to obtain some answers from this study to questions regarding immigration, natural growth and assimilation.

NJPS found 5,731,685 persons in Jewish households – defined as households with at least one Jewish person; among these there were 5,370,000 Jews. If this number would have included all the Jews in the U.S., the increase over 27 years earlier would have been only 171,000! An analysis of the age structure (*Table 12*) proves that such a tiny growth is totally impossible.

### Table 12: Age Structure of American Jews: 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Share in %</th>
<th>Share per Year of Birth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966–1970</td>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–1965</td>
<td>5–9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–1960</td>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–1955</td>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–1950</td>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–1945</td>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936–1940</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931–1935</td>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926–1930</td>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921–1925</td>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916–1920</td>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911–1915</td>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906–1910</td>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901–1905</td>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896–1900</td>
<td>70–74</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891–1895</td>
<td>75–79</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior to 1891</td>
<td>80 and older</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident that the incidence of births was not very great from 1941 to 1945, but between 1946 and 1960 it was considerable; after that it fell rap-

---

The table points to a net growth rate between 1946 and 1960 of possibly around 0.8% per year. The decade of 1961-1970 saw a drastic reduction in the number of births. It may be assumed that the rate of natural increase fell to as low as 0.2% p.a. on average.\(^{17}\) Given these growth rates, the Jewish population would have had to pass the 6-million-mark by 1970 even without the post-war immigration flows.

The absolute impossibility of just 5.37 million American Jews in 1970 was supported by other information made available by the NJPS. The study noted that 8.6% of all heads of households aged 20 to 24 years—born 1946 to 1950—were foreign-born.\(^{18}\) There is no reason to assume that the heads of households showed very different characteristics from the rest of the Jewish population; thus, we can apply that rate to the entire Jewish population as well.

While there is no information on the percentage of those born abroad in the years 1946-1950 among the post-war Jewish migrants to the United States, the population statistics of the immigrant nation of Israel provide a rather good indication of the relative number of Jewish immigrants born in Europe during the first few post-war years.

As of December 31, 1954, there were 37,279 Jews in Israel born in Europe\(^{19}\) between 1945 and 1949 (age 5-9 years).\(^{20}\) From 1945 until May 15, 1948, a total of 73,282 Jews entered Israel, 90%, or roughly 67,000, of them from Europe.\(^{21}\) Between May 15, 1948, and December 31, 1954, another 346,000 Jews arrived from there.\(^{22}\) The total number of immigrants from Europe may have reached 413,000 between 1945 and 1954, about nine-tenths of them in the years 1945-1950. A relatively small number either returned or moved on to America, Australia, etc. Of all the Jews entering Israel between May 15, 1948, and the end of 1955, 7% are supposed to have left again.\(^{23}\) The extent to which these emigrants consisted of European, North African or Middle Eastern Jews is not known. Applied to the 413,000 European Jews who emigrated between 1945 and 1954, one may argue that

\(^{17}\) It must be assumed that the Jewish natural rate of increase fell below zero in the USA in the 1970s. The *AJYB*, 1976, Vol. 77, p. 310 wrote for instance: “[...] the current Jewish fertility is 6 points below the rate that prevails in even the most intensely urbanized areas.” The urban population, especially in the large cities, in the United States like in all industrial countries recorded natural increases far below that of the general population. But if, as the publication “Population Estimates and Projections” of the U.S. Department of Commerce notes, the average American net growth rate was below 0.6% after 1972, the logical conclusion must be that the American-Jewish population is confronted with a serious demographic crisis since the early 1970s.


\(^{19}\) The *Statistical Abstract of Israel* does not list the immigrant Jews from America and Europe separately; but the Jewish immigrants from America represent only a tiny fraction of this group.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 1980, Table V/1, p. 133.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 1954/55, Table 5, p. 33.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 1955/56, Table 3, p. 7.
the net immigration from Europe between 1945 and 1954 amounted to only 384,000 (93% of 413,000).

Evidently, the age groups 1945 to 1949 amounted to only 9.7% (37,279 of 384,000) of the European Jews who immigrated in Israel between 1945 and 1954. There is no reason to suppose the Jewish immigrants in the United States displayed a radically different age structure – after all, they too came from Europe. The implications for the American Jews are as follows:

1. The age group “20-24 years” in the purported Jewish population of 5.37 million amounted to 8.7% according to Table 12; in numbers, 467,000.
2. Of these, 8.6% or about 40,000 were born abroad in the years 1946-1950.
3. These 40,000 immigrant Jews born abroad in the years 1946-1950 constituted 10% of all immigrants; thus, total immigration must have numbered about 400,000!

Using the age structure as provided by NJPS, and the natural growth rate which may be estimated from it, the total natural increase must have been around 700,000 between 1946 and 1970. Deducting these excess births and immigration from the 5.37 million (1970), one should obtain the level of the Jewish population in the United States at the end of the war: Not surprisingly, the remainder of 4.27 million is even half a million below the semi-official figure of 1937!

The conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is not that the data gathered by NJPS are worthless. They are probably quite correct. The problem is that the NJPS-study was only concerned with those Jews with continuing ties to the Jewish community; the assimilated Jews remained outside the study. In effect, the study shows the magnitude of the losses suffered by American Jews during the past decades through assimilation!

But just how large was the Jewish population in the United States really in 1970? Publishing the Zionist population figures for the United States in 1957, the World Almanac and Book of Facts apparently believed them to be far too anachronistic. To be sure, the Almanac cited the “official” Zionist figure of just 5.2 million but added that “an independent study places the percentage [of Jews] at 3.69%, and the possible number of Jews in the United States at 6,290,000.”²⁴

Starting from these 6.29 million (1957) and projecting them until 1970 on the basis of the growth rates implicit in Table 12, one obtains 6.6 million. This figure includes, of course, the assimilated Jews as well. If the latter did not exhibit drastically different characteristics, which is not likely, 8.7% of them were also born in the years 1946-1950, and 8.6% of these, in turn, were foreign-born. The relationship of this age group to all of the Jews immigrating after the war also must have been 1 to 10. The resulting alternative development looks like this:

Jewish population in the United States – 1970 6,600,000
deduct:
– Natural increase 1946-1970\(^{25}\) 865,000
– Post-war immigration until 1970\(^{26}\) 490,000
Total demographic changes after the war –1,355,000
Jewish population in the United States – 1945 5,245,000

This calculated 1945-figure is just barely above the one mentioned by Dr. Wischnitzer for the Jewish population of the United States in 1943. If one deducts, furthermore, the semi-official figure of 4.77 million for 1937, it becomes apparent that Long’s testimony regarding the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews until 1943 fits neatly into the difference.

The composition of the Jewish population in the United States by age and origin – as published by NJPS – provides the following conclusive results:
A. In 1945, 5.25 million Jews inhabited the United States.
B. Their number increased to 6.6 million by 1970.
C. About 0.5 million Jews entered the United States between 1945 and 1970.

At the same time, NJPS admitted unintentionally that 1¼ million Jews, or one Jew in five, renounced their Jewish identity:

| Actual Jewish population 1970 | 6,600,000 |
| Jews found by NJPS 1970 | 5,370,000 |
| Assimilated Jews 1970 | 1,230,000 |

Such a high assimilation rate among Jews in the United States cannot surprise. Today, more than 40% of all U.S. Jews marry gentiles – four times as many as just a few decades ago. Only one third of these mixed couples raise their children in the Jewish tradition. In a study on “Interrmarriage and the Jewish Future,” the American Jewish Committee complained that the United States’ Jewish population would drop below one million within fifty years unless these losses can be stopped.\(^{27}\)

**Israel**

The census of 1931 found 174,610 Jews in Palestine; by 1944, their number increased to 553,600,\(^{28}\) and to 649,600 on May 15, 1948.\(^{29}\) Offi-

---

\(^{25}\) The excess of births over deaths numbering 865,000 for the years 1946-1970 was calculated on the basis of the age structure as published by NJPS.

\(^{26}\) The immigration of 490,000 for the years 1946-1970 was computed as follows:

- a) The Jewish population born in 1946-1950 is 8.7% of 6,600,000, or 574,000.
- b) Of these 574,000 8.6%, or 49,000 were born abroad.
- c) These 49,000 represent about 10% of the immigrants.


\(^{28}\) *AJYB*, 1947, Vol. 49, p. 742.
cially, Jewish immigration – most of the immigrants came from Europe at the time – numbered 292,779 between 1932 and 1944, and 73,282 between 1945 and May 15, 1948. But these statistics are not as reliable as they seem. They represent only gross numbers, because comparable emigration figures appear not to exist for Palestine. Also, it is questionable whether the authorities really succeeded in keeping statistics on the considerable number of illegal immigrants. It is possible that emigration and illegal immigration cancelled each other; but it seems that the remaining difference, implying a natural increase of about 2% p.a., is too high even for the young Jewish immigrant population of those days.

Between May 15, 1948, and December 31, 1970, another 1.4 million Jews entered the country, mainly from Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The immigration figures by countries of origin shown in Table 13 should not be taken at face value. Ostensibly, Israeli immigration statistics are kept on the basis of the country of origin. But there is good reason for doubt, as the following examples indicate.

It can be shown that among the 60,581 Jews from Persia, there were few Persian Jews; almost certainly, most of them originated from eastern Europe or the Balkans. Another explanation is impossible: Before the war, Iran’s Jewish population numbered 40,000; by 1970, 60,581 Jews had left Persia for Israel, and yet, in 1971, there were still 80,000 Jews in Persia. A natural increase of this size is unthinkable, leaving only one logical conclusion: They must have entered Persia between 1939 and the end of the war, coming from eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States violated Iran’s proclaimed neutrality by force of arms and occupied that country against its will in World War Two. Persia was powerless to stop the immigration of Jews who had escaped from the German sphere of influence but whom no country wanted to accept.

In theory, two roads existed for the fleeing Jews to reach Iran: One was by way of the Soviet Union, and may have been used by a few Polish and Rumanian Jews – provided the Soviets allowed it. The second, more important route, led from Rumania through Bulgaria and neutral Turkey to the Anglo-Saxon occupied part of Persia. Now, if Israel alone obtained 60,000 non-Iranian Jews from Persia, it would be only logical to assume that many other tens of thousands migrated to other countries and continents as well, for instance, to North and South America. The exact number is of no great importance, although it would be helpful, because if Iran accepted that many Jewish refugees during the war from eastern Europe, the bridge from the

---

29 *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1971*, No. 22, Table B/2, p. 22.
33 *1972 World Almanac*, p. 156.
Balkans across Turkey must have been used by more than one hundred thousand, possibly even two hundred thousand refugee Jews. One should keep in mind that the official immigration in Palestine between 1940 and 1944 amounted to 45,066,\textsuperscript{34} and to this must be added the many thousands of “illegal” entries. Almost all of these immigrants had come from eastern Europe and the Balkans.

The census of 1936 listed 161,312 Jews in French-Morocco.\textsuperscript{35} The high fertility of these Jews was offset, however, by a very high infant mortality rate, meaning that their natural increase was not all that different from that in other Oriental countries. In the early 1930s, the excess of births of Oriental Jews amounted to 5,000 according to the \textit{Universal}.\textsuperscript{36} Applied to a total Jewish population in Africa of perhaps 550,000, this excess is equivalent to a net growth rate of 0.9\% p.a. For the period 1939-1945 the \textit{Year Book} suggests an increase of the African Jews (excl. South Africa and Rhodesia) by 27,000 or 4,500 annually. This, too, would correspond to a net growth rate of 0.9\% for an African-Jewish population (again excl. South Africa and Rhodesia), averaging barely more than 500,000.\textsuperscript{37} Given a natural increase of, let us say, 1\% p.a., Morocco’s Jewish population could have increased to reach at most 200,000 by the early 1950s, when most of the Jews left the country. Almost 50,000 Moroccan Jews (1971: 48,000),\textsuperscript{38} however, decided to stay.

In other words, the total number of Jews who could possibly have left Morocco for Israel was 150,000 – provided that all of them decided to go to Israel. Israeli immigration statistics, however, list more than 250,000 immigrant Jews from Morocco. The only explanation is that Morocco, a French protectorate during and after the war, was an intermediate station for Jewish refugees from devastated Europe. Western Europe’s resident Jews certainly saw little reason to move into Moroccan DP-camps after the war, and those 100,000 “surplus” Jews in Morocco, therefore, can only have originated in eastern Europe, or they consisted of western European Jews who returned from German deportation camps and who were neither willing nor capable of adjusting to a new life in their native countries.\textsuperscript{39}

We can observe a similar development in Tunisia. The 1936 census registered 59,485 Jews,\textsuperscript{40} but in 1950, 105,000 Jews inhabited the country,\textsuperscript{41} and 13,000 had left Tunisia meanwhile for Israel (\textit{Table 13}). Even conced-

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Encyclopaedia Judaica}, Vol. 9, p. 533.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{AJYB}, 1945, Vol. 47, p. 638.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Universal Jewish Encyclopedia}, Vol. 10, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{AJYB}, 1946, Vol. 48, p. 609.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{1972 World Almanac}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{39} Butz, \textit{Hoax of the Twentieth Century}, p. 227.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{AJYB}, 1944, Vol. 46, p. 501.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 1951, Vol. 52, p. 199.
Table 13: Jewish Immigration in Israel: 1948-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>48,642</td>
<td>11,411</td>
<td>37,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>24,255</td>
<td>10,624</td>
<td>13,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>8,063</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>7,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>156,011</td>
<td>52,279</td>
<td>103,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>20,572</td>
<td>2,355</td>
<td>18,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>229,779</td>
<td>110,839</td>
<td>118,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (excl, USSR)</td>
<td>487,326</td>
<td>187,980</td>
<td>299,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>14,006</td>
<td>11,863</td>
<td>2,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>2,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26,295</td>
<td>22,287</td>
<td>4,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>8,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4,120</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>2,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16,342</td>
<td>11,343</td>
<td>4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>75,037</td>
<td>50,032</td>
<td>25,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>21,391</td>
<td>16,693</td>
<td>4,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4,004</td>
<td>3,771</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>34,288</td>
<td>32,379</td>
<td>1,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>19,964</td>
<td>18,830</td>
<td>1,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5,590</td>
<td>5,148</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,001</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>75,372</td>
<td>70,784</td>
<td>4,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>124,647</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>121,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>60,581</td>
<td>35,777</td>
<td>24,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>46,447</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>45,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>3,912</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>3,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>53,288</td>
<td>19,075</td>
<td>34,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>33,871</td>
<td>25,531</td>
<td>8,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>322,746</td>
<td>85,523</td>
<td>237,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13,119</td>
<td>11,596</td>
<td>1,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>46,255</td>
<td>33,116</td>
<td>13,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>34,265</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>30,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>252,642</td>
<td>221,892</td>
<td>30,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>37,867</td>
<td>21,359</td>
<td>16,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6,845</td>
<td>6,261</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>392,443</td>
<td>299,266</td>
<td>93,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>24,797</td>
<td>4,633</td>
<td>20,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,399,112</td>
<td>714,911</td>
<td>684,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Encyclopaedia Judaica, Vol. 9, S, 535 and 541,
ing a natural increase of 1%, as in the case of the Moroccan Jews, Tunisia’s Jewish population could not have grown to more than 73,000 by the mid-1950s, when the majority of the Jews left the country. Obviously, Tunisia, too, had “surplus” Jews numbering 45,000 (105,000 plus 13,000 minus 73,000). 10,000 were still living in Tunisia in 1971, about 46,000 had left for Israel, and the largest part of the rest of the remaining 60,000 had moved on to France.

Without question, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa also gave shelter to refugee Jews, most of whom left for Israel after May 15, 1948, but never appeared as European Jews in Israeli statistics.

All of the western European countries were affected by the Jewish drama. But it was the uprooted Jews looking for a new beginning who constituted the bulk of the immigrants in Israel. Almost certainly, the 75,037 Jews who immigrated from western Europe either were eastern European in origin or else they belonged to those Jews returning from deportation camps. It is quite unlikely that western European Jews who survived the war in their home countries would have departed in large numbers for Israel.

The 75,372 immigrants from the Americas also provide some food for thought. A resident population does not migrate abroad very eagerly. All of the listed American countries were prime destinations for Jewish immigrants before, during and after the war. It is probable that the majority of these Jews also hailed from eastern Europe; but there is no direct evidence.

The following summary of the immigrant European Jews in Israel after May 15, 1948, represents a minimum number:

| (Eastern) European Jews from Tunisia | 45,000 |
| (Eastern) European Jews from Persia  | 60,581 |
| (Eastern) European Jews from Morocco | 100,000 |
| (Eastern) European Jews from western Europe | 75,037 |
| Jews from eastern Europe (excl. the USSR) | 487,326 |
| **Immigration of European Jews 1948-1970** | **767,944** |

Not all of the 1.4 million immigrants between 1948 and 1970 remained in Israel. For the same period, the *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1971* listed a net immigration figure of 1,155,100. This means that 244,000, or every sixth immigrant, left the country; it is not known how many of them were of European origin. But since the European Jews were considerably better educated than the Jews from North Africa and the Middle East and also had, in many cases, close ties of kinship to Jews in other Western countries, it is probable that the majority of the emigrants, let us say 75%, were of Euro-

---

42 It is not known whether the Jews coming to Israel from Tunisia belonged to the Oriental or to the immigrated (eastern) European part. We assumed them to belong to the European Jews; consequently, the Jews migrating to France from Tunisia were grouped among the Orientals.  
43 *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1971*, Table B/2, p. 22.
pean origin, *i.e.* 183,000 of 244,000. On balance, the net, number of Euro-
pean Jews immigrated in Israel between 1948 and 1970 must have num-
bered 585,000 (768,000 minus 183,000).

### Latin America and the Anglo-Saxon Countries

The other countries serving as main immigration countries besides the
United States, Israel and France, which will be covered subsequently, are
listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Pre-war</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>Post-war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>260,000 (’35)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>500,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>40,000 (’33)</td>
<td>110,750</td>
<td>150,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3,697 (’30)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>40,000 (’50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,045 (’35)</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>10,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>20,000 (’35)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>35,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1,500 (’35)</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>5,300 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>12,000 (’30)</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>50,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>882 (’26)</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>12,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>340,124</td>
<td>552,300</td>
<td>802,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>155,614 (’31)</td>
<td>170,241 (’41)</td>
<td>296,945 (’71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23,553 (’33)</td>
<td>32,500</td>
<td>72,000 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>90,662 (’36)</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>119,900 (’70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>300,000 (’31)</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>450,000 (’50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Saxon countries</td>
<td>569,829</td>
<td>666,741</td>
<td>938,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>909,953</td>
<td>1,219,041</td>
<td>1,741,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until 1943, Latin America’s Jewish population of 340,000 had increased
by 210,000. Of this total, no more than 30,000 may be attributed to a natural
increase, and the remainder of 180,000 thus represents Jewish immigration.
In the post-war period, the Jewish population increased to over 800,000 – an

---

44 Tartakower, Arieh and Kurt R. Grossmann. *The Jewish Refugee*, New York, 1944, p. 343; also,

45 According to *AJYB*, 1969, Vol. 70, p. 276, the estimated number of Jews in Great Britain rose to
450,000 in 1950 “and has stood at this figure ever since.” In the issue of 1977, Vol. 78, p.
339-340, the *AJYB* wrote again:

*An outstanding feature [of British Jews] is a demographic decline. […] demographers forecast
that, in the foreseeable future, the Jewish population may fall to 225,000 compared with the
410,000 currently [in 1971] estimated. The primary cause is the low birth rate. […] Jewish fam-
ilies [showed] only an average of 1.72 children per family [compared] to the general population,
which had an average of 2.16 children. […] intermarriage unmistakably emerges as the greatest
single threat to the future of British Jewry. […] the true level of assimilation […] is approximately
20 per cent […]”*

The reduction since 1950 thus may be explained by both of these factors intermarriage and too
few births.
addition of 250,000. Since Latin America’s Jews are mostly urban dwellers, especially in Argentina and Brazil, it is quite improbable that the excess of births over deaths even reached 100,000; this means that at least 150,000 must be due to immigration.

In the case of the Anglo-Saxon countries, excl. the United States, there was an increase of 97,000 until 1943. In all four countries, however, the Jewish population was rather infertile. Between 1933 and 1943, the following immigration occurred:\textsuperscript{46}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, the natural increase cannot have been larger than 7,000. After the war, the Jewish population rose by 272,000. Because of the relatively low birth rate and, in the case of England because of the short time interval, immigration must have been at least 250,000.

**France**

France is a special case in the group of the main immigration countries for Jews. It was the only country occupied by Germany during the war, and after the war it not only recorded a huge immigration from eastern Europe, but from North Africa as well. As mentioned in the Sixth Chapter, only 238,000 Jews are supposed to have survived the war in France. In 1970, it is claimed 550,000 Jews were living there.\textsuperscript{47} Up to 60,000 Jews had entered the country from Tunisia in the 1950s, and in the years 1962/1963 most of the 130,000 Algerian Jews decided to go to France. Only 13,000 moved to Israel, and 1,500 remained in Algeria after independence.\textsuperscript{48} Without any natural growth at all, there would have been almost 400,000 Jews in France by 1970. But whatever their natural increase was, 150,000 would have been out of reach.

Unfortunately, the 550,000-figure published by the *Year Book* turns out to be much too low! In the mid-1970s, an official investigation discovered 700,000 Jews living in France. The *International Herald Tribune* commented:\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Tartakower and Grossmann, *Jewish Refugee*, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{47} *AJYB*, 1971, Vol. 72, p. 476.
\textsuperscript{48} *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Vol. 9, p. 538-539.
\textsuperscript{49} *International Herald Tribune*. “French Policies to Court the Jewish Vote,” May 10, 1977, p. 2.
[...] a census report showed there were 700,000 Jews in France, at least 150,000 more than had been believed.

It is true that the North African Jews proved relatively fertile, but the native European Jews exhibited the low birth rate usual for Europe. It may be assumed that this mixed Jewish population was not much larger than 670,000 in 1970 – seven years prior to the official count. Of these, in turn, 185,000 may have been of North African origin (see footnote to Table 15). Consequently, the number of European Jews in France probably was 485,000 in 1970. In view of the “original” 238,000 of the year 1945 and the relatively small growth rate, immigration from eastern Europe must have amounted to 230,000 Jews after the war.

As for the pre-war immigration in France, a number of “estimates” exist. But the number of 90,000 (Sixth Chapter) also contained the – mostly foreign – Jews who fled from Belgium and Holland.

The “Missing”

Summarizing, we may say that from the end of WWII until 1970 1,778,000 Jews found shelter in the main Jewish immigration countries. This number is about one and a half times as large as the 1.1 million Jews who entered the same countries during the 1930s (Table 14). In analyzing Jewish emigration from the countries occupied by Germany during the war, however, we must disregard France, because this country, even though it was one of the large immigration countries for Jews both before and after the war, was in the German sphere of influence during WWII. Thus, Jewish immigration in all the above-mentioned main immigration countries outside the former German sphere of influence totaled 1,548,000 after the war (until 1970). The only possible countries of origin of these more than 1.5 million Jewish immigrants are those European countries (excl. the USSR in today’s borders) which were occupied by Germany during WWII.

In 1970, 860,000 Jews of European origin lived in these very same countries (Table 15). If one adds them to the 1,548,000 Jews who left these countries after the war for the main immigration countries (excl. France), then one obtains the minimum number of Jews who must have been living in the former German-occupied European countries (excl. the USSR and the Baltic states) at the close of World War Two, namely, 2,408,000. Their number was probably larger yet, because European Jewry was subject to considerable attrition during the interim 25 years on account of low birth rates and assimilation.

However, highly regarded Zionist organizations like the American Jewish Committee put the number of Jews in those European countries in
Table 14: Immigration of EUROPEAN Jews in the Main Countries of Immigration before and after World War Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Before the war</th>
<th>After the war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>180,000 (1930s)</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Australia, England, South Africa</td>
<td>90,000 (1930s)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>90,000 (1930s)</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main immigration countries: 1,059,000

**deduct:**

France: 90,000

Main immigration countries outside the German sphere of influence during World War Two: 969,000

Source: Seventh Chapter.

Table 15: Jewish Population of EUROPEAN Origin in the former German-occupied European Countries in 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist countries excl. the USSR</td>
<td>217,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>485,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximate total: 860,000

* In 1977, 700,000 Jews were found in France. The native Jewish population was stagnant, but the younger immigrant Eastern European Jews might have had some growth. Much larger excesses of births over deaths were recorded by the app. 170,000 immigrant North African Jews who arrived in the 1960s. Applying an average rate of growth of at most 0.8%, there were 670,000 Jews in France in 1970. It may be possible that the North African Jews recorded an excess of births amounting to 15,000; if true, 485,000 Jews of European origin were living in France in the year 1970.

Source: Seventh Chapter.
1946/47 at only 1.41 million. Thus, the missing million Jews (2,408,000 minus 1,410,000) must have left Europe either during the immediate post-war period or – disregarding the possibility that we were given “political” figures – the count in 1946/47 was incomplete.

The improbability of just 1.41 million “survivors” (1946/47), as published by the *Year Book*, is highlighted by the fact that in that case only half a million Jews (1,410,000 minus 860,000) from the former German occupied countries could have entered the main immigration countries between the end of the war and 1970. The fact is that Israel alone received more than half a million immigrants from these countries after 1948.

Insisting on the 1.41 million figure is to deny the huge Jewish immigration in the Western Hemisphere after World War Two. That, of course, is nonsense. Which European countries these surviving, but statistically “missing” European Jews should be allocated to, cannot be reconstructed today. During the first post-war years, Jewish refugees were streaming week after week, month after month from the East to the West, being transported from camp to camp, and it often lasted years until they finally found their place of final residence. Hundreds of thousands were literally moving “between” the countries, and thus were not recorded in the statistics for individual countries. Certainly, the *Year Book* published figures on the number of Jewish DP’s for 1947 in the case of Italy, Germany and Austria, but not for other countries. For instance, one cannot detect Cyprus – where the British held tens of thousands of Jews wanting to migrate to Palestine – or Morocco and Tunisia.

By proving a large-scale immigration in many countries outside the former wartime German sphere of influence, it was possible to demonstrate that 1,548,000 Jews left Europe between the end of the war and 1970 (*Table 14*). In 1970, these European countries still contained 860,000 European Jews (*Table 15*). Consequently, the number of Jews who survived must have been at least 2,408,000.

On the basis of largely Zionist or pro-Zionist data, however, the number of surviving Jews found was only (*Table 11*) 1,443,000. This means that the difference constitutes additional survivors in, and/or emigrants from, former German-occupied Europe; their numbers are 965,000.

Thus, while the real number of Jewish survivors in former German-occupied Europe (excl. the USSR in today’s borders) was almost 2½ million, the sum of the actually missing Jews was much smaller. Based on Zionist statistics we arrived in *Table 11* at 1,269,000.
“missing” Jews. Deducting the additional 965,000 survivors from them, European Jews not traceable statistically number 304,000.

The extent to which these 304,000 represent actual missing persons is difficult to judge. It is known that the Jewish population of German-occupied Europe suffered from an extremely low birth rate. The resulting excess of natural deaths over births was not taken completely into account in the above analysis due to lack of data. In addition, we only considered Jewish immigration in fourteen countries which accepted the bulk of the large number of Jewish emigrants after the war. An investigation of some of the smaller countries of destination certainly would discover further emigrants.

It is thus obvious that the figure of 1.3 million “missing” Jews arrived at on the basis of Zionist information for former German-occupied Europe (excl. the USSR in today’s borders) in no way reflects reality. The huge flow of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe after the cessation of hostilities – as described by General Morgan and even Zionist sources – must have exceeded 1.5 million until 1970. This flow also included the majority of the deportees and the Polish Jews under wartime German control.

Organized Flight

It was pointed out before that many Jews managed to escape during the war from the German sphere of influence. They, too, belong to the 965,000 surviving, but statistically unaccounted for European Jews. The exact number of Jews who fled after the start, but before the end, of the Second World War to neutral or Allied countries and regions is not known; it must have reached several hundreds of thousands.

To be sure, the Institute of Jewish Affairs reported that 180,000 Jews escaped from the countries controlled by the Axis powers between the beginning of the war and 1943, but their countries of origin and routes of escape are largely clouded in mystery.51

Hidden indications can be found here and there pointing to Turkey as an important receiving and transit country for fleeing Jews who tried to reach neutral or Allied overseas countries by ship via the port of Constanza (Rumania) or by rail via Bulgaria. Even more mysterious are the temporary receiving stations for these refugees. The Year Book, for instance, does list figures for the Jewish DP-camps in post-war Germany, Austria and Italy, but none for Cyprus, Persia or Morocco where – as was shown in this

---

51 Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler’s Ten-Year War, p. 306.
chapter – many Jewish refugees were admitted before and just after the end of the war.

An invaluable piece of evidence describing the extent and organization of this refugee movement during the last 16 months of the war is furnished by the U.S. War Refugee Board. The Board was established by Roosevelt on January 22, 1944, for the purpose, *inter alia*, of aiding the escape of as many Jews as possible from areas under German control. Special representatives of the Board were stationed in all “strategic” places important for the reception, shelter and transportation of these refugees, such as Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Great Britain, Italy and North Africa.52

The diplomatic status of these representatives enabled them to negotiate with all friendly and neutral governments in the name of the U.S. Government, and even to contact German authorities for the purpose of obtaining the release of Jewish prisoners. The number of Jews freed from German control as a result of these direct negotiations is not specified, but the last U.S.-German exchange is supposed to have taken place in February 1945; the released Jews “were taken to an UNRRA camp in North Africa to await ultimate resettlement.”53

Of much greater importance for the escape of Jews from the German sphere of influence – especially during the last 1½ war years – was their flight to Turkey and, to a smaller degree, to southern Italy. To be sure, the United States had no need to pay attention to a sovereign Italian government, but in the case of neutral Turkey an agreement had to be reached. In order to transfer the escaped Jews on to Palestine and to transit camps in the Middle East and North Africa, the consent of Great Britain and France, *i.e.* de Gaulle, was necessary. The United States Government

`assured the neutral governments that it would arrange for the maintenance of newly arrived refugees and for the evacuation to other places of safety as soon as possible.54` Representations were therefore made to the Turkish Government for consent to admit into its territory all refugees from Axis areas who might reach the Turkish border. Assurances were given the Turkish Government that the Board would arrange for maintenance of refugees in Turkey as well as for their eventual removal to other places. […] the Turkish Government finally agreed to grant increased numbers of entrance and transit visas and transportation facilities, and generally to cooperate in this [U.S.] Government’s program to rescue Nazi victims.55`

---

In order to carry out this far-flung escape operation, the services of the UNRRA were utilized, which provided temporary shelter for the Jewish refugees and their transport and maintenance on the way to makeshift camps. UNRRA camps sprouted in the Middle East, Italy and North Africa ready to accept thousands of these refugees.\(^{56}\)

The possibility to escape from the Balkans via Turkey to Palestine and other allied territory existed for Jews since the beginning of World War Two. The route of escape led from the port of Constanza (Rumania) across the Black Sea to Istanbul or by rail through Bulgaria. The Board assumed the task to systematically improve and expand these routes to “develop a steady flow of refugees over these routes through Turkey.”\(^{57}\)

For this purpose, lesser German and other border officials were bribed, false identification papers were supplied, exit and entry visas were procured, and transportation by boat and by rail was provided for evacuation to safe areas. “Tens of thousands were rescued from the Nazis by these clandestine means,” the Board wrote.\(^{58}\)

\[
\text{[...] refugees were collected, concealed from the Nazi-controlled Rumanian officials, and placed in small vessels in the port of Constanza. [...] The refugees were herded by the hundreds on ships built to carry 20 to 50 passengers. [...] late in March 1944, 48,000 Jews were moved from Transnistria to Rumania. Many of them, mostly children, were transferred with other [Jewish] refugees from Rumania to Palestine.}^{59}\]

A second route of escape from the Balkans to Allied territory led from Yugoslavia by boat across the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. Partisan and other underground units in Slovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia smuggled Jewish refugees to the coast, where boats organized by the Board waited to receive and transport them to southern Italian UNRRA camps. Approximately 7,000 Hungarian Jews are supposed to have escaped this way, but it is not known whether they were Jews from Greater Hungary or from the Hungarian territory within post-war borders.\(^{60}\)

In southern Italy the UNRRA maintained numerous camps for the Jews streaming across the Adriatic Sea. Soon, these facilities became overtaxed, and the inmates were transferred to “havens in other Allied territory.”\(^{61}\) The reference was to the UNRRA camps in North Africa like, for instance, Camp Marechal Lyautey near Casablanca or Camp Philippeville in Algeria.\(^{62}\)

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 19-20.
\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 18.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 21-23.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 26.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 64.
\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 61-62.
The financial means to bribe officials, procure false identity papers, and obtain ship and rail transport in German-occupied areas was paid for by funds channeled through “neutral” Switzerland and from there to the Jewish organizations in Hungary and elsewhere.63

It is unfortunate that the Board made no references as to the total number of Jews who escaped from Axis territory through its assistance. Here and there the report mentions some figures for particular national Jewish groups, but generally the Board just mentions hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands coming out of German-occupied Europe. The fact that

- at the end of the war, there were 8,000 more Jews in Bulgaria than at the beginning,
- 6,000 Hungarian Jews were found stranded in Rumania after the war,
- 60,000 and more than 100,000 European Jews, respectively, arrived in Israel from Persia and Morocco between 1948 and 1970,
- the Jewish population of Palestine increased by about 100,000 between 1939 and 1945, with only a fraction thereof accounted for by natural net growth,
- the Institute of Jewish Affairs reported 180,000 escaped Jews between the beginning of the war and 1943,
- the U.S. Government’s War Refugee Board and the UNRRA had systematically organized the escape of a stream of refugees through Turkey and southern Italy,

permits us to assume a gigantic flight and evacuation during the war from areas of former German-occupied Europe: it numbered many hundreds of thousands.

63 Ibid., p. 32-33.
EIGHTH CHAPTER:

The World Jewish Population

The Demographic Development before the War

As late as the early 1930s, 9.5 million Jews lived in Europe (incl. the Soviet Union). Almost two-thirds of them either were never in the German sphere of influence or escaped from it. On the other hand, Europe’s Jewish population was in the midst of a process of dissolving its former concentration long before Hitler’s ascension to power. This dissolution was the consequence of a large flow of emigration from eastern European countries, negative net birth rates, conversions and general assimilation tendencies. The economic crisis of the 1930s and the officially managed anti-Jewish measures in Greater Germany, Poland, Rumania, etc., intensified the efforts of Jews to turn their backs on Europe. The outbreak of World War Two finally destroyed their one-time stronghold in Europe, except for a few remnants on the western rim of the Occident.

About one million Jews left Europe before the war. Roughly half a million lived anyway in European countries never occupied by Germany, and between September 1939 and mid-1940 more than two million Jews disappeared in the Soviet Union and shared the fate of the other three million Soviet Jews. Consequently, only 2.8 million Jews remained in the countries that were to come within the German sphere of influence until June 22, 1941. Another three-quarters of a million Jews fell into German hands when Axis troops struck in order to forestall a Soviet attack, bringing the total number of Jews in the German sphere of influence in Europe during the Second World War to 3.5 million.

Of the 5 to 5.5 million Jews in the USSR (1940), one million inhabited from the start the territories outside the maximum German expansion in Russia, close to another million were deported by the Soviets from the western frontier areas to Siberia in the spring of 1940 already, and four-fifths of the remaining 3.5 million Jews withdrew more or less voluntarily with the Red Army in 1941.

1 AJYB, 1932, Vol. 34, p. 251.
Table 16: World Jewish Population in the 1930s  
— by Countries —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (1930)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England (1931)</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar (1931)</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (1926)</td>
<td>3,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta (1920)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (1931)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (1934)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (1930)</td>
<td>6,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (1930)</td>
<td>17,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied Europe</td>
<td>334,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (1930)</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (1934)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (1934)</td>
<td>48,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1930)</td>
<td>356,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (1930)</td>
<td>5,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (1937)</td>
<td>1,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1936)</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (1939)</td>
<td>250,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1928)</td>
<td>72,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (1930)</td>
<td>444,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (1931)</td>
<td>47,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg (1935)</td>
<td>3,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (1935)</td>
<td>111,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (1930)</td>
<td>1,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1931)</td>
<td>3,113,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania (1930)</td>
<td>756,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (1931)</td>
<td>68,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former German-occupied Europe</td>
<td>5,584,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1934)</td>
<td>4,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (1935)</td>
<td>93,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (1923)</td>
<td>155,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union (1939)</td>
<td>3,020,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union and Baltic states</td>
<td>3,273,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9,191,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa, Asia, Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (1931)</td>
<td>110,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (1923)</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (1934)</td>
<td>72,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (1936)</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (1931)</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya (1938)</td>
<td>30,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (French) (1936)</td>
<td>161,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (Span.) (1936)</td>
<td>12,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portug. East Africa (1923)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W. Africa</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangier</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabia (?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria/Lebanon</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transjordan</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia and New Zealand</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, Asia and Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North and South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiana (Brit.)</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama Canal Zone</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Paraguay (1930) 1,200  
Peru (1935) 1,500  
Salvador (1939) 120  
Surinam (1938) 799  
Uruguay (1930) 12,000  
Venezuela (1926) 882  
Latin America 356,414  
Canada (1931) 155,614  
United States (1937) 4,771,122  
North America 4,926,736  
Americas 5,283,150  
World Jewish population 15,840,532

Source: AJYB, 1944, Vol. 46, p. 501 for all countries except Rumania and the Netherlands; for these two countries “estimates” were provided by the Year Book, even though the Dutch census of 1935 registered 111,917 Jews (AJYB, 1940, Vol. 42, p. 602) and Rumania’s census of 1930 found 756,930 Jews (Hilberg, _Destruction of the European Jews_, p. 486).

After World War Two, 2.4 million Jews were found to be alive in the former German-occupied European countries (excl. the USSR); about 300,000 are statistically unaccounted for. Over one million of the more than five million Jews died during the war in the Soviet Union, the largest part either as Red Army men or in Siberian labor and concentration camps. Probably up to 4.3 million Jews survived the war in the Soviet Union, and as late as 1980 prominent Zionist personalities like Dr. Nahum Goldmann estimated the number of Soviet Jews at up to 3.5 million. But meanwhile hundreds of thousands had left the Workers’ Paradise during the past three and a half decades, and considerable negative net birth rates and numerous mixed marriages caused Soviet Jewry to suffer great losses.

Fitting the numerical development of the Jewish population in Europe into that of world Jewry is aggravated by the fact that there are no reliable figures on the actual number of Jews throughout the world. In most countries, Jews are still not considered an ethnic, but a religious minority and, strangely enough, political Zionism was unable so far to persuade the governments of the Western countries with the largest Jewish populations to include them separately in the periodic censuses.

This situation led to large differences in the estimates of the world Jewish population even before the Second World War. As a rule, the Jewish population estimates were too low for the immigration countries, too high for the countries of emigration and, generally, Jewry was endowed with far too large rates of natural increase. This is particularly a problem for the last pre-war figure, namely, the world Jewish population estimated at 16.7 million in 1939. The huge shift of millions of Jews to the East, West and South caused by the war and its aftermath, and the political interest in keeping the
pre-war figure high, made it impossible so far to attain an objective correc-
tion of this number; yet, historical truth demands it.

For most of the countries of the world the latest official and semiofficial
pre-war figures are available only for the early or the middle 1930s. Ex-
ceptions are the United States, Palestine, the Soviet Union and Greater
Germany. On the basis of the last censuses or estimates for the countries
listed in Table 16 one obtains the following summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Figure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North and South America</td>
<td>5,283,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, Africa, Australia</td>
<td>1,365,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries not occupied by Germany</td>
<td>334,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during World War Two</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries outside the area of wartime German influence</td>
<td>6,983,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries inside the area of wartime German influence</td>
<td>5,584,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry outside the USSR and the Baltic countries</td>
<td>12,567,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union and the Baltic states</td>
<td>3,273,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry</td>
<td>15,840,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 17 we listed the census years when the Jewish population of the
individual countries was counted or estimated last before the war. Classified
by periods of time, the summary is as follows (in 1,000):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923/25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926/32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>1,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933/35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936/38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>5,431</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>12,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>3,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>5,431</td>
<td>3,696</td>
<td>15,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years until 1939 (average)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average percentage increase</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Jewish population at the end</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>5,635</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>5,485</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>16,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main countries listed in columns A and B are Lithuania, Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and England. Poland registered a very
small natural increase of only 0.2% for its Jewish population before the war
already; Hungary’s Jews suffered a negative net growth rate. In Czecho-
slovakia and probably in England, the Jewish population was stagnating,
and Rumania’s Jews, too, recorded just a very small natural growth (0.2%)
in the 1930s. The relatively high rate of growth of the small number of Asian
and African Jews cannot possibly have affected the overall rate for these
columns. An average rate of 0.2% seems ample under the circumstances.
Table 17: World Jewish Population in the 1930s – by Census Years –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europe + Asia + Australia + Africa + Americas = World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1925</td>
<td>155,160 1,703 477 157,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3,686 882 4,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>72,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5,000 566 5,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,590,206 17,747 1,607,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,532,216 54,418 112,889 155,614 3,855,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>111,917 23,553 47,800 183,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>116,700 700 72,550 189,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>96,623 229,800 285,545 611,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>240,000 2,653 382,377 150 625,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,755 4,771,122 4,772,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>200 30,046 2,348 32,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>250,448 424,377 620 675,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>756 756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World excl. USSR 6,171,502 741,194 26,206 598,339 5,283,150 12,820,391
1939 USSR 3,020,141 3,020,141
World 9,191,643, 741,194 26,206 598,339 5,283,150 15,840,532

Source: Table 16,

The countries listed in column C are distributed quite evenly among the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Asia/Africa. The small or even totally absent growth rates in Europe were more than offset by the large growth rates in Asia. Still, the applied average rate of 0.7% seems somewhat high. U.S. Jews dominate column D almost completely. Their rate of natural increase is not certain, but we do know that the highly urbanized U.S.-Jewish population recorded much lower net growth rates than the U.S. average; also, other U.S. population sections (for instance, the non-white and the rural white population) were blessed with a growth rate far in excess of the U.S. average of 0.75% (1935-1939). Therefore, an average rate of 0.5% in column D is probably exaggerated. Column E also was provided with a growth for one year, because the Soviet census took place in January of 1939. Here too, it seems that the applied increase of 0.3% is rather generous, because the Soviet-Jewish population stagnated long before the war, as Prof. Lorimer pointed out.

The maximum size of the world Jewish population thus cannot have exceeded 16.04 million in 1939. A scrutiny of Table 17 shows that the census dates of the countries receiving Jewish immigrants in the Western Hemisphere and Palestine happened to fall into the second half of the 1930s, whereas those of the European emigration countries, excepting Germany,

---

were to be found at the beginning of the decade, generally 1930/1931. No question, the census count of many immigration countries included Jews who were also covered by the population statistics of Poland, Rumania, the Baltic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, etc. Considering the half a million Jewish emigrants from Poland in the 1930s and the many tens of thousands from other European countries, it is certain that double counting must have amounted to at least 100,000, probably more. We can be sure that the Jewish world population of 1939 never reached the 16-million mark; it was at least 700,000 smaller than is usually assumed.

The elusiveness of the figure of 16.64 million published by the *Year Book* can be demonstrated another way: For this figure to be true, the Jews would have had to grow by an annual average rate of 1.2% since the last count in the individual countries until 1939. This rate is 50% larger than the populations of North America and Europe with their very large rural population were able to show! This is obvious nonsense.

In the official *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, a similar unreal number may be found for 1939, namely, 16.7 million. The same source also mentioned the worldwide Jewish population for the years 1914 and 1925:4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>13.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>14.8 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An increase by 1.3 million from 13.5 million to 14.8 million within eleven years is equivalent to an annual rate of 0.85%. Before and after these dates, millions of Jews left eastern Europe and emigrated mainly to North America, where their natural increase soon began to decelerate in the new urban commercial environment. Also, the economic crisis of the 1930s produced the same trend to lower birth rates among the Jews as was true for all industrial nations. But an increase to 16.7 million in 1939 would correspond to an average rate of +0.9% per year. Not only would the Jews have had an actual rise in their rate of natural increase, but – contrary to the trend of those years – their fertility would have been considerably larger than was recorded for central and western European countries. This is absurd!

However, an increase by 1.2 million from 14.8 (1925) to 16 million in 1939 would amount only to an average rate of growth of 0.55% per annum. Even this rate would seem rather high in view of the drastically falling Jewish birth rates in eastern Europe, the negative tendencies in some central and southeastern European countries, and a moderate growth in the United States. Still, considering the whole development since 1914, it appears much more realistic. By way of comparison: The U.S. population recorded an average net growth rate of only 0.8% between 1930 and 1939 despite a fast

---

4 *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1971*, Table B/3.
growing non-white and white rural population. In Germany the net rate was 0.7-0.8% (however, there was a decline from 0.9% in 1925 to 0.66% in 1930 and a rise from then on to 0.8% by 1939).

To be sure, the much publicized emigration from Germany and the immigration into Palestine was reflected in the Year Book’s figures, but the considerably larger emigration from eastern Europe was disregarded almost entirely. The fact that the United States had accepted more than 400,000 Jewish refugees and immigrants was made public only in 1943 during hearings of an investigating committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. But those hearings did not receive particular notice. Thus, while Jewish immigration showed up to a small extent in the statistics for the immigration countries, emigration was disregarded in the statistics for eastern Europe. This situation had dire consequences for the ascertainment of the total number of the pre-war Jewish population and the number of missing persons. To all appearances, the overseas immigration countries displayed fewer Jews than actually were present before and after WWII, and the eastern European emigration countries were assigned numbers that were exaggerated by 800,000!

The country-specific investigation in the First and Sixth Chapter points to a net emigration before and during the war of at least 1,121,000 (Table 18). It is possible, though, that this figure does include some negative net growth, because sometimes the data available was just too scanty.

Table 18: Jewish Emigration before and during World War Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>52,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany and Austria</td>
<td>442,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>121,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,121,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: First and Sixth Chapter. The escape of about 30,000 Jews from France in 1940 was not taken into account; they consisted mainly of refugees from Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and thus would in effect constitute a double counting.

Analyzing immigration in the main immigration countries – i.e. Palestine, the United States, Canada, Australia, England, South Africa, France and seven Latin American countries – before the end of WWII, we found 1,059,000 Jews in the Seventh Chapter (Table 14). In addition, there were many other smaller countries which also accepted thousands of Jewish refugees, such as Switzerland, Sweden, New Zealand, China, for instance.

---

It is apparent that the emigration and immigration figures for the period before the end of WWII as developed in this study are more or less balanced, each in effect confirming the other.

*A Question of Millions*

In order to check on the accuracy of the world population figures as published by the *Year Book* for the post-war period (1946), we established two groups which will be looked at separately: The Soviet (or those living in the Soviet Union) and the non-Soviet Jews.

As mentioned above, the world Jewish population of 1939 numbered less than 16 million; of these, 3.02 lived in the Soviet empire; the non-Soviet Jews thus counted fewer than 13 million in 1939. Within a few months, the Soviets acquired millions of Polish, Baltic and Rumanian Jews. On balance, the division looked like this one year later:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Jewish population 1939 (maximum)</th>
<th>16,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deduct:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “Old” Soviet Jews (1939)</td>
<td>3,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Former Polish Jews (1939/1940)</td>
<td>1,867,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Former Baltic Jews (1940)</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Former Rumanian Jews (1940)</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Soviet Jews</td>
<td>5,337,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews outside of the Soviet Union 1940 (maximum)</td>
<td>10,663,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Early in WWII, the rough distribution of these 10.7 million non-Soviet Jews was as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States (1943)</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (1941)</td>
<td>170,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America (1943)</td>
<td>584,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>5,954,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (1939)</td>
<td>424,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (incl. Turkey) (1939)</td>
<td>376,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (1939)</td>
<td>609,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand (1939)</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries <em>not</em> occupied by Germany during the Second World War</td>
<td>384,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries <em>outside</em> the subsequent German sphere of influence</td>
<td>7,782,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries <em>inside</em> the subsequent German sphere of influence 1939</td>
<td>2,952,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews <em>outside</em> the USSR 1939/1943 (maximum)</td>
<td>10,735,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Western Hemisphere no figures were obtainable for 1939. They are therefore somewhat too high and reflect the immigration during the first war years. On the other hand, the population of 384,500 for the unoccupied European countries probably is too low by several tens of thousands. Generally though, the total of 10,663,000 is quite in line with the sum of the individual country groups for the years 1939/1943. It is rather improbable that the post-war figure for the Jews living *outside* the Soviet Union exceeded the pre-war figure, because possible negative net growth rates in Europe during the war, direct war losses (soldiers and partisans killed in combat), chaotic conditions in the German camps during the closing months of the war, Allied bombing raids, etc., may have pushed the total down to at least 10.6 million or below.

Comparing these 10.6 million survivors with the 9 million outside the Soviet Union as published by the *Year Book* for 1946 (*Table 19*), there is a gap of 1½ million.

The *Year Book* figure of 9 million for 1946 includes only 5.75 million Jews in North and South America. But the *Year Book* itself admitted to 5.95 million Jews in this region in the year 1943, and in 1945 and 1946 other hundreds of thousands of Jews coming from devastated Europe had arrived in the New World. Evidently, the *Year Book* understated the 1946-figures for Western Hemisphere by half a million persons.

---

7 See Seventh Chapter.
8 *AJYB*, 1945, Vol. 47, p. 637.
12 In 1939 (before the outbreak of the German-Polish war), 5,044,000 Jews lived in those European countries later occupied by Germany (excl. USSR and Baltic countries) according to *Table 11*. Of these, 1,867,000 Polish and 225,000 Rumanian Jews came within the Soviet empire before the start of the war; there remain 2,952,000.
Table 19: Purported World Jewish Population: 1939 and 1946 – according to the American Jewish Year Book

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1946¹</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. World outside the German sphere of influence in World War Two</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– North and South America</td>
<td>5,489,620</td>
<td>5,756,700</td>
<td>+ 267,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Asia, Africa, Australia</td>
<td>1,494,300</td>
<td>1,647,000</td>
<td>+ 152,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unoccupied Europe</td>
<td>384,500</td>
<td>419,000</td>
<td>+ 34,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,368,420</td>
<td>7,822,700</td>
<td>+ 454,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. German sphere of influence outside the Soviet Union:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Poland</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>– 3,130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>– 305,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Rumania</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>– 550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Other European countries</td>
<td>1,539,700</td>
<td>669,600</td>
<td>– 870,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,999,700</td>
<td>1,144,600</td>
<td>– 4,855,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. World excl. the USSR</td>
<td>13,368,120</td>
<td>8,967,300</td>
<td>– 4,400,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Soviet Union and Baltic states</td>
<td>3,275,000</td>
<td>2,032,500</td>
<td>– 1,242,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. World Jewish Population</td>
<td>16,643,120</td>
<td>10,999,800</td>
<td>– 5,643,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Jewish population in the German sphere of influence (B + D)²</td>
<td>9,274,700</td>
<td>3,177,100</td>
<td>– 6,097,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x The *Year Book* listed the world Jewish population for 1946 as 11,123,800, but an addition of the individual countries totaled only 10,999,800; it is not clear where the difference of 124,000 should be looked for, but it seems the Rumanian figure may be wrong.

y In this table the entire Soviet Union appears as having belonged to the German sphere of influence; in reality, in 1939 one million Jews lived already outside the territory later occupied by German troops.

In Asia, Africa and Australia, too, the actual number of Jews in 1946 was not 1.67 million, as the *Year Book* would like us to believe, but hundreds of thousands more. As we mentioned already, the Jews coming from eastern Europe were moved from camp to camp in western Europe, and many were quartered temporarily in UNRRA camps in the Middle East, Cyprus and North Africa. We know, for instance, that about 200,000 European Jews immigrated into Israel after May 15, 1948, coming from Persia, Morocco and Tunisia (see Seventh Chapter).

The figure of 1.6 million Jews in all of Europe (1,145,000 plus 419,000) as published by the *Year Book* for 1946 also is much too low. We have seen in the Seventh Chapter that roughly one million more Jews had survived in the countries within the former German sphere of influence (excl. the USSR) than was admitted to by the *Year Book*. In addition, the *Year Book* committed an obvious mistake in the case of the Rumanian Jews, because in

---

the following year already the figure for the Jewish population of Rumania was increased by 130,000.

The statistical data published by the *Year Book* become even more doubtful when one realizes that the figure of 11.33 million for 1970 (excl. the USSR) is too low by several hundreds of thousands – despite the huge jump by 30% within only 24 years! The *Year Book* listed only 5.9 million U.S. and 550,000 French Jews. In reality, there were 6.6 million in the United States and almost 700,000 in France.

For 1970, the *Year Book* mentioned the following Jewish population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Europe (excl. France)</td>
<td>837,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Asia (incl. Turkey and Israel)</td>
<td>2,707,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Africa</td>
<td>196,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Latin America</td>
<td>812,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totaling</td>
<td>4,630,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the Canadian census of 1971 listed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in the United States we found (Seventh Chapter)</td>
<td>6,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and in France (Seventh Chapter)</td>
<td>670,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1970, the world Jewish population outside the Soviet Union was at least 12,200,000.

It is almost certain that this figure of 12.2 million for 1970 is too low as well. As mentioned already, an official investigation in France found 150,000 more Jews than was admitted to by the *Year Book*. In other countries the situation may be very similar. The Zionists themselves admit that the Jewish population is suffering from attrition through assimilation in all European countries – in East and West. The number of Jews who fail to appear statistically as Jews because of this development is not known, but the examples of France, where the *Year Book*’s estimate is 20% below the official figure, and of the United States, where more than one million Jews disappeared from the statistics, provide some food for thought. We may be sure that the real number of Jews outside the USSR exceeded 12.3 million in 1970.

In this connection, we find a very interesting piece of information in the *Israel Almanach* (1958-1959), published by the Zionist World Organization (ZWO) headquartered in Jerusalem. We learn from it that the 1.8 million Jews of Israel in 1958 were equivalent to *one-eighth* of the Jewish world population. In effect, this renowned Zionist source was estimating the

---

number of Jews in the world at 14.4 million in 1958. Unfortunately, the ZWO did not provide more detailed figures on this subject, and we are left guessing as to how many Soviet Jews were included in this estimate. Officially, the figure which was current in those days in Zionist literature on the Jews in the USSR was around 2.3 million. Deducting it from the 14.4 million, we arrive at a Jewish population outside the USSR of 12.1 million for 1958. This estimate is very close to our own calculations of at least 12.3 million.

Henri Zoller, the Israel-correspondent of the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, wrote in the summer of 1980 that 80% of the world Jewish population was still living in the diaspora.\footnote{Zoller, Henri. “Israel – Ein Nachtsaely?,” Der Spiegel, No. 37, 9/8/1980, p. 148-149.} Thus, if Israel’s 3¼ million Jews\footnote{Statistical Abstract of Israel 1980, Table II/2.} constituted 20% of world Jewry in early 1980, this one-time Jewish member of the French Resistance is putting the number of Jews in the world at 16.3 million in 1979/1980.

Now, Henri Zoller may not be exactly an expert on questions of Jewish demography, but Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the former president of the World Jewish Congress and one of the most prominent leaders of world Zionism, was one of the best-informed experts on the size of the world Jewish population. Dr. Goldmann, too, stated that 80% of world Jewry was living in the diaspora in early 1980.\footnote{Goldmann, Dr. Nahum. “Aus Sorge um Israel,” Die Zeit, No. 29, 7/11/1980, pp. 13f. A short time before his death, Dr. Goldmann was still more specific: in Der Spiegel (“Israels Regierung hat das Volk betrogen,” No. 34, August 28, 1982, p. 9); he narrowed Israel’s share of the world Jewish population down to less than 20%; applying this rate to Israel’s Jewish population of 3.2 million, Dr. Goldmann, in effect, placed world Jewry at over 16.5 million.} In other words, only one-fifth was to be found in Israel. Dr. Goldmann rounded his figure for Israel to 3.5 million. Official Israeli statistics mention only 3¼ million Jews for early 1980. On the basis of these 3¼ million, one arrives at 16.3 million Jews in the world according to Dr. Goldmann.

Contacted by personal letter, Dr. Goldmann replied that Soviet Jews counted 3 to 3.5 million in 1980.\footnote{Goldmann, Dr. Nahum. Private letter dated 2/13/1981.} Deducting the upper end of his estimate, let us say 3.4 million, from the world Jewish population of 16.3 million, there remain 12.9 million Jews in the world outside the USSR.

It is noteworthy that Dr. Goldmann’s admission is putting him squarely in the corner of the Jewish dissidents in the USSR with regard to the number of Jews in the Soviet Union. If he places the number of Soviet Jews at 3 to 3.5 million in 1980, he is saying in effect that in the early 1970s there were 3.5 to 4 million Jews in the Soviet Union. After all, one-quarter of a million Jews left the Workers’ Paradise during the past decade, and the excess of...
deaths over births may have reached up to one per cent per year for the Soviet-Jewish population during that period, or about 200,000.

Ostensibly, the development of world Jewry looked like this during the past forty years:

**Purported World Jewish Population outside the USSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Changes (Mio.)</th>
<th>Period (Years)</th>
<th>Average Annual Changes in percent since</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1940 1946 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>−1.6</td>
<td>−2.7 0.5 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>+3.3</td>
<td>0.5 1.1 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that the entire increase for the last 9 years amounted to just 0.6 million (or even less). This is quite a contrast to the thirty years prior to this, which were characterized by extremely large plus and minus changes but which, as the whole, recorded a most remarkable increase of 1.7 million.

The suspicion is not unfounded that the contrary developments before and after 1946 are directly connected with each other. To be sure, one could blame the reduction between 1940 and 1946 on the German measures within the so-called “Final Solution,” but there is no sensible explanation for the unheard of “fertility” between 1946 and 1970, namely, +1.3% p.a.!

The almost totally urbanized world Jewish population – which lived almost entirely in the large urban centers in the East and West and which not only recorded a birth rate that has been dropping for generations, but also suffered a relatively low net growth rate before the war already – would have demonstrated a fertility after the war close to the biological limit and nearly equivalent to the population growth in the developing countries.\(^{21}\) This is pure fantasy!

There is only one reasonable conclusion: The figure published by the *Year Book* for the world Jewish population outside the USSR in 1946 did not conform to reality. Political reasons were decisive for putting the number so low. Leaving aside the *Year Book*’s obviously manipulated figure for 1946, the 40-year demographic development of world Jewry outside the Soviet Union begins to look much more realistic:

\(^{21}\) *AJYB*, 1980, Vol. 81, pp. 61f.: Since the middle of the 1960s at the latest, there has been a drastic drop in births.
The development evident from the above compilation shows no contrast between the time before and after 1970. The growth rate for the 30-year-period before 1970 was relatively large despite the losses in WWII, because it also included the short-lived Jewish baby boom of the immediate post-war period. This growth of 0.5% per year until 1970 of the highly urbanized extra-Soviet world Jewish population is relatively large and represents conclusive evidence that the losses suffered in the war were relative small – at least as far as the Jews outside the Soviet Union are concerned.

At first glance it is surprising to see the growth rate maintain this level after 1970 as well, despite the reduction of the birth rate in all industrial countries since the early 1960s. This seemingly high rate of 0.5%, however, reflects also the quarter of a million Jews who emigrated from the USSR in the last decade. It is correct, of course, that Israel’s immigrant population registered notable growth rates even after 1970, but all Zionist statements regarding the Jewish population in the rest of the Western World and in eastern Europe point to a drastic aging process and frequent negative net growth rates.22

---

22 Ibid., 1969, Vol. 70, p. 275:

In all diaspora Jewish communities for which we have data, the proportion of elderly and old people is greater than in the surrounding general population. This is basically due to low fertility over the last few decades. [...] Contributory factors may be the differential impact of withdrawals and a recent negative migration balance, involving particularly younger adults. [...] more than half of some European Jewish populations are above the age of 40. In Europe and America the aging of the Jewish populations has led to an exaggerated proportion of persons no longer participating in reproduction while being subject to the comparatively high age-specific mortality of the elderly.

The AJYB (pp. 274-275) goes on:

The population dynamics of the Jews in Europe, the Americas, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand should be viewed in the context of their socio-economic position. These Jews have a strong tendency toward urbanization, educational attainment, and concentration in white-collar occupations and higher income brackets. In most of these countries, the relatively small or highly dispersed Jewish communities are strongly affected by environmental influences, secularization and assimilation. [...] The keynote is the very low level of Jewish fertility. In all countries for which data are available, including the United States, the fertility of the Jews is below that of the general population. In several countries it has fallen below replacement level. After a short-lived post-World War II baby boom, Jewish birth figures declined in the 1950s.
The demographic development of the Jews in the Soviet Union was discussed before, and there is no reason to repeat the statistical details at this point. Adding the 3½ million Soviet Jews – as confirmed by Soviet-Jewish dissidents, the Encyclopaedia Judaica and Dr. Goldmann – to the almost 13 million Jews outside the USSR, one obtains a total of 16.5 million for world Jewry. This is about half a million more than in 1940! The losses of at least one million during the war – mainly while serving in the Red Army, during the more or less forcible Soviet evacuation to Siberia, and in the Siberian labor camps – caused the Jewish world population to drop below the 15-million-mark. Since the end of WWII, it multiplied by at least 1.5 million, and thus more than compensated for the losses incurred as a result of the war and Soviet barbarism. This is equivalent to a worldwide net growth of 0.4% p.a. since the end of the war.

Even today the world Jewish population figures still reflect the political interests of Zionism, and estimating “mistakes” usually lead to figures for the post-war Jewish populations which are too low. Nevertheless, the ever more frequent larger population statistics for the USSR represent a fundamental admission by Zionism that the original post-war figures were much too low. Slowly, but steadily, they are working themselves toward the real world Jewish population size – even though the means applied are implicit, unrealistic assumptions regarding Jewish fertility.

The purpose of this analysis was not to investigate the content of truth in the “Holocaust” story, but to outline the extent and the direction of the Jewish population movement before, during and after World War Two. If the developments as traced here are in conflict with the taboos of contemporary historians, it is their task to reconsider an untenable position.

Even though the well-known “Holocaust” figures are of only minor interest in this study, it is necessary, nevertheless, to sketch the main controversial positions as far as the statistical data is concerned. Between 1939 and 1946, the Year Book found that the world Jewish population had been reduced by one-third from 16.64 million to 11 million (Table 19). Admittedly, the largest reduction was registered by today’s Communist countries, but for the USSR itself the loss was put at “only” 1¼ million. In contrast, the countries beyond the former German sphere of influence recorded a plus of almost half a million Jews, obviously largely the result of migratory gains.

The fact that the political boundaries of 1946 in no way corresponded with those of 1939 – especially in the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and the Soviet Union – was not mentioned at all by the Year Book, let alone taken into account in the determination of war losses. Only in the case of Rumania did the Year Book mention that the post-war borders excluded northern Bukovina and Bessarabia; yet this footnote was not reflected in the purported number of “missing” Rumanian Jews. The annexa-
tion of eastern Poland (1939) and Ruthenia (1945) by the USSR was completely disregarded. In short, a comparison of Jewish population statistics for 1939 and 1946 is incorrect in principle.

Certainly, this would make no difference as far as the total number of “missing” persons is concerned, if the figures for 1939 and 1946 were correct. But the crucial question is precisely how reliable these figures are. After all, it was the Soviet Union which acquired most of the Polish Jews in 1939/1940, besides hundreds of thousands of Rumanian and Baltic Jews. Any observer would immediately recognize the dubiousness of the “missing” figures, if the comparison would depict the fact that the bulk of the “missing” Jews is ascribed to that country which, with regard to falsification, lies, deception and statistical manipulation, is in a class by itself, and whose inhuman “scorched earth” initiatives forced tens of millions of people from all walks of life to move from the embattled areas to Siberia during the war.

Adjusting the pre-war figures to take account of the border changes and population movements until 1941, an entirely different picture develops (Table 20). To be sure, this table, too, points to five million “missing” Jews and creates the erroneous impression that eight million Jews came within the German sphere of influence, but otherwise it presents a very different view.

First of all, we see that the Jewish population outside the former German sphere of influence in 1946 is too low by hundreds of thousands (point A). A reduction by 200,000 in the Western Hemisphere during the interim years, when hundreds of thousands of Jews immigrated from Europe, is hardly in conformity with reality.

Secondly, the table shows clearly that the vast bulk of the “missing” Jews must be sought in the Soviet Union.

Assuming that the Jewish population of the Western Hemisphere maintained its size between 1943 and the end of the war, that the losses on the Soviet side exceeded one million, that the surviving post-war Jewish population numbered more than four million in the Soviet Union, and that the number of Jews who left Europe after the war – although “officially” unaccounted for – reached one million, the comparison with 1941 produces considerable differences with the current version of contemporary historians. These corrections were made on Table 21. There we see that the worldwide losses suffered by the Jews during the Second World War were in the neighborhood of 1¼ million – 8% of world Jewry – caused largely not by the direct impact of the war, i.e. those killed in action, but by Soviet barbarism. Over two hundred thousand remain unaccounted for. This latter worldwide figure agrees roughly with the missing figure of about 300,000 calculated for Europe in the Seventh Chapter.
Table 20: Purported World Jewish Population: 1941 and 1946

1941: according to results of this analysis
1946: according to the American Jewish Year Book (in 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1946 (^x)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. World outside the German sphere of influence in World War Two</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– North and South America</td>
<td>5,955 (‘43)</td>
<td>5,757</td>
<td>– 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Asia, Africa, Australia</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>+ 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unoccupied Europe</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>+ 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,783</td>
<td>7,823</td>
<td>+ 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. German sphere of influence outside the Soviet Union:(^x)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Poland</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>– 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>– 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Rumania</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Other European countries</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>– 841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>–1,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. World excl. the USSR</td>
<td>10,521</td>
<td>8,967</td>
<td>–1,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Soviet Union, Baltic countries and Ruthenia</td>
<td>5,446</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>–3,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. World Jewish Population</td>
<td>15,967</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>–4,967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of which:

| F. Jewish population in the German sphere of influence in the years 1941–1945 (B + D)\(^y\) | 8,184 | 3,178 | –5,006 |

\(^x\) For 1941, see Table 11 excl. Ruthenia.
\(^y\) In this table the entire Soviet Union was listed as having belonged to the German sphere of influence; in reality, in early 1941 only 3¾ million Jews lived in the area later occupied by German troops (disregarding the Ruthenian Jews).

Regardless of whether one traces the development of the Jewish population in Europe country by country or more generally for the world, the missing remainder seems to narrow to two or three hundred thousand. Even this figure has no claim on absolute certainty. Available data on population size, migration, flight and deportation, fertility and mortality rates, mixed marriages and assimilation tendencies often are so vague that it would not have been surprising to obtain a statistically unaccounted difference which is larger by several hundreds of thousands or near zero.
Table 21: Probable World Jewish Population: 1941 and 1945
(in 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. World outside the German sphere of influence in World War Two</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– North and South America 5,955 (‘43)</td>
<td>5,955</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Asia, Africa, Australia</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>+ 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unoccupied Europe</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>+ 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,783</td>
<td>8,021</td>
<td>+ 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. German sphere of influence outside the Soviet Union acc. to Table 11 but excl. Ruthenia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Poland</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>– 517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>– 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Rumania</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Other European countries</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>– 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>– 1,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. World excl. the USSR</td>
<td>10,521</td>
<td>9,464</td>
<td>– 1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Soviet Union, Baltic states and Ruthenia</td>
<td>5,446*</td>
<td>4,301</td>
<td>– 1,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Number of Jews who left Europe during and shortly after World War Two and who could not be traced statistically</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>+ 965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. World Jewish Population</td>
<td>15,967</td>
<td>14,730</td>
<td>– 1,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Jewish losses in the Red Army, in Siberian labor and concentration camps, etc.</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Statistically unaccounted for</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the 5.5 million Jews, approximately 700,000 Soviet Jews fell into German hands besides the roughly 100,000 Ruthenian Jews. On balance, no more than 3.5 million Jews were ever under German control during World War Two.

The Great Migration

Today’s dispersion of the Jews in all parts of the world is without precedent in Jewish history. What irony of fate that just in the age when a political force – Zionism – finally gave geographic substance to the old yearning “Next year in Jerusalem,” assimilation in the diaspora became the driving force in a process of dissolution that may prove fatal in the end.

The Second World War destroyed Jewry in Europe as an important, geographically concentrated population group for all time. Other centers appeared in the place of Europe – the United States, Israel and the Soviet Union – and one may presume that these three countries include 80% of world Jewry within their borders today. Basically, the world’s Jewish pop-
ulation never was as divided and dispersed throughout the world as it is at present.

But this process of dissolution did not start with the Jewish drama in World War Two, or with the growing anti-Semitism in the 1930s, or with the division of Eastern Jewry following the establishment of Soviet might on the ruins of Tsarist Russia. It began in the second half of the 19th Century with the swelling Jewish westward drive, when literally millions of Eastern Jews poured into the melting pot across the ocean.

At the end of the 19th Century almost 90% of all Jews in the world lived in Europe, and within Europe almost exclusively in an area whose “borders” ran from Lithuania through Poland to Hungary, turning east to the Sea of Azov and from there, encompassing the Ukraine and White Russia, north towards the Baltic countries. In those days, world Jewry was concentrated in three European countries, but, nevertheless, occupied a relatively well-defined geographic core. More important, the Jewish population in this area was rather homogeneous with regard to language (Yiddish) and religion (little secularization).

The so-called dispersion of the Jews throughout the world was nothing but a fable until the end of the 19th Century. It became a reality only in the 20th Century. The emigration of millions of Jews to America, the accelerated migration to the east and north within the Soviet Union during the last war, as well as the settlement of Palestine after World War One brought about the dissolution of Eastern Jewry, which seemed so stable just three generations ago, and dispersed them to all corners of the earth.

Today, four-fifths of the Jews live in regions where a hundred years ago not even three per cent of world Jewry could be found, i.e. the Western Hemisphere, Israel, Russia proper (excluding the Ukraine and White Russia), Siberia, Africa and Australia. On the other hand, most of the historic regions of the traditional diaspora are almost entirely without Jews today; this applies especially to eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East.

This process continued uninterruptedly after the last war. It is, however, very difficult to obtain a rough outline of this development since 1945 because of a whole barrage of problems. Not only does the political character of Jewish population statistics make every “official” publication of relative data suspect, but the signs of disintegration in the course of accelerated secularization and assimilation tendencies in East and West, plus the difficulty in obtaining reliable data on Soviet Jewry, burden every attempt to trace the demographic development of world Jewry during the last 35 years.

---

Nevertheless, there is great unanimity that the USA, Israel and the Soviet Union together account for 80% of the world’s Jews. The other fifth is composed of Jews in Europe, Latin America, South Africa, Australia and North African and Asian countries. No differences of opinion exist either on the generally largely urban character of world Jewry, and its much lower fertility than the surrounding gentile population. Only the Israelis register a healthy birth rate. In many countries – today probably in most – negative net growth rates replaced formerly small positive ones, and the trend toward assimilation and mixed marriages places a real question mark on the survival of the Jewish people outside Israel.

When looking into country-specific data, Zionist statistics suddenly become confused, even contradictory. Some Zionist experts insist on accepting the official Soviet statistics on Soviet Jewry (Schmelz), others are convinced that they underestimate the number of Jews in the USSR by 50% or more (Goldmann, Zand), while a third group prefers a figure somewhere in between (Shapiro). Keep in mind, in just this one case millions of people are involved, and the “Holocaust” story is affected directly by the final outcome of this controversy. As if this were not enough, some place the natural increase of post-war Soviet Jews at up to +1% p.a. (Shapiro), while others take it for granted that they actually suffered huge net growth deficits of up to −1% p.a. in part (Schmelz).

Similar inconsistencies could be listed for the United States, where the Jewish population was unscrupulously “reduced” to 5.4 million (1971: 6.1 million, and at the end of the war: 5 million), even though half a million Jews immigrated meanwhile as a matter of record, and the excess of births over deaths in the late 1940s, in the 1950s and in the 1960s added almost another million.

The way the Year Book sees the development of world Jewry since 1945 can be seen in Table 22. For the United States, whose Jewish population was listed much too low for 1946 already, one finds a drastic drop since the early 1970s. For the Soviet Union, whose Jews suffered drastic negative birth rates throughout the entire post-war period, a positive growth rate of 1% per year was applied until 1970. The other countries of the world purportedly lost only 0.7 million Jews between 1945 and 1970. This contradicts the fact that Israel and the United States alone received more than one million Jewish immigrants from there, and that the over-aged Jewish population remaining behind in Europe registered huge negative growth rates in part.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6x</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Israel</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>+1.6x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.4x</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.1x</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deduct:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry outside</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.5x</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In an analysis published in the Year Book, the Israeli demographer Prof. U.O. Schmelz from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem listed annual rates of natural increase or decrease for the following countries:\(^{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Net Fertility Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (Sao Paulo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Paris):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– European Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Oriental Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Brussels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union (RSFSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since then, a further drop in Jewish fertility rates occurred in almost all countries of the world. Still, we should emphasize that at least in the United States and Canada the Jewish population developed more favorably in the first two decades after the war.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp. 68 and 69.
The above-mentioned Jewish growth rates in the individual countries correspond much more closely to the population changes as traced in this study than with those utilized by the *Year Book*. Our investigation, which is based largely on Zionist sources, showed that world Jewry was clearly less than 15 million in 1945 but exceeded 16 million just as surely in 1980. The extremely low fertility rates of world Jewry – Israel excepted – simply did not permit a faster growth. The probable development of the Jewish population, and the factors behind it – migration or fertility – have been recorded in *Tables 23 and 24*.

*Table 23* shows that the 14.7 million surviving Jews multiplied by 0.4% annually between 1945 and 1970; but the smallness of the rise was almost exclusively due to the decrease of the Soviet Union’s post-war Jewish population, whose losses of men in the ranks of the Red Army, untold deaths in Siberian labor camps, and multitudes of mixed marriages effected a drastically dropping birth rate. In the last decade – signs of this were visible in the 1960s already – the Jewish population of the Western World had no further growth, Israel excepted. One might even say that from here on world Jewry will grow only as much as Israelis overcompensate for the net deficits in the USSR – and this, too, is becoming ever more questionable, as Israel’s excess of births over deaths begins to shrink and the deficit of the Jews in the USSR grows year by year.

*Table 23: Probable World Jewish Population Development:*

1945, 1970 und 1979 (in millions)

– according to results of this study –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>–0.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine or Israel</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of world</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>–1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–0.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deduct:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>–0.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry outside the Soviet Union</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today, only Israel has a growing Jewish population, and until two decades ago this was also true in the United States. The Soviet Union and the group of the remaining countries in the world (within this group there were noticeable changes) registered a continually falling number of their Jewish population.
The percentage distribution of world Jewry can be seen in Table 24. In 1945, the United States and Israel (Palestine) accounted for 40%, but today for more than 60%. In the Soviet Union – which contained more than one-third of world Jewry in 1940 – there were still almost 30% of the world’s Jews in 1945 despite the huge wartime losses of men and among the internees in Siberian labor camps. By 1980, this share had fallen to about 20%. A similar reduction in the share of Jews was recorded by the rest of the countries of the world: From 30% at the end of the war to about 20% in 1979/80.

While 80% of world Jewry today may be found outside the USSR, and of these, in turn, 80% in just two countries – USA and Israel – only time will tell whether or not this development really was a net gain for the once immensely fertile Eastern European Jewry. The Jews in the U.S. seem to have entered a phase of low, much too low fertility and assimilation tendencies, and the rapidly rising phenomenon of mixed marriages promises large losses for the future. Only in Israel did a young Jewish population persist. But here it is essentially the Oriental Jews who provide a healthy birth rate and who finally may shape the future and culture of this island nation in an Arabian sea – if the dams don’t break.

**Table 24: Distribution of World Jewry:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Israel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Jewry</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>deduct:</strong> Soviet Union</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewry outside the Soviet Union</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 23.
EPILOGUE:

Sanning Put to the Test

by Germar Rudolf

A New Hope

The present book is not about the Holocaust – that is at least what the author claims on page 192 of the present study. But that is more wishful thinking than reality. Of course, the core issue of the present study is the big elephant which is always present when Jewish demographic developments during World War Two are discussed: Many of the mystical Six Million Jewish victims are said to have died in the various homicidal gas chambers of the Third Reich’s camps, the largest and most notorious of which – with the highest claimed death tolls – are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>claimed Jewish death toll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auschwitz</td>
<td>≈1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treblinka</td>
<td>≈800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belzec</td>
<td>≈600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobibor</td>
<td>≈250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelmno</td>
<td>≈150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>≈1,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to this, somewhere between 1,300,000 and 3,000,000 Jews are said to have been executed either by shooting or in so-called “gas vans” behind the German-Russian front. Finally, victims of all kinds of atrocities, mistreatments and neglect in other camps and in ghettos are said to make up the bulk of the rest to reach the Six Million. Since, as indicated, all these numbers vary widely, pinning down how many Jews died under which circumstances and where is almost impossible.

With all these variations going on, it should strike one as rather peculiar that the Six Million number itself is a seemingly invariable constant.

---

1 Claims as to the actual death toll vary wildly. I have given the most widely accepted figures here. See the respective chapters in my book Lectures on the Holocaust (2nd ed., The Barnes Review, Washington, DC, 2010) for more details.
However, if one realizes that the emblematic number of Six Million suffering and dying Jews has been around since the late 1800s, that is to say: well before the outbreak of the FIRST(!) World War, as Don Heddesheimer was first to point out with a thorough study,⁴ then it might dawn upon the reader that we are dealing here not with a number arrived at with thorough demographic studies, but with a purely mythical symbol of political import.

Attempts at determining the Jewish death toll during World War Two are numerous, since every major work addressing this topic includes some kind of accounting.⁵ But until the first edition of the present work was published in 1983, no monograph dedicated exclusively to this topic existed, which is quite astounding, considering the importance of this issue.

How should one react to a book that proclaims that the Jews suffered a far lower death toll than Six Million during World War Two? Is such a message a reason to rejoice and hope, or a reason to become angry and to attack the messenger? The latter is no doubt the way many if not most people react – but why?

Everyone who insists with zeal that at least Six Million Jews must have fallen victim to Nazi persecution should examine their own motives for doing so. For shouldn’t it be the normal reaction to find hope and comfort in the thought that fewer people died in a catastrophe than heretofore believed? The “Holocaust,” however, is not a normal catastrophe. It comes with all the hallmarks of a religion, and questioning any detail of it, as Sanning does in the present book, inexorably provokes the ire of the devotees and high priests of the religion. Hence, when the present book was first published, expecting it to be welcome by the mainstream with exultation was too much to hope. Insults and ad hominem attacks against the author were more likely.

The first edition of the present book was honored by two mainstream historical periodicals with reviews, something which is nowadays quite unheard of for revisionist publications,⁶ although the quality of these reviews was quite poor, as they merely contain unfounded suppositions and innuendoes rather than address any of the core issues at hand.⁷ However, since giving any credence or respect to iconoclastic, i.e. revisionist publi-

---

⁵ The earliest and at once most prominent ones being Reitlinger’s *The Final Solution*, and Hilberg’s *The Destruction of the European Jews*, ch. VIII, section 3.
cations may cause a lot of trouble for anyone doing so, not much more could be expected. That this book caused quite some discomfort in the ranks of the academic Holocaust orthodoxy can be gleaned from Henry Huttenbach’s review:

*The danger of this book (and of those that will doubtlessly follow) is its clever veneer of scholarship. [...] Not one in a thousand undergraduates could find fault with it; only a few more graduates would be competent to identify its flaws and to convincingly question its credibility. The ultimate danger lies in the lack of a serious response to this continuing wave of attacks on history itself.*

Hence, what had to be expected was the publication of a major mainstream monograph that would lay claim to refuting Sanning by proving “once and for all” that Six Million Jews died during the Holocaust indeed.

*The Empire Strikes Back*

And so it happened: Eight years after Sanning had presented his research results to the Anglophone and German publics, the German official Institute for Contemporary History (*Institut für Zeitgeschichte*) published an impressive 584-page study titled *Dimension des Völkermords* (Dimension of the Genocide). It is an anthology consisting of 17 individual contributions (plus the editor’s introduction), each written by an expert in the field of Jewish demography for a particular European country that fell under the influence of Nazi rule at any point between 1933 and 1944. The editor of this anthology, Dr. Wolfgang Benz, at that time Professor for Research of Anti-Semitism in Berlin, summarized the results of this study as follows:

*The bottom line indicates a minimum of 5.29 and a maximum of just over 6 million* [Jewish victims of the Holocaust].

Needless to say that Benz forestalls any suspicions by denying that the purpose of the demographic research project coordinated by him had been “to prove any pre-set figure (‘six million’),” although that is inevitably the impression one gets.

Now, 584 pages of thorough research by 18 expert authors should spell doom for the slender 200-page book written by the lone-wolf author Walter N. Sanning aka Wilhelm Niederreiter. But both books cannot be compared, really. While Sanning focused exclusively on demographic statistics and

---

8 I am not sure what makes those contributing authors experts in demographics, but I take it that, by studying their subject in depth, they at least have become experts during the course of their preparatory research. 16 of the 18 contributing authors have a PhD title, and six of them are professors.


ignored everything else, like anti-Jewish measures implemented in various countries and the alleged means, locations and numbers of mass murders perpetrated, Benz et al. present elaborate peripheral matters for their readers. Each one of their contributions starts out with a summary of the history of the Jews in the country under discussion, and then gives a detailed account of all the anti-Jewish laws, measures and events that took place there. The size of Benz’s book is thus no indication of its statistically relevant contents, nor is that of Sanning’s indicative of any deficiency.

But what about the part of Benz’s book which does address statistical issues? Does it refute or even address Sanning’s claims?

The first surprising fact of Benz’s anthology is that Sanning’s book is mentioned only by one author, and then only in a footnote almost at the very end of the book. There one reads:11

“The author [Sanning] distinguishes himself through his methodologically unsound handling of the statistical material as well as through daring and demonstrably erroneous reasoning and conclusions.”

The huge discrepancy between the works’ final death toll make it seem obvious that this had to be this anthology’s conclusion, if not already its starting hypothesis. However, the reader’s hope to find out in which way Sanning handled the statistical material wrongly and why his reasoning and conclusions are erroneous is disappointed. All that is provided in Benz’s book is the above mere claim with nothing to back it up.

Again, it is absolutely imperative for mainstream historians not to grant revisionists even a semblance of respect, so they hardly, if ever, quote revisionist works, let alone discuss any of their claims, reasoning and conclusions. If revisionist works are mentioned at all, then usually only in mere passing with unfounded derogatory remarks and often even with invectives against their authors, although the latter can fortunately not be found in Benz’s work. Hence nothing more than this footnote could be expected from these “reputable” scholars.

---

What one has to expect, though, is at least a “serious response” to Sanning’s contested claims, as Prof. Huttenbach had demanded – if only implicitly by refuting them without repeating or mentioning them – so that serious students of history may be equipped with the tools they need in order to see through the alleged web of lies spun by revisionists like Sanning.

The Return of the Jedi

When I learned about the existence of Benz’s anthology in 1992, I had to find out whether it contained powerful arguments which could refute Sanning’s hypotheses. I read both books in parallel and made notes along the way pertaining to the population data each book provides for each country, as well as how and why they differ, if at all. After finishing my survey, I used this data to write a paper which I planned on publishing in a revisionist anthology edited by me at that time. I sent an early version of this paper to Herr Niederreiter (aka Sanning), asking him for his comments. Unfortunately he had suffered a stroke a short while before this, so he managed to send me only a few comments. Mr. Niederreiter passed away shortly afterwards. My paper comparing Sanning’s and Benz’s works was therefore published without major changes. The following is a brief summary of the most important of my findings.

On the positive side, Benz’s book impresses with its richness and thoroughness of the statistical source material used by each author analyzing a certain country. Most authors obviously had full access to the archival resources of the countries they were investigating. In this regard, Benz far excels Sanning, who had to make do with far less material.

On the downside, the editor Wolfgang Benz did a bad job coordinating the work of each author involved in the project. Since the borders of many countries in Europe shifted considerably during and after the Second World War, it would have been mandatory to agree up front on certain borders, so that no area where sovereignty changed during the investigated time span is left untreated or is counted twice or even multiple times. Because this was not done, 533,193 alleged Holocaust victims were counted twice.

The result of a country-by-country comparison of Benz’s and Sanning’s data for the countries which in some way came under German influence during World War Two is given in Table 25. It reveals that, by and large, the data both books come up with are relatively similar in most cases. Really

---

decisive differences of more than 100,000 missing persons exist only in three cases highlighted in italics: Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union.

Sanning’s figure for Hungary is based on the assumption that only few Hungarian Jews were deported to German labor camps in the spring and summer of 1944, while mainstream historiography insists that some 400,000 Hungarian Jews shared that fate. Sanning bases his assumption on arguments first brought forward by Arthur Butz. Butz’s thesis, in turn, has been challenged even by revisionists, and in a 1993 letter to me, Mr. Niederreiter indicated that he changed his position in this regard and assumes that several hundred thousand Hungarian Jews were indeed deported to Germany in spring/summer 1944 – although for forced labor rather than for wholesale slaughter, as orthodox historiography claims.

This leaves us with only two countries where Sanning and Benz profoundly disagree: Poland and the USSR. Hence, the core of the issue lies in the fate of the Jews of these two countries.

---


Digging deeper into Benz’s anthology, I revealed another way the Holocaust figure is inflated by it. This time it is not a matter of incompetence, but one of premeditation. It is based on the highly dubious method applied by Benz and his colleagues to ascertain the death toll for each country. This method is basically based upon a simple difference between pre-war and post-war population sizes. All of the following reasons why the number of Jews in a country could have been reduced were simply lumped together as German Holocaust victims:

- death due to Soviet deportation and imprisonment
- death as partisan (battle or execution)
- death as soldier/killed in combat
- death due to pogroms by non-Germans, without German collaboration or sanction
- death due to effects of war (labor service, bombing victims)
- natural excess of deaths over births
- religious conversions
- unregistered emigration during and after the war
- Jews not statistically registered or identified as Jews today

The first point is particularly important in this context, since one of Sanning’s emphases is on the fate of Jews under Soviet rule. In Benz’s anthology, on the other hand, all these many complex issues are basically ignored. Symptomatic for this is the following statement by Prof. Dr. Gert Robel, author of the contribution on the Soviet Union, about the reasons for the demographic decline of Soviet Jewry:

\[
\text{It [the number of Jewish Holocaust victims in the USSR] also includes the casualties among Jewish soldiers and civilians [partisans] as well as those who succumbed to the strain of flight and to starvation.}
\]

\[
\text{This is justified. They too were victims of violent National Socialist policies.}
\]

Robel neither quantifies these categories, nor does he give reasons for this catch-all approach, for these are the closing words of this book. This is a convenient sleight of hand, though, as it puts the blame for all of Stalin’s wartime victims squarely on Germany’s shoulders and thus relieves Robel from the potentially unrewarding duty to conduct any in-depth investigation into the scope and scale of Soviet deportations and evacuations. If all casualties caused by the war are Germany’s fault, and if therefore all Jewish

---

15 That flawed approach was also recognized by German historian Prof. Dr. Ernst Nolte in an expert report (in: Germar Rudolf, Resistance is Obligatory, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2012, p. 278):

\[
\text{Wolfgang Benz […] in fact proceeds from the premise worthy of critique that one could be able to determine the number of victims of the National Socialist measures of extermination by comparing the number of Jews in statistics before and after the Second World War.}
\]

casualties count as German Holocaust victims, then why bother looking into how, where and in whose hands they died?

It is therefore not surprising that Robel doesn’t bother getting involved in this issue. Hence, regarding the all-decisive topic of Soviet evacuations and deportations immediately prior to and after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Robel suggests merely that there are no systematic accounts of their extent and scope. He dismisses this very important aspect in merely two paragraphs with the comment that Stalin did not wish to provoke Hitler with evacuation activities, and that there were therefore hardly any noteworthy deportations. This claim is backed up with – nothing.

In contrast to this, Sanning devoted four entire chapters to the subject of Jews under the rule of the Soviet Union, with two of them focusing on Stalin’s mass evacuations and deportations.

As for Poland, Benz’s and Sanning’s opposing positions can be summarized as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
& \text{Benz} & \text{Sanning} \\
\hline
\text{1931 population} & 3,100,000 & 3,100,000 \\
\text{pre-war fertility} & \text{high (1.4% p.a.)} & \text{low (0.2% p.a.)} \\
\text{1931-1939 emigration} & 100,000 & 500,000 \\
\text{pre-war population} & 3,350,000 & 2,664,000 \\
\text{fled to Russia/Rumania in 1939} & 300,000 & 850,000 \\
\text{German-occupied western Poland (late 1939)} & 2,000,000 & 760,000 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

For details and page numbers see my study mentioned in footnote 12.

While Sanning devotes roughly 20 pages of intensive and thoroughly documented analysis to the problem of the demographic development of Polish Jewry in the years 1931-1939, Benz’s Poland author Prof. Dr. Frank Golczewski deals with this important issue in only two sentences:  

“[…] if we extrapolate the census figures [of 1931], taking into account natural increase and emigration, we arrive at a 1939 total population of 35,100,000 persons for the Polish nation as a whole, of which the Jewish component is estimated at 3,446,000. We repeat: these figures are not certain […]”

Golczewski simply assumes, without even making the slightest effort to investigate this topic, that the highly urbanized and persecuted Jews had the same growth and emigration rates as the rural Christian Poles.

The same guesswork is involved when Golczewski deals with the eastward mass flight of the Jews at the outbreak of the war. His figure is simply based on estimates, claiming that there are no reliable figures. Even

---

though that may be true, estimates can still be based on circumstantial evidence as presented by Sanning, but Golczewski decided to simply ignore them and conjure up some figures out of thin air.

As bad as all this sounds for Benz, it gets worse still, because the real Achilles’ heel of Benz’s anthology isn’t even his ridiculously superficial and incompetent treatment of Polish and Soviet Jewry. The biggest flaw of Benz’s book is that it does not contain even a single paragraph on the problem of Jewish post-war emigration from Europe. It does not even mention that there was a large-scale migration after the war, especially of the European population of Jewish faith, which has become known as the modern Exodus (as celebrated, for example, in the name of the iconic 1960 movie starring Paul Newman!)

The first ten chapters of Benz’s anthology are conspicuous in their lack of any mention of post-war emigration, while others (Greece and Yugoslavia) fashion a fig-leaf for themselves by admitting to a few hundreds or thousands who left the country after the war’s end.

Hence, exactly in the areas where Sanning’s work impresses – mainly the fates of Jews in Poland and in the USSR as well as the Jewish Exodus during and after World War Two – Benz is completely and utterly silent.

One important characteristic of a scholarly work is that it mentions and addresses the arguments raised by other works in this area. Since Benz’s anthology appeared eight years after Sanning’s monograph, it would have been absolutely imperative to mention and thoroughly discuss Sanning’s arguments. But Benz and his colleagues decided to do the exact opposite. Not even implicitly did they mention, let alone address, a single one of Sanning’s arguments. Hence, Benz’s work fails the litmus test of being a scholarly work. It’s a botched, politically driven job of paid flacks hell-bent on proving the veracity of the Holy Six Million figure – despite Benz’s claim to the contrary.

Hence, readers expecting to find answers in Benz’s voluminous work to nagging questions and doubts instilled by Sanning’s book will walk away disappointed and empty-handed.

This may also be the reason why no English translation of Benz’s book has ever been published in the 24 years after it first appeared in German.
Since there do not seem to exist in the public domain any arguments refuting Sanning’s hypotheses and conclusions, we have decided to issue this essentially unchanged new edition of Sanning’s classic work on Jewish wartime demographics with an updated preface by Arthur Butz. Only several typos were corrected, and I also translated the few German words contained in several tables which the original translator and editor had apparently overlooked.

Therefore Sanning returns herewith, unchanged, unbowed, and unchallenged.

_Sanning_ – Swedish for: truth, veracity, realism, exactitude, precision
Appendix

Document
Bibliography

– American Jewish Year Book, New York (various issues).
– Annuaire Statistique Hongrois 1931, Nouveau Cours XXXIX, l’Office Central Royal Hongrois de Statistique, Budapest, 1933.
– Brockhaus, Der Grosse, Leipzig, 1931.


– Deutsche Ukraina-Zeitung, Lutsk/Wolhynia (various issues).

– Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, Riga/Latvia (various issues).


– Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności Z Dn. 9.XII 1931 R.; Mieszkania i Gospodarstwa Domowe. Ludność. Stosunki Zawodowe; Województwo Wołyńskie; Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Statystyka Polski, (Deuxième Recensement Général de la Population du 9 Décembre 1931, Office Central de Statistique de la Polonaise, Statistique de la Pologne), Warsaw (various issues).


– Fischer, Dr. Ludwig and Dr. Friedrich Gollert. Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft, Cracow, 1942.


– Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, 1958.
– Kauener Zeitung, Kovno (Kaunas)/Lithuania (various issues).
– Krakauer Zeitung, Cracow (various issues).
- Publikationsstelle Wien. *Die Bevölkerungszählung in Rumänien 1941* (Geheim), Vienna, 1943.
- Reichswirtschaftsministerium. *Annähernde Angaben über die am 1. November 1942 besetzten Gebiete der UdSSR*, (Date unknown), Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, Bestand R 24/804.
- *Die UdSSR Anfang 1942*, (Date unknown), Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, Bestand R 24/817.
- *Gebiet und Bevölkerung der UdSSR*, (Date unknown), Koblenz: Bundesarchiv: Bestand R 24/804.
– Schlag nach aber Polen. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, undated [1940?].


– Vierzehntagesbericht Wi Stab Ost (3.8.-16.8.1941), 8/30/1941 Freiburg, Militärarchiv, Bestand RW 31/11.

– Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.11.1941), 12/8/1941, Freiburg: Militärarchiv, Bestand RW 31/68.


– Zentralblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine, Rovno, No. 2, 2nd Year, 1/9/1943, Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, Bestand R 43 II/690c.

– Zionist Year Book (The). London (various issues).


THE HOLOCAUST HANDBOOK SERIES

This ambitious, growing series addresses various angles of the “Holocaust” of the WWII era. Most of them are based on decades of research from archives all over the world. They are heavily footnoted and referenced. In contrast to most other works on this issue, the tomes of this series approach its topic with profound academic scrutiny and a critical attitude. Any Holocaust researcher ignoring this series will remain oblivious to some of the most important research in the field. These books are designed to both convince the common reader as well as academics. The following books have appeared so far and are available from THE BARNES REVIEW:

SECTION ONE:
General Overviews of the Holocaust

The First Holocaust. Jewish Fundraising Campaigns With Holocaust Claims During and After World War One. By Don Heddesheimer. Don Heddesheimer’s compact but substantive First Holocaust documents post-WWI propaganda that claimed East European Jewry was on the brink of annihilation. And the magic number was 6 million then as well. The book details how these Jewish fundraising operations in America raised vast sums in the name of feeding suffering Poles and Russians but actually funneled much of the money to Zionist and Communist groups. Second edition, 142 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#6)

Lectures on the Holocaust. Controversial Issues Cross Examined. By Germar Rudolf. Between 1992 and 2005 German scholar Germar Rudolf lectured to various audiences about the Holocaust in the light of new findings. Rudolf’s sometimes astounding facts and arguments fell on fertile soil among his listeners, as they were presented in a very sensitive and scholarly way. This book is the literary version of Rudolf’s lectures, enriched with the most recent findings of historiography. Rudolf introduces the most important arguments for his findings, and his audience reacts with supportive, skeptical and also hostile questions. We believe this book is the best introduction into this taboo topic. Second edition, 500 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#15)

Breaking the Spell: The Holocaust, Myth & Reality. By Nicholas Kollerstrom. In 1941, British Intelligence analysts cracked the German “Enigma” code. Hence, in 1942 and 1943, encrypted radio communications between German concentration camps and the Berlin headquarters were decrypted. The intercepted data refutes, the orthodox “Holocaust” narrative. It reveals that the Germans were desperate to reduce the death rate in their labor camps, which was caused by catastrophic typhus epidemics. Dr. Kollerstrom, a science historian, has taken these intercepts and a wide array of mostly unchallenged corroborating evidence to show that “witness statements” supporting the human gas chamber narrative clearly clash with the available scientific data. Kollerstrom concludes that the history of the Nazi “Holocaust” has been written by the victors with ulterior motives. It is distorted, exaggerated and largely wrong. With a foreword by Prof. Dr. James Fetzer. 256 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#31)

The Hoax of the Twentieth Century. The Case against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry. By Arthur R. Butz. The first writer to analyze the entire Holocaust complex in a precise scientific manner. This book exhibits the overwhelming force of arguments accumulated by the mid-1970s. It continues to be a major historical reference work, frequently cited by prominent personali-
Dissecting the Holocaust. The Growing Critique of Truth and Memory.
Edited by Germar Rudolf. Dissecting the Holocaust applies state-of-the-art scientific technique and classic methods of detection to investigate the alleged murder of millions of Jews by Germans during World War II. In 22 contributions—each of some 30 pages—the 17 authors dissect generally accepted paradigms of the "Holocaust." It reads as exciting as a crime novel: so many lies, forgeries and deceptions by politicians, historians and scientists are proven. This is the intellectual adventure of the 21st century. Be part of it! Second revised edition. 616 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#7)

The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry. By Walter N. Sanning. Six Million Jews died in the Holocaust. Sanning did not take that number at face value, but thoroughly explored European population developments and shifts mainly caused by emigration as well as deportations and evacuations conducted by both Nazis and the Soviets, among other things. The book is based mainly on Jewish, Zionist and mainstream sources. It concludes that a sizeable share of the Jews found missing during local censuses after the Second World War, which were so far counted as “Holocaust victims,” had either emigrated (mainly to Israel or the U.S.) or had been deported by Stalin to Siberian labor camps. 2nd, corrected edition, foreword by A.R. Butz, photographs of Alleged Mass Murder SitesSTACK, 139 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index (#3)

Air Photo Evidence: World War Two Photos of Alleged Mass Murder Sites Analyzed. By John C. Ball. During World War Two both German and Allied reconnaissance aircraft took countless air photos of places of tactical and strategic interest in Europe. These photos are prime evidence for the investigation of the Holocaust. Air photos of locations like Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka, Babo Yar etc. permit an insight into what did or did not happen there. John Ball has unearthed many pertinent photos and has thoroughly analyzed them. This book is full of air photo reproductions and schematic drawings explaining them. According to the author, these images refute many of the atrocity claims made by witnesses in connection with events in the German sphere of influence. 3rd revised and expanded edition. Edited by Germar Rudolf; with a contribution by Carlo Mattogno. 168 pages, 8.5”x11”, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index (#27).

The Leuchter Reports: Critical Edition. By Fred Leuchter, Robert Faurisson and Germar Rudolf. Between 1988 and 1991, U.S. expert on execution technologies Fred Leuchter wrote four detailed reports addressing whether the Third Reich operated homicidal gas chambers. The first report on Auschwitz and Majdanek became world famous. Based on chemical analyses and various technical arguments, Leuchter concluded that the locations investigated “could not have then been, or now be, utilized or seriously considered to function as execution gas chambers.” 3rd edition, 242 pages, b&w illustrations. (#16)

The Giant with Feet of Clay: Raul Hilberg and His Standard Work on the “Holocaust.” By Jürgen Graf. Raul Hilberg’s major work The Destruction of European Jewry is an orthodox standard work on the Holocaust. But what evidence does Hilberg provide to back his thesis that there was a German plan to exterminate Jews, carried out mainly in gas chambers? Jürgen Graf applies the methods of critical analysis to Hilberg’s evidence and examines the results in the light of modern historiography. The results of Graf’s critical analysis are devastating for Hilberg. 2nd, corrected edition, 139 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#27).

Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich. By Ingird Weckert. Current historical writings about the Third Reich claim that Jewish emigration was welcomed by the German authorities. Emigration was not some kind of wild flight, but rather a lawfully determined and regulated matter. Weckert’s booklet elucidates the emigration process in law and policy. She shows that German and Jewish authorities worked closely together. Jews interested in emigrating received detailed advice and offers of help from both sides. 72 pages, index. (#12) (cover shows new reprint edition in preparation)

Inside the Gas Chambers: The Extermination of Mainstream Holocaust Historiography. By Carlo Mattogno. Neither increased media propaganda nor political pressure nor judicial persecution can stifle revisionism. Hence, in early 2011, the Holocaust Orthodoxy published a 400 pp. book (in German)
claiming to refute “revisionist propaganda,” trying again to prove “once and for all” that there were homicidal gas chambers at the camps of Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Neuengamme, Stutthof... you name them. Mattogno shows with his detailed analysis of this work of propaganda that mainstream Holocaust hagiography is beating around the bush rather than addressing revisionist research results. He exposes their myths, distortions and lies. 268 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. (#25)

SECTION TWO: Books on Specific Camps

**Treblinka: Extermination Camp or Transit Camp?** By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. It is alleged that at Treblinka in East Poland between 700,000 and 3,000,000 persons were murdered in 1942 and 1943. The weapons used were said to have been stationary and/or mobile gas chambers, fast-acting or slow-acting poison gas, unslaked lime, superheated steam, electricity, diesel exhaust fumes etc. Holocaust historians alleged that bodies were piled as high as multi-storied buildings and burned without a trace, using little or no fuel at all. Graf and Mattogno have now analyzed the origins, logic and technical feasibility of the official version of Treblinka. On the basis of numerous documents they reveal Treblinka’s true identity as a mere transit camp. 365 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#8)

**Belzec in Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research and History** By Carlo Mattogno. Witnesses report that between 600,000 and 3 million Jews were murdered in the Belzec camp, located in Poland. Various murder weapons are claimed to have been used: diesel gas; unslaked lime in trains; high voltage; vacuum chambers; etc. The corpses were incinerated on huge pyres without leaving a trace. For those who know the stories about Treblinka this sounds familiar. Thus this work of propaganda that mainstream Holocaust hagiography is beating around the bush rather than addressing revisionist research results. He exposes their myths, distortions and lies. 268 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#9)

**Sobibór: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality** By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. Between 25,000 and 2 million Jews are said to have been killed in gas chambers in the Sobibór camp in Poland. The corpses were allegedly buried in mass graves and later incinerated on pyres. This book investigates these claims and shows that they are based on the selective use of contradictory eyewitness testimony. Archeological surveys of the camp in 2000-2001 are analyzed, with fatal results for the extermination camp hypothesis. The book also documents the general National Socialist policy toward Jews, which never included a genocidal “final solution.” 434 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#19)

**The “Extermination Camps” of “Aktion Reinhardt”** By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. In late 2011, several members of the exterminationist Holocaust Controversies blog published a study, which allegedly refutes three of our authors’ monographs on the camps Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka (see previous three entries). This tome is their point-by-point response, which makes “mincemeat” out of the bloggers’ attempt at refutation. It requires familiarity with the above-mentioned books and constitutes a comprehensive update and expansion of their themes. 2 volumes, total of 1385 pages, illustrations, bibliography. (#28)

**Chelmno: A Camp in History & Propaganda** By Carlo Mattogno. The world’s premier holocaust scholar focuses his microscope on the death camp located in Poland. It was at Chelmno that huge masses of prisoners—as many as 1.3 million—were allegedly rounded up and killed. His book challenges the conventional wisdom of what went on inside Chelmno. Eyewitness statements, forensics reports, survivors’ reports, evacuations, crematoria, building plans, U.S. reports, German documents, evacuation efforts, mobile gas vans for homicidal purposes—all are discussed. 191 pages, indexed, illustrated, bibliography. (#23)

**The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation** (A perfect companion to the Chelmno book.) By Santiago Alvarez and Pierre Marais. It is alleged that the Nazis used mobile gas chambers to exterminate 700,000 people. Up until 2011, no thorough monograph had appeared on the topic. Santiago Alvarez has remedied the situation. Are witness statements reliable? Are documents genuine? Where are the corpses? Alvarez has scrutinized all known wartime documents, photos and witness statements on this topic, and has examined the claims made by the mainstream.
Concentration Camp Majdanek. A Historical and Technical Study. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. Little research had been directed toward Concentration Camp Majdanek in central Poland, even though it is known that up to a million Jews were murdered there. The only information available is discredited Polish Communist propaganda. This glaring research gap has finally been filled. After exhaustive research of primary sources, Mattogno and Graf created a monumental study which expertly dissects and repudiates the myth of homicidal gas chambers at Majdanek. They also critically investigated the legend of mass executions of Jews in tank trenches (“Operation Harvest Festival”) and prove them groundless. The authors’ investigations lead to unambiguous conclusions about the camp which are radically different from the official theses. Again they have produced a standard and methodical investigative work, which authentic historiography cannot ignore. Third edition, 350 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#26)

Concentration Camp Stutthof and Its Function in National Socialist Jewish Policy. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. The concentration camp at Stutthof in Prussia has never before been scientifically investigated by Western historians—until now. Third edition, 171 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#4)

SECTION THREE: Auschwitz Studies

Auschwitz: The Case for Sanity: A Historical & Technical Study. By Carlo Mattogno. Prof. Robert van Pelt is considered one of the best mainstream experts on Auschwitz and has been called upon several times in holocaust court cases. His work is cited by many to prove the holocaust happened as mainstream scholars insist. This book is a scholarly response to Prof. van Pelt—and Jean-Claude Pressac. It shows that their studies are heavily flawed. This is a book of prime political and scholarly importance to those really known about this once again. Second edition, 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#18)

Auschwitz: The Central Construction Office. By Carlo Mattogno. Based upon mostly unpublished German wartime documents, this study describes the history, organization, tasks and procedures of the Central Construction Office of the Waffen-SS and Auschwitz Police. Despite a huge public interest in the camp, next to nothing was really known about this office, which was responsible for the planning and construction of the Auschwitz camp complex, including “the gas chambers.” 182 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary. (#13)

Special Treatment in Auschwitz: Origin and Meaning of a Term. By Carlo Mattogno. When appearing in German wartime documents, terms like “special treatment,” “special action,” and others have been interpreted as...
code words for mass murder. The author proves this is not true. 151 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#10)

**The Bunkers of Auschwitz: Black Propaganda vs. History** By Carlo Mattogno. The bunkers at Auschwitz are claimed to have been the first homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz specifically equipped for this purpose. With the help of original German wartime files, this study shows that these “bunkers” never existed, how the rumors about them evolved as black propaganda created by resistance groups in the camp, how this propaganda was transformed into a false reality. 264 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. (#11)

**Auschwitz: The First Gassing—Rumor and Reality** By Carlo Mattogno. The first gassing in Auschwitz is claimed to have occurred on Sept. 3, 1941, in a basement room. The accounts reporting it are the archetypes for all later gassing accounts. This study analyzes all available sources about this alleged event. It shows that these sources contradict each other in location, date, preparations, victims etc, rendering it impossible to extract a consistent story. Original wartime documents inflect a final blow. Second edition, 168 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#20)

**Auschwitz: Crematorium I and the Alleged Homicidal Gassings** By Carlo Mattogno. The morgue of Crematorium I in Auschwitz is said to be the first homicidal gas chamber there. This study investigates all statements by witnesses and analyzes hundreds of wartime documents to accurately write a history of that building. Mattogno proves that its morgue was never a homicidal gas chamber, nor could it have worked. 138 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#21)

**Auschwitz: Open Air Incinerations** By Carlo Mattogno. Hundreds of thousands of corpses of murder victims are claimed to have been incinerated in deep ditches in the Auschwitz concentration camp. This book examines the many testimonies regarding these incinerations and establishes whether these claims were even possible. Using aerial photographs, physical evidence and wartime documents, the author shows that these claims are fiction. A must read. 132 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#17)

The Crematory Furnaces of Auschwitz and Birkenau, By Carlo Mattogno. An exhaustive technical study of crematorium technology in general and of the crematory ovens of Auschwitz in particular. Next to the alleged “gas chambers,” these ovens are claimed to have been the main “weapon of crime” said to have destroyed the traces of up to a million murdered individuals. On a sound and thoroughly documented base of technical literature, extant wartime documents and material traces Mattogno reveals the true hygienic function, i.e. the benign nature of the crematories of Auschwitz. 2 vols., ca. 900 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. Projected for 2016 (#24)

**SECTION FOUR**

**Witness Critique**

**Holocaust High Priest: Elie Wiesel, Night, and the Cult of Memory** By Warren B. Routledge. Elie Wiesel’s lies are exposed with rigor and precision. Routledge proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that, despite all the awards he received and the huge media attention he still attracts, Wiesel is an arrant impostor who was never imprisoned at Auschwitz and whose famous story Night is a fable made up from delerious imaginations. (Projected for late 2015.) (#30)

Further projects include:

**Auschwitz: Confessions and Testimonies of the Holocaust** By Jürgen Graf

**Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, his torture and his forced confessions** By Carlo Mattogno

**Dr. Mengele’s Assistant: Miklos Nyiszli’s Auschwitz Tales** By Carlo Mattogno

Other witnesses about whose testimony monographs are envisions are: Fillip Müller, Rudolf Vrba, Henryk Tauber, Yankiel Wiernik, Richard Glazar. Any scholar interested in taking on any of these or other more or less prominent witnesses not listed here, please feel free to get in touch with the series editor using the contact form at www.codoh.com/contact-us

For current prices and availability see outlets like Amazon.com or Amazon.co.uk, and:

**Distribution USA:** The Barnes Review, P.O. Box 15877, Washington, D.C. 20003; 1-877-773-9077; www.BarnesReview.org

**Distribution UK:** Castle Hill Publishers, PO Box 243, Uckfield, TN22 9AW; shop.codoh.com
Below please find some of the books published or distributed by Castle Hill Publishers in the United Kingdom. For our current and complete range of products visit our web store at shop.codoh.com.

Wilhelm Stäglich, *Auschwitz: A Judge Looks at the Evidence*

Auschwitz is the epicenter of the Holocaust, where more people are said to have been murdered than anywhere else. At this detention camp the industrialized Nazi mass murder is said to have reached its demonic pinnacle. This narrative is based on a wide range of evidence, the most important of which was presented during two trials: the International Military Tribunal of 1945/46, and the German Auschwitz Trial of 1963-1965 in Frankfurt. The late Wilhelm Stäglich, until the mid-1970s a German judge, has so far been the only legal expert to critically analyze this evidence. His research reveals the incredibly scandalous way in which the Allied victors and later the German judicial authorities bent and broke the law in order to come to politically foregone conclusions. Stäglich also exposes the shockingly superficial way in which historians are dealing with the many incongruities and discrepancies of the historical record. Second, corrected and slightly revised edition with a new preface and epilogue.

422 pp., 6”×9”, pb, ill.

P. Angel, J. Tiffany: *Fountain of Fairytales: A Scholarly Romp Through the Old Testament*

Some say the Old Testament is a collection of valuable parables with no basis in historical fact, while others have made a living of trying to prove that it is an accurate history of early man. *Fountain of Fairytales* takes us on a whirlwind tour of the Old Testament, telling us which stories are pure balderdash and which may have some basis in real archaeology and authentic history. And also which tales seem to have been borrowed from other primary cultural sources including the Egyptians. If you want proof the entire Bible is a faithful transcription of the word of God – straight from mouth to Jewish scribe’s pen – read no further, for this book is more of a light-hearted yet scholarly tour of the Old Testament, not a dense religio-historical treatise. If you’re ready for a tour of the Old Testament like none other, get a copy of *Fountain of Fairytales*.

178 pp. pb, 5.5”×8.5”

Abdallah Melaouhi, *Rudolf Hess. His Betrayal and Murder*

In May 1941, Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s right-hand man, flew to England to make peace. His plane crashed, and he was made a prisoner of the Allies and kept in solitary confinement nearly the rest of his life. What truths about the war did Hess possess that were of such danger? The author worked as a male nurse caring for Rudolf Hess from 1982 until his death in 1987 at the Allied Prison in Berlin. Minutes after the murder he was called to the prison. Ask by the author what had happened, an unknown U.S. soldier replied: “The pig is finished; you won’t have to work a night shift any longer.” What he experienced there, minutely described in this book, proves beyond doubt that Mr. Hess was strangled to death by his Anglo-Saxon captors.

300 pp. pb, 6”×9”, ill.

Curtis B. Dall, *FDR: My Exploited Father-in-Law*

The author was FDR’s son-in-law and spent much time in the White House. He had an insider’s view of who came to see FDR and Eleanor and how often. Dall also was a Wall Street banker and knew the tricks and tactics the financial predators use to deceive the public. The book is loaded with personal anecdotes of the people Dall met during his life. This included such notables as Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, Bernard Baruch, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Harry Dexter White, the Warburgs, Rothschilds, and more. Dall views the stock market crash of October 1929 as “the calculated shearing of the public triggered by the sudden shortage of call money in the New York money market.” He views the Federal Reserve and their globalist cheerleaders as being against the interests of Americans. They plan and execute the wars that line their pockets and ravage the world. Dall portrays FDR as a man who began his career as an optimistic ladder-climber and ended up as one of the most manipulated presidents in U.S. history. Reprint with a foreword by Willis A. Carto.

298 pp., 5.5”×8.5”, pb
Herbert L. Brown, *The Devil’s Handiwork. A Victim’s View of “Allied” War Crimes*

An amazing compilation of war crimes committed by the “good guys” against the “bad guys.” Many of the events covered in this book are to this day censored or twisted in mainstream history books. Chapters cover: Death camps in the Civil War; concentration camps in the Boer War; The Dresden Massacre – the worst war crime in history; the Ukrainian terror famine; the gruesome harvest in Eastern Europe; the myth of the 6 million; Operation Keelhaul; the Nuremberg Trials; the Katyn Forest Massacre; the Stuttgart Atrocity; bastardizing the Germans after WWII; the use of the atom bomb; Cuba betrayed; the Invasion of Lebanon; the policy of de-Nazification; the Malmedy Trial; the Dachau Trial; the Vinnytsia genocide; crimes during the occupation of Germany; FDR’s Great Sedition Trial; the Morgenthau Plan; the propaganda of the Writers War Board; myths of civilian bombings; the Lend-Lease fiasco; truth about Auschwitz; Pearl Harbor; the Soviet genocide across Europe; much more.

275 pp., 5.5“×8.5“, pb

Ralph Grandinetti, *Final Solution. Germany’s Madagascar Resettlement Plan*

Everyone “knows” the Germans had a “final solution” for their so-called “Jewish Problem.” But Adolf Hitler’s final solution did not involve homicidal gas chambers and blazing crematory ovens. Instead, Hitler’s final solution offered Jewish leaders the island of Madagascar, back then a French colony. In a meeting with Vichy French Prime Minister Pierre Laval, Laval agreed to turn Madagascar into a new Jewish homeland where, ultimately, all of Europe’s 4,000,000 Jews might be settled. This new Madagascar was to be governed by a joint German-French board with representation granted to any government cooperating. What a paradise Madagascar could have become, but instead Zionists insisted on occupying the “Holy Land,” where they knew strife and conflict awaited them. What was the Madagascar Plan, and why did it fail? Which world leaders supported it – and which did not? Why was the plan eventually abandoned?

108 pp., 5.5“×8.5“, pb

John Tiffany, *A Short History of the Balfour Declaration*

Few have heard of the Balfour Declaration, the history of which is known primarily to students of global affairs. What general knowledge there is surrounding its origins is usually limited to dry accounts in diplomatic histories. But here is a case where truth is stranger than fiction. The issuance of the Balfour Declaration set the stage for American entry into World War I and thereby laid the groundwork for World War II and the many consequential global convulsions that followed. And, ultimately, of course, it’s the foundation of the tension in the Middle East today that points toward further war and destruction. Here is the secret history of the Balfour Declaration, laid out in no uncertain terms and devoid of euphemism and political correctness. Those who have any serious desire to understand the sources of world conflict need this precise and candid analysis – the facts – about the behind-the-scenes machinations that brought the Balfour Declaration into being – and why.

118 pp., 5.5“×8.5“, pb

Germar Rudolf: *Resistance is Obligatory!*

In 2005 Rudolf, a peaceful dissident and publisher of revisionist literature, was kidnapped by the U.S. government and deported to Germany. There the local lackey regime staged a show trial against him for his historical writings. Rudolf was not permitted to defend his historical opinions, as the German penal law prohibits this. Yet he defended himself anyway: 7 days long Rudolf held a speech in the court room, during which he proved systematically that only the revisionists are scholarly in their attitude, whereas the Holocaust orthodoxy is merely pseudo-scientific. He then explained in detail why it is everyone’s obligation to resist, without violence, a government which throws peaceful dissident into dungeons. When Rudolf tried to publish his public defence speech as a book from his prison cell, the public prosecutor initiated a new criminal investigation against him. After his probation time ended in 2011, he dared publish this speech anyway…

376 pp., 6“×9“, pb, colour ill.

For prices and availability see www.shop.codoh.com or write to: CHP, PO Box 243, Uckfield, TN22 9AW, UK